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Abstract 
This thesis is comprised of six Chapters on US Conventional and Unconventional Monetary 
Policy and their interaction with fiscal policy, both domestically and internationally. Chapter 1 
introduces the main themes of the thesis. Chapter 2 studies the theoretical background of the 
thesis. After setting out key themes and the theoretical background in the introductory Chapters, 
the first core Chapter, i.e. thesis Chapter 3, examines the interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policy. Price puzzles are a repeated feature of empirical VAR models studying the effect of 
monetary policy. These price puzzles are often believed to appear due to the lack of information. 
However, we show that whether monetary and fiscal policy are active or passive influences the 
appearance of the price puzzle. This is because an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary 
policy can encourage private expenditure through a positive wealth channel. An active fiscal 
policy means fiscal authorities set expenditure regardless of tax revenues, while a passive 
monetary policy refers to a weak response of the policy interest rate to inflation. Finally, we find 
evidence in this Chapter that fiscal policy stimulates economic activity, i.e. it is non-Ricardian. 
Chapter 4 examines the effect of monetary and fiscal policy interactions in an international 
context. In particular, it considers the international spillovers of US monetary policy, whilst 
account for fiscal policy. This Chapter shows that US government debt influences the duration 
of the responses to a monetary contraction. Furthermore, it is shown that an increase in US 
government debt influences both the short and long-term interest rates, inflation, and output in 
the Euro Area and UK. This is through a positive wealth effect. In addition, the results of 
Persistence Profiles test, i.e. how fast we converge upon equilibrium following a shock, suggest 
that accounting for US government debt delays the return to equilibrium following monetary 
policy shocks. This may be due to the impact of fiscal policy on inflation and its persistence. 
Chapter 5 studies Unconventional Monetary Policy (UMP). It is shown that UMP increases 
output and inflation in the US, and generates spillovers to the Euro Area and UK. Furthermore, 
we present evidence that the portfolio balance is the transmission channel of UMP. That is UMP 
contributes to lowering the bound yields while it increases the price of assets. Chapter 6 
concludes and summarizes the thesis, and provides a discussion of policy implications.            
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions 
An important economic issue facing policymakers over the past decades has been the interaction 
of monetary and fiscal policy. US fiscal policy can be illustrated by the government debt-to-GDP 
ratio. This has risen from 35 percent in 1970 to 100 percent in 2013, see Figure 1.1. This 
occurrence poses a classic question: how does government debt affect the economy? In particular, 
what are the potential implications of government debt for monetary policy? Macroeconomists 
are divided on the answer: fiscal policy does not matter for monetary policy, says the Ricardian 
view, and fiscal policy does matter for monetary policy, says the non-Ricardian view. The crucial 
importance of taking into account the potential interaction between monetary and fiscal policy 
for good policy-making is further emphasised in Sims (2011): "there is no excuse for econometric 
models intended for monetary policy analysis to continue to omit serious treatment of fiscal 
behaviour".  
The standard textbook theories suggest that the key outcome of monetary policy such as 
inflation and output may be affected by the debt accumulated mainly through the interest rate, 
see Mishkin (1995). For example, an increase in the real interest rate shall reduce demand, 
inflation, and output in the short-run. On the other hand, an increase in government debt may also 
have implications for the level of interest rates. Hence, this thesis examines the empirical 
evidence on the interactions of monetary and fiscal policy. It deals with various aspects of 
monetary policy concerning the influence of government debt on the impact of monetary policy 
shocks.  
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Figure 1.1. US Government Debt as a Share of GDP 
 
Notes: This Figure presents US Government Debt-to-GDP ratio over the period 1959:Q1-2013:Q2. Data are taken 
from the St Louis Fed FRED database as detailed in Appendix 3.A.      
 
Moreover, the outcome of monetary policy may change over time depending upon whether 
fiscal policy is active or passive. Fiscal policy is active if the fiscal authority set its expenditure 
regardless of the governmentˈs intertemporal budget constraint. Fiscal policy is passive if the 
fiscal authority adjusts tax revenues to satisfy the balanced budget requirements. The study seeks 
to examine the way that monetary policy interacts with active and passive fiscal policy.  
Further to the potential implications of the fiscal stance for monetary policy, another 
challenge regarding the conduct of monetary policy concerns its effectiveness at the zero lower 
bound. The zero lower bound on the interest rates has challenged Conventional Monetary Policy 
first in the early 2000s in Japan, and then after the 2008 financial crisis in the most advanced 
economies. This necessitates the use of non-standard monetary measures, namely 
Unconventional Monetary Policy. It accounts for examining the impact of both conventional and 
unconventional forms of policy in monetary studies. This is another scope that our thesis 
explores.     
Finally, it is also important to consider potential interactions between monetary and fiscal 
policy in an international context. As nations throughout the world are increasingly globalized, 
it is often argued that domestic macroeconomic variables such as output, inflation, and interest 
12 
 
rates are significantly influenced by the world economy. In a global context, openness 
particularly alters the sensitivity of the macro variables to domestic and foreign policy shocks. 
As discussed in Gali (2008), openness influences matters in two ways: (i) increasing the 
sensitivity of output and inflation to changes in the term structure of interest rates, and (ii) relating 
the natural interest rates to global output and inflation. Moreover, in a global environment the 
direct negative effect of an increase in real interest rates on aggregate demand and output can be 
amplified through the exchange rate channel. Consequently, the interest rate rise will appreciate 
the domestic currency and switches expenditure towards foreign goods. Openness may also 
reduce the impact of monetary policy under external shocks. For example, an increase in the 
commodity prices shall reduce the power of domestic monetary authorities to control inflation.  
Hence, globalization raise these two crucial questions, which this thesis attempts to address. 
First, to what extent have international forces affected the impact of monetary policy? Second, 
does a change in US interest rates have a smaller domestic impact once we account for 
international spillovers? To address these questions, this thesis attempts to provide an empirical 
assessment of the possible changes in the impact of monetary policy due to foreign macro-finance 
variables.              
Overall, our thesis poses the following questions. Does monetary and fiscal policy 
interactions influence the real economy? If so, what is the transmission mechanism by which 
these effects occur? Are there any international spillovers associated with the macroeconomic 
policy interactions? What are the domestic and international impact of unconventional monetary 
policy? The existing literature mainly focuses on the domestic impact of US monetary and fiscal 
policy interactions, see for example Bradley (1984), Muscatelli et al. (2004), Chung et al. (2007), 
Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), Canzoneri et al. (2011), Ramey (2011), Sims (2011), Leeper and 
Walker (2012), and Woodford (2012). However, those studies which are conducted in global 
context, ignore the potential contribution of the fiscal stance to the monetary transmission 
mechanism, see for example Dees et al. (2007), Pesaran and Smith (2012), and Gambacorta et al. 
(2014) among others. Furthermore, previous studies about unconventional monetary policy 
13 
 
focuses upon the domestic impact of the policy, see for example work by Baumeister and Benati 
(2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), Kapetanios et al. (2012), Joyce et al. (2011, 2012), Pesaran and 
Smith (2012), Gambacorta et al. (2014), and Wu and Xia (2014).   
We aim to investigate these controversial questions and present new empirical evidence 
within three core empirical Chapters. The next section explains the structure of our thesis.  
1.2 Thesis Structure 
This thesis overall comprises six Chapters. The core Chapters intend to explore different aspects 
of the research questions using a variety of appropriate methodological approaches, motivated 
by the theoretical literature. Table 1.1 summarises the econometric methods used in the empirical 
Chapters to investigate our key research questions. This introductory Chapter is followed by a 
literature review Chapter to provide an insight into the related theories for the work. Given that 
we study the way that government debt and globalization may influence the interaction between 
monetary policy, both conventional and unconventional, and fiscal policy, we provide a review 
of the relevant theories supporting the individual Chapters. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the 
thesis together with commenting on the limitation of the study and potential directions for further 
research. A preview of the main contribution of each Chapter can be seen from Table 1.2. The 
follow subsections briefly describe our empirical Chapters.  
1.2.1 Chapter Three: Scope and Contribution 
We pursue two main objectives in Chapter 3. First, we examine the way in which the interactions 
between monetary and fiscal policy influence inflation and output dynamics in the US. Second, 
we study the extent to which the fiscal stance may influence the impact of monetary policy shocks 
at different time periods. For these purposes, the study applies Factor-Augmented VAR 
(FAVAR) and Time-Varying Parameter FAVAR (TVP-FAVAR) methods to examine US 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions.  
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Table 1.1. Summary of Econometric Methods  
     Methodology Economies of Interest Time Span 
Chapter 3 FAVAR and             
TVP-FAVAR 
US Economy Quarterly time series spans 1959:Q1-2013:Q2 
Chapter 4 GVAR US Economy plus 13 
Major Economies 
Quarterly time series spans 1979:Q2-2013:Q2 
Chapter 5 FAVAR and      
GVAR 
US Economy plus 13 
Major Economies 
Monthly time series spans 2007:M06-2013: M06 
Note: This Table outlines the applied methodologies in the core empirical Chapters. FAVAR stands for Factor-
Augmented VAR. TVP-FAVAR stands for Time-Varying Parameter FAVAR. GVAR stands for Global VAR.   
The FAVAR modelling approach, pioneered by Bernanke et al. (2005) and Stock and 
Watson (2005), summarizes a large number of macroeconomic time series into a relatively small 
number of factors. The key insight of the FAVAR approach is that it is possible to take account 
of almost all relevant information for policy analysis. For example, price puzzles that is found in 
the existing empirical literature, counter-intuitively, suggest that inflation may initially rise with 
a contractionary monetary policy, see Bernanke et al. (2005). We provide empirical evidence 
from our FAVAR model to interpret the price puzzle. That is prices can increase in response to 
a monetary contraction in the presence of government debt by generating a positive wealth effect. 
This positive wealth effect can induce aggregate demand to increase through private consumption 
leading to a rise in inflation.   
We also consider macroeconomic policy performance within a TVP-FAVAR method. We 
do so because over the past four decades monetary and fiscal policy regimes have changed a 
number of times. For example, monetary policy responded weakly to inflation before Paul 
Volcker while the response was stronger post Paul Volcker. Thus, the macroeconomic dynamics 
over this period cannot solely be described by a linear model. There is increasing use of TVP 
methods when considering macro outcomes, for example see Primiceri (2005), and Koop and 
Korobilis (2010). We go beyond these existing studies by accounting for fiscal variables in a 
TVP-FAVAR model. The impulse response from our fiscal-augmented TVP-FAVAR model also 
provide evidence that fiscal policy can contribute to producing a price puzzle through generating 
a positive wealth effect. The price puzzle is more accentuated in the case of an active fiscal policy 
and a passive monetary policy.   
15 
 
Table 1.2. Contribution to the Literature  
 Main Contribution Methodology 
Chapter 3 
(i) The price puzzle appeared in response to US monetary 
contraction tends to be more accentuated when an active fiscal 
policy coordinated with a passive monetary policy, 
(ii) US government debt influences the monetary 
transmission mechanism through generating positive wealth 
effect, 
(iii) US fiscal policy appeared to be consistent with the non-
Ricardian view.  
FAVAR and  
TVP-FAVAR 
Chapter 4 
(i) US government debt influences the duration of  the 
responses to a monetary contraction, 
(ii) US fiscal policy seems to be more consistent with the 
non-Ricardian view,  
(iii) US government debt induces a decrease in the 
convergence rate to equilibrium following the policy shocks. 
GVAR 
Chapter 5 
(i) US-UMP seems to be effective in increasing US inflation 
and output, 
(ii) US-UMP can generate international spillovers to the Euro 
Area and UK, and to stimulate their economies, 
(iii) US-UMP seems to be transmitted through the portfolio 
balance channel both domestically and internationally. 
FAVAR and 
GVAR 
Note: This Table summarizes the main contribution of the thesis with the related literature. UMP stands for 
unconventional monetary policy. FAVAR stands for factor-augmented VAR. TVP-FAVAR stands for time-varying 
parameter factor-augmented VAR. GVAR stands for global VAR.  
Chapter 3 seeks to contribute to the empirical literature on monetary and fiscal policy 
interactions in the following ways. First, we provide empirical evidence to interpret the price 
puzzle within both the FAVAR and TVP-FAVAR methods. Comparing the estimated impulse 
responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock, within both the simple and fiscal-
augmented FAVAR models, suggest that government debt can produce the price puzzle. It can 
be explained as government debt influences the monetary transmission mechanism through 
generating positive wealth effect and increasing consumption, consequently. Further 
investigation within the TVP-FAVAR model, which accounts for different periods of monetary 
and fiscal dominance suggest that the price puzzle is more accentuated in the case of an active 
fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy. This influences the monetary transmission 
mechanism through generating a positive wealth effect. Thirdly, the estimated impulse responses 
within both FAVAR and TVP-FAVAR provide empirical evidence for the non-Ricardian view 
on the US fiscal policy. That is we find evidence of inflation and output both responded to the 
fiscal shock. 
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1.2.2 Chapter Four: Scope and Contribution 
Chapter 4 considers US monetary policy in an international context. It explores the international 
spillovers of US Conventional Monetary Policy (CMP) in the presence of government debt. We 
adopt the Global VAR (GVAR) method which is a multi-country model accounting for global 
shocks through bilateral trade among countries. This approach was developed by Pesaran et al. 
(2004), and Dees et al. (2007). The GVAR method can be described as a useful method to analyse 
interactions in the global macroeconomy where both the cross-section and the time-dimensions 
are large in that some variables are considered as structurally exogenous, see di Mauro and 
Pesaran (2013), and Chudik and Pesaran (2014). This approach is suitable for policy evaluation 
in a global environment where the weak exogeneity assumption of foreign variables is required. 
By weak exogenity we mean that there are no long-run feedback from foreign specific variables 
to their domestic counterparts, see Pesaran et al. (2004), and Dees et al. (2007).   
We argue that US government debt contributes to the persistence of the price puzzle in the 
global economy. For this purpose, two GVAR models have been constructed, namely a simple 
and a fiscal-augmented GVAR model. Our fiscal-augmented model includes the potential impact 
of government debt on the monetary transmission mechanism. We argue that although the short-
term interest rate is the key policy transmission channel for both fiscal and monetary policy, 
under a policy of increasing government debt, however, the interest rate channel can be less 
powerful. Furthermore, government debt delays the speed of return to equilibrium after a policy 
shock, compared to a model ignoring monetary and fiscal interactions. 
In Chapter 4, we contribute to the empirical literature on the international spillovers of a 
contractionary monetary policy shock in a number of ways. First, we show that US government 
debt influences the duration of responses to a monetary contraction, in particular the price puzzle. 
Second, the impulse responses of an expansionary fiscal policy support the non-Ricardian view 
on fiscal policy within US economy. This policy shock also appears to generate expansionary 
effects to the economies of interest. Third, the results of Persistence Profiles (PP) test suggest 
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that government debt induces a decrease in the convergence rate to equilibrium following the 
policy shocks compared with the otherwise model specifications.  
1.2.3 Chapter Five: Scope and Contribution 
In Chapter 5, we explore the domestic and international impact of US Unconventional Monetary 
Policy (UMP).  Reflecting on our motivation in this Chapter, the analysis is conducted using the 
FAVAR and GVAR frameworks while accounting for US government debt. The study pursues 
two objectives. First, to examine the effectiveness of US-UMP from both a domestic and global 
perspective. Second, to investigate the transmission mechanism of US-UMP and its potential 
international spillovers. The study attempts to add further evidence supporting the effectiveness 
of UMP implemented in the US. Our Chapter 5 also discusses the international spillovers of UMP 
suggesting US-UMP has influenced the Euro Area and UK economies.  
Our contribution in Chapter 5 are in three ways. First, within a FAVAR model we show that 
US-UMP increased output and inflation. Second, having estimated the impulse responses results 
within the GVAR model, we find that US-UMP has increased output and inflation both in the 
US, Euro Area and UK economies. Third, the portfolio balance is validated as the transmission 
channel of the policy implemented. This means that UMP may cause a reduction in the bond 
yield spread and a rise in the asset prices leading to a positive wealth effect.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature and Methodological Review 
Abstract  
The subject matter of this thesis is to explore the conduct of monetary policy, in both conventional 
and unconventional forms, and the way that it can be influenced by the fiscal stance. The 
investigation concerns both the domestic impact of monetary and fiscal policy interactions and 
its international spillovers. To do so, this conceptual Chapter attempts to provide an insight into 
relevant theories to establish a theoretical background for the empirical chapters. The Chapter 
consists of two sections. First, we study the theoretical background required for our empirical 
analysis. That is the macroeconomic impact of monetary and fiscal policy and their interactions. 
Second, we review the literature on the applied macro econometric methods. Our methodology 
section focuses on the recent development in the VAR literature and their applications for our 
study.  
Keywords: Conventional Monetary Policy, Unconventional Monetary Policy, Ricardian 
Equivalence, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions, 
Time-Varying Parameter Factor-Augmented VAR, Global VAR.      
JEL Classification Codes: C4, E4, E5, E6, F5, H3.   
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2.1 Introduction 
John Maynard Keynes presented in 1936 pioneering work on monetary and fiscal policy, 
particularly to describe the Great Depression. Up to 1970s, the general consensus was that 
discretionary fiscal policy mitigated the aftermath of the Great Depression and helped 
stabilization policy. Indeed, both fiscal and monetary policies were considered as two instruments 
to achieve macroeconomic goals. However, during the three past decades up to the 2008 financial 
crisis, theoretical and empirical work raised serious doubts about fiscal policy abilities to 
accomplish counter-cyclical stabilization, see Blinder (2004).   
During the 1970s, there were greater emphasis on monetary economics within 
macroeconomics. Several reasons contribute to switching from active fiscal policy to focusing 
on debt sustainability and passive fiscal rules.1 Particularly, the seminal work of Lucas (1972) 
provides theoretical foundations for models of economic fluctuations in which money was the 
fundamental driving factor behind movements in real output in the short-run. Then, the rise of 
Real Business Cycle (RBC) models during the 1980s and early 1990s, based on the work of 
Kydland and Prescott (1982), changed the focus to non-monetary factors as the driving forces of 
the business cycle. Since then, the RBC models have been employed to integrate monetary factors 
into Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models in order to investigate the 
aggregate economy. As Walsh (2010) explains, the rigidities of New Keynesian (NK) models 
have been combined with Rational Expectations (RE) and the RBC methodology to 
produce DSGE models. It makes the NK models capable to capture the way that peopleˈs 
expectations and microeconomic behaviour may change in response to policy interventions. 
Note that, the NK models assume that all households are forward-looking and optimize their 
spending decisions. It implies that the Ricardian view on fiscal policy holds within the NK 
                                                     
1 Blanchard et al. (2010) explain that the key factors in focusing on monetary policy included the ability of monetary 
policy to maintain a stable output gap, development and integration of financial markets that emphasis the 
effectiveness of monetary rather than fiscal policy, lags in the design and implementation of fiscal policy compared 
with monetary policy, and Ricardian Equivalence arguments. Ricardian Equivalance states that a certain type of 
fiscal policy may not affect the economy, see for example Cochrane (1999), and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000). 
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framework. The Ricardian view refers to a situation in which taxes adjust to ensure the 
government budget constraint, see Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), Cochrane (1999), and 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000).  In contrast, the traditional Keynesian consumption function is 
upon the assumption that households follow rule-of-thumb with a high and constant marginal 
propensity to consume, see Cogan et al. (2010). As is explained in Cogan et al. (2010),  Keynesian 
consumers spend all their after tax income whereas the NK forward-looking consumers take into 
account any expected future earnings and taxes to optimize their spending decisions. Thus 
Keynesian consumersˈ expenditure may account for a non-Ricardian view as they consider their 
lump-sum taxes.  
Having noted these developments in macroeconomics and regardless of the Ricardian or 
non-Ricardian views, price stability still is an important goal for macroeconomic policy. The 
standard monetarist doctrine, as a popular argument developed in the theoretical and empirical 
literature, offers a simple answer. That is inflation stabilization should be a concern of the 
monetary authority with an independent Central Bank. The main justification for analysing 
monetary policy isolated from fiscal policy lies in the Quantitative Theory of Money that argues 
inflation is a monetary phenomenon. However, an alternative view argues that the goal of price 
stability requires both monetary and fiscal policy to coordinate effectively to achieve the policy 
target, see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), and Leeper (2013). As mentioned in Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2000), Michael Woodford has called this alternative view on the importance of fiscal 
policy in the determination of prices as the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). 
The FTPL states that fiscal policy affects the price level and that an independent Central 
Bank is not sufficient to ensure inflation stabilization, see Cochrane (1999, 2001, 2009), Leeper 
(1991, 2013), Sims (1994, 1997, 2011), and Woodford (1996, 1998). The theory requires the 
government to run a balanced budget during the business cycles for the price levels to be stable. 
Note that as Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) discuss, the difference between the conventional 
view and the FTPL is related to the way that the governmentˈs intertemporal budget equation is 
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viewed. When the Ricardian view considers the government budget as a constraint, the FTPL 
holds it as a condition for the equilibrium.      
Thus, the mainstream argument in macroeconomic policy management holds that monetary 
policy should be relied upon as the primary policy tool while discretionary fiscal policy can play 
an important rule under unusual circumstances such as a recession or when short-term interest 
rates hit the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB), see Blinder (2004). However, some argue that a credible 
model for analysing policy should be informative of both monetary and fiscal policy, see Curdia 
and Woodford (2009), Pesaran and Smith (2011), and Sims (2011). In particular, Sims (2011) 
emphasises that monetary policy has a limited role as a determinant factor of the price level, 
while fiscal policy has an important implication for prices and the aggregate economy.  
Given the objective of this thesis that is to examine the way that US fiscal policy may 
influence the conduct of monetary policy and its potential international spillovers, this Chapter 
reviews the related literature. First, we shall review standard theories explaining the impact of 
monetary policy, both conventional and unconventional, on the real and nominal economy. Then, 
public finance shall be discussed followed by a brief review of the implication of monetary and 
fiscal policy interactions for inflation and output. Finally, we consider reviewing the applied 
methodologies.    
2.2 Conventional Monetary Policy 
Monetary economics studies the relationship between real variables such as output and 
employment with nominal variables such as inflation, interest rates, the exchange rates, and 
money supply.2 The focus of monetary economics is to provide an insight into how to achieve 
optimal monetary policy, see Walsh (2010). Monetary policy is mainly concerned with why and 
by which means the monetary authority controls the supply of money and/or the setting of short-
                                                     
2 The classical dichotomy holds that real and nominal variables must be analyzed separately. In particular, this means 
that real GDP and other real variables can be determined without knowing the level of the nominal supply of money 
or the rate of inflation. It implies that money is neutral and can only affect the price level and not real variables, see 
Patinkin (1965). Keynesian and Monetarists reject the classical dichotomy. They argue that prices are sticky 
implying that in the short-run prices fail to adjust. Thus, any changes in the money supply can alter real 
macroeconomic variables, as well as nominal variables.         
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term interest rates. Until recently, monetary policy in advanced economies targets interest rate 
with the purpose of promoting economic growth, and with the official goal of stable prices and 
low unemployment, see Bernanke (2013). While it is widely accepted that Central Banks should 
be responsible for implementing monetary policy, it can also be performed by the Treasury or by 
a large commercial bank entrusted with the governmentˈs tax revenue, see Bordo (2008) for a 
historical survey of the related literature.3  
The earlier form of monetary policy was gold standard that the key role of Central Banks 
was to maintain gold convertibility. Central Banks also utilized their discount rate to adjust 
external shocks through the balance of payments.4 After World War I, the gold standard was 
restored, but emphasis was placed by Central Banks on the domestic objectives of stable prices, 
output, and employment. After the gold standard, the world has gradually shifted to a fiat money 
regime.5 Thus, the focus of monetary policy has shifted from gold convertibility to economic 
stability. Then, under the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, countries maintained a pegged 
exchange rate allowing Central Banks to intervene in the foreign exchange market with the 
predominant goal of domestic full employment.6  
The collapse of Bretton Woods, between 1971 and 1973, ended any connection of the 
monetary regime to gold.7 This moved the world to a pure fiat regime in which domestic stability 
                                                     
3 According to Bordo (2008), the initial motivation for instituting Central Banks has been the fiscal revenues 
managements. Then it has turned to follow the gold standard rules in order to manage the swings in interest rates 
induced by the business cycles. Although the early Central Banks had placed the primary weight on their commercial 
activities, since World War I onwards, they shifted their focus to public objectives in terms of stimulating the 
economy and to facilitate the Treasuryˈs debt management. Monetary policy in its current state launched by Central 
Banks in the form of discounting the paper of other financial institutions, both government debt and commercial 
paper. The interest rate at which Central Banks would lend based on their collateral became known as bank rate or 
discount rate. By altering this rate, Central Banks could influence credit conditions at both national and international 
levels, see Bordo (2008).                     
4 For example, in the case of a deficit in the balance of payments, gold would tend to flow abroad inducing Central 
Bankˈs gold reserve to reduce. Thus, Central Bank would require raising its discount rate. This in turns would lower 
aggregate demand and offset the deficit. It would also stimulate a capital inflow. The opposite set of policies was to 
be followed in the case of a surplus.         
5 According to Bernanke (2013), the main reason for ending the gold standard period was that the commitment might 
have constrained monetary policy in a way that it did not allow highly expansionary policies that was needed. 
6 The Bretton Woods Agreement evolved into a dollar-gold exchange standard in which member currencies were 
convertible on a current account basis into dollars, and the dollar was convertible into gold, see Bordo (2008), and 
Bernanke (2013) for further details.  
7 Bordo (2008) explains that the Bretton Woods System collapsed mainly due to the inflationary policy pursed by 
the US, as the dominant economy, to finance both the Vietnam War and the Great Society project.  
23 
 
joined with the Philips Curve. This led to focus on maintaining full employment at the expense 
of inflation. The induced Great Inflation of the 1970s was eventually ended in the 1980s by 
implementing an active monetary policy. Since then the goal of low inflation and sustainable 
economic growth has been pursued by Central Banks, see Orphanides (2003), Bordo (2008), and 
Bernanke (2013). According to the literature, between the 1980s to early 2000s, US monetary 
policy approximately followed a monetary rule, i.e. Taylor Rule, to achieve its goals, see Taylor 
(1993), and Taylor and William (2010). Then, collapses in output and weak inflation necessitated 
a fall in nominal interest rates beyond the zero lower bound.  Thus, the ability of monetary policy 
to stabilize the economy through Open Market Operations is sharply diminished and it is no 
longer possible to reduce the real interest rate further to counteract deflationary pressures.8 
To understand how Conventional Monetary Policy works, next we explain CMP 
instruments followed by its transmission channels. Then we study the zero lower bound as the 
main limitation on the effectiveness of CMP.      
2.2.1 Instruments and Objectives  
Conventional Monetary Policy can be implemented mainly using discount rate, the minimum 
reserve requirements imposed on banks, and Open Market Operations.9,10  The discount rate is 
the interest rate in which Central Banks charge commercial banks and other depository 
institutions on loans they receive. Under the minimum reserve system, banks are required to hold 
compulsory deposits with Central Banks. The amount of the required reserves are determined by 
                                                     
8 Under extreme conditions, a deflationary cycle can develop leading to a decrease in inflation endogenously and 
raising the level of the real rates. This in turns would cause demand to weaken and push inflation down raising the 
real interest rate even further. With the monetary authority powerless to stop this downward spiral through 
conventional Open Market Operations, the deflationary episode ends only if Central Banks implement some other 
stimulus to spending, namely the non-standard policy measures such as massive purchases of long-term securities, 
see Clouse et al. (2000), Goodfriend (2000), and Reifschneider and Williams (2000).  
9 Some argued that the use of discount rate by the Federal Reserve to end the inflation induced by the post-World 
War I, was the main factor responsible for the Great Recession, see Bindseil (2004), and Bordo (2008). In addition, 
the Federal Reserve policy of doubling reserve requirements in 1936 had been blamed for the late 1930s recession, 
see Bordo (2008).       
10 Open Market Operations were first developed in the 1870s by the Bank of England. Then, during the 1930-40 
decades, various types of controls and regulations such as margin requirements on stock purchases, selective credit 
controls on consumer durables, and interest rate ceilings, were utilized in conjunction with the downgrading of 
monetary policy. The return to traditional monetary policy in the 1950s placed Open Market Operations in a 
dominant position again, see Bindseil (2004), Bordo (2008), and Bernanke (2013).  
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the size and composition of the liabilities on the balance sheet of the bank concerned. The 
minimum reserve system serves two main purposes: (i) to create sufficient structural demand for 
Central Banksˈ credit, and (ii) to contribute to the stabilisation of money market interest rates, 
see Bindseil (2004), and Bordo (2008). 
The Federal Reserve moved from the discount rate to Open Market Operation in the early 
1920s, and maintained Open Market Operation as its principal tool up to the 2008 financial crisis. 
Open Market Operation entails influencing either short-term interest rates or the supply of money 
through purchasing and selling of various financial instruments such as Treasury Bills, Bonds, 
and Foreign Currencies. Having considered that the demand for money is highly unstable, hence, 
targeting money supply can lead to a large swings in interest rates. For this reason, monetary 
officials mainly focus on interest rate stability by targeting interest rates, see Bindseil (2004). 
 Thus, intervention at the low end of the yield curve has become the general practice for 
Central Banks. The rationale has been that intervention at the low end would minimizes credit 
risk, and would assure a smooth transmission of policy actions across the yield curve. Moreover, 
in normal circumstances, Central Banks have a substantial credibility for maintaining price 
stability, given that inflation expectations are anchored. Therefore, Central Banks can produce 
the required real interest rate movements by managing their target for short-term nominal interest 
rates, see Goodfriend (2000), and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).  
Although monetary policy tools has changed over the time, but the objective of stable prices 
is still the focus of monetary policy. According to the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977, there 
are three objectives for monetary policy including maximum employment, stable prices, and a 
moderate long-term interest rates, see Bindseil (2004), Bordo (2008), and Bernanke (2013). 
While most Central Banks mainly pursue to maintain these objectives, the Great Inflation episode 
necessitated a changed view on the dual mandate as the monetary authority considers the 
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achievement of price stability as a necessary condition for maximum employment and the growth 
potential of the economy, see Bernanke (2013).11         
2.2.2 The Transmission of Conventional Monetary Policy   
The process through in which monetary policy interventions influences the real economy in 
general and the price level in particular is referred to as the monetary transmission mechanism, 
see Bindseil (2004). As noted, CMP mainly is conducted through Open Market Operations, by 
purchasing and selling short-term assets, targeting short-term nominal interest rates, and the 
monetary base, see Bindseil (2004), and Fawley and Neely (2013). 
The key channels for the transmission of CMP includes market interest rates, asset prices, 
credit channel, expectations channels, and the exchange rate channel, see Mishkin (1995). It is 
expected that any changes in official interest rate will influence market interest rates, i.e. bank 
deposit rates and mortgage rates. This would also affect expectations about the future course of 
the economy as well as asset prices and the exchange rate. This in turn would influence private 
expenditure, aggregate demand, and output. For example, an increase in the official interest rate, 
under a floating exchange rate regime, would encourage the foreign investment leading to an 
appreciation of the exchange rate, see Mishkin (1995). This can induce the net exports to fall. 
Thus, a monetary contraction through the exchange rate channel can lower aggregate demand 
and output, see Mishkin (1995). In addition, the policy would induce the real interest rate and 
capital costs to increase. This in turn would encourage saving and reduce private expenditure. 
The results would be a lower level of prices and output.  
A contractionary monetary policy also is expected to cause bank reserves and deposits to 
fall through the credit channel. This would induce bank loans and consequently output to decline 
due to a fall in private expenditure that encourages more saving. Credit channel requires asset 
price changes to work. Thus, the policy would also affect asset prices, as an increase in interest 
rates would encourage the demand for bonds. It tends to reduce the demand for equities and asset 
                                                     
11 The dual mandate refers to the first two goals, and the long-term interest rate goal emerged from the achievement 
of the employment and price stability goals, see Bernanke (2013).     
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prices. This in turn would lower private expenditure through a negative wealth effect. The result 
would be a lower aggregate demand, prices, and output, see Mishkin (1995).     
Note that these channels may not work at the ZLB because money and bonds become close 
substitutes. The occurrence of the ZLB prevents the additional money from stimulating economic 
activity. This situation can motivate Central Banks to focus on specific markets and/or interest 
rates rather than simply changing the quantity of money, see Fawley and Neely (2013). The next 
section explores the limitations of CMP at the ZLB.      
2.2.3 Limitations of Conventional Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound 
Monetary policy has been challenged by the global financial crisis. Prior to the recent financial 
crisis, the general consensus was that policy interest rates and Open Market Operations are the 
main monetary policy instruments. However, the effectiveness of this instrument will greatly 
reduce at the ZLB. The ZLB can cause problem for two reasons. First, negative real interest rates 
are required for the economy to recover from recessions, particularly in periods of financial 
market stress. Second, deflation expectations in economic downturns can actually raise expected 
real interest rates when nominal rates are at the ZLB, with perverse effects on demand and 
employment induced by a potential deflation spiral, see Clouse et al. (2000), Goodfriend (2000), 
Bernanke et al. (2004), and Curdia and Woodford (2009).12  
John Maynard Keynes first raised the question of what can be done to stabilize the economy 
in a liquidity trap.13 While the liquidity trap was only a theoretical curiosity at the time, the ZLB 
has been appeared to be one of the most challenging issue in the conduct of monetary policy, see 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). The ZLB forced Central Banks to consider other forms of 
monetary policy intervention. Central Banks hold the view that when recovery occurs, CMP and 
                                                     
12 Clouse et al. (2000) report that the real short-term interest rates were negative in most of the twelve recessions in 
the US since the early 1930s. The two exceptions occurred in the recessions of the 1930s, and in the post-World War 
II recession, when deflation actually pushed real rates up as the economy turned down.  
13 A liquidity trap refers to the phenomenon when increased money supply fails to lower interest rates, and, therefore, 
fails to stimulate the economy, see Krugman (1998). According to the Keynesian view a liquidity trap is caused 
when people hold cash because they expect an adverse event such as deflation. Thus, Keynesianˈs formulation of a 
liquidity trap refers to the existence of a horizontal demand curve for money. However, the liquidity trap invoked 
since the 2008 financial crisis. It is now referred to the presence of the ZLB as monetary policy has turned to be 
impotent to reduce the interest rates below zero.      
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macro-prudential tools will achieve price and financial stability jointly, see Bernanke et al. 
(2004). However, the challenge is to aid the economy to reach that point.   
Four approaches have been proposed to reduce the probability of hitting the ZLB. First, to   
raise the inflation target.14 Second, to adopt forward guidance policy.15 Third, to adopt a history-
dependant monetary rule such as price level targeting. Forth, to target nominal GDP, see 
Krugman, (1998), and Eggertson and Woodford (2003). Krugman (1998) argues that in the actual 
event of the ZLB, Central Banks should hold the nominal interest rate down and target a moderate 
rate of inflation for some period to make the real interest rate negative. However, he does not 
explain how a Central Bank could create inflation at the ZLB. In addition, as Goodfriend (2000) 
discusses, a Central Bank with the power to create inflation would have the power to stimulate 
spending directly. This requires changes in CMP, known as the non-standard policy measures, 
on two fronts: (i) policy intervention on safe sovereign bond markets at much longer maturities 
than those typically targeted by the policy rate, and (ii) purchase of risky private-sector assets 
directly, see Bernanke et al. (2004), and Gagnon et al. (2011).  
Targeting long-term interest rate is discussed in Woodford (2012). He argues that both the 
current level of the policy rate and the whole path of expected future interest rates are important 
for spending decisions. It implies that any Central Bankˈ action that influences interest rate 
expectations could be a monetary policy tool, even if current short-term rates cannot be reduced 
any further, see Eggertson and Woodford (2003), Bernanke et al. (2004), and Moessner et al. 
(2014) among others. These policy actions include forward guidance, asset purchases of private 
sector debt, and more extensive discount window lending. The idea is that such policies could 
help to finance credit-constrained firms at the ZLB.16  
                                                     
14 There are two important issues as regards raising the inflation target: the costs associated with a permanently 
higher inflation rate, and the difficulty of credibly transitioning to a higher inflation target. 
15 An explicit forward guidance is referred to as an explicit communication of Central Banks regarding the future 
path of the policy rate, see Joyce et al. (2012).   
16 Monetary policy is effective as long as the real policy rate is below the natural rate of interest. A lower natural 
rate makes hitting the ZLB more likely, since smaller shocks are sufficient to push the optimal policy rate to negative 
levels. This makes the ZLB an unlikely immediate issue in emerging markets with their higher inflation and natural 
rates where monetary policy challenges are mostly related to structural and institutional issues. Advanced economies, 
however, with their lower natural rates may face the ZLB more frequently. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis may be 
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Thus, at the ZLB, Central Banks must switch from short-term interest rate target to non-
standard policy measures with the goal of influencing longer-term rates. Longer-term yields are 
determined mainly by two components: (i) the risk premium, and (ii) the average level of short-
term risk-free interest rates expected for the future, see Gagnon et al. (2011). To understand the 
way that monetary policy can potentially affect long-term interest rates, it is useful to decompose 
the n-year real yield on a bond as follows. 
 (2.1) 
Where ntty ,  is the expected real yield at time t  on a n year bond, ntty ,   is the average expected 
overnight rate over the next n  years at time t , ntTP, is the term premium on an n  year bond at 
time t , and ntE  is the expected average rate of inflation over the next n years at time t . As 
Equation (2.1) suggests, the long-term real yields may decline in three ways: (i) an increase in 
expected inflation, (ii) a fall in the expected policy rate path, and (iii) a fall in the term premium, 
see Mishkin (1995), and Fawley and Neely (2013).  
Central Banks can lower long-term real rates by reducing term premia through asset 
purchases.17 When a Central Bank purchases a quantity of a certain type of risk, i.e. duration, it 
will cause investors to demand less compensation to hold the remaining amount of that type of 
risk and term premia will fall. This can cause a fall in long-term rates and thereby stimulate the 
economy through asset price and credit channels, see Mishkin (1995), and Fawley and Neely 
(2013).18  
                                                     
an indication that large shocks are more likely than previously thought, and the natural rate may be on a secular 
downward trend, see Laubach and Williams (2003) for a detailed discussion. 
17 When a Central Bank purchases a sizable quantity of long-term bonds at low rates, the value of its bond portfolio 
would decline if long rates rise. Similarly, the value of long-term loans will decline as long-term rates rise, see 
Fawley and Neely (2013). 
18According to the expectations theory of the term structure, altering the maturity of the net supply of assets from 
government to private investors should have only minimal effects on the term structure of interest rates. This view 
was supported by the literature studying Operation Twist in the early 1960s, which did not find robustly significant 
effects for a swap between short-term and long-term Treasury securities, see, Modigliani and Sutch (1967). However, 
the recent Large Scale Asset Purchases program differs from Operation Twist in that the reduction in long-term 
bonds is financed by reserve creation rather than sales of short-term Treasury bills. With interest rates on bank 
reserves and short-term bills roughly equal, the two assets should be viewed as close substitutes and thus the effect 
on the term spread should be similar. However, as noted by Solow and Tobin (1987), Federal Reserve purchases 
during Operation Twist were small and were soon offset by increased Treasury issuance of long-term debt. Overall, 
ntntnttntt ETPyy   ,,,
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Having explained the potential usefulness of targeting long-term rates, however, there are 
two concerns. First, long-term yields reflect the expected future path of short-term interest rates 
and a time-varying maturity premium. Wright (2011) links this premium to uncertainty about 
future inflation and to financial market segmentation driven by differences in preferences over 
alternative assets. He argues that volatilities in the premium may disorder the transmission of the 
short-term policy rate to the real economy and generate large international spillovers. More stable 
long-term rates, however, would come at the cost of greater volatility at the short end. Second, 
there is the risk of fiscal dominance. It may be perceived by agents that purchasing bonds 
subordinates monetary policy to ensure financing the Treasury.19  
Note that a monetary policy intervention that perceived to be long-lived may have 
expansionary fiscal effects. Indeed, as long as market participants expect a positive short-term 
interest rate at some point in the future, the existence of government debt implies a current or 
future tax liability for the public. When the Central Bank expands its balance sheet by open-
market purchases, it replaces public holdings of interest-bearing government debt with 
noninterest-bearing currency or reserves. If the increase in the monetary base is expected to 
persist, then the expected interest costs of the government debt, and hence, the publicˈs expected 
tax burden would decline, see Bernanke and Reinhart (2004). As Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) 
explain, the expectational and fiscal channels of the non-standard policy measures require a 
credible commitment by the Central Bank that lasts until certain conditions are met. 
Having discussed CMP and its limitations, the next section studies UMP instruments and 
the way that unconventional monetary measures take effect.  
                                                     
there was little movement in the average maturity of Treasury debt held by the public and thus little hope of 
estimating a statistically significant and robust effect, see Gagnon et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion.  
19 A prolonged public debt may implies that the Central Bank is willing to keep sovereign rates low to reduce the 
real value of public debt. Thus, targeting short-term rates does not necessarily protect policy from fiscal dominance, 
as Central Banks could erode the real value of public debt by allowing inflation to rise, although this effect could be 
mitigated by higher market yields for long-term bonds. This makes the argument of switching to long-term interest 
rates as monetary policy tool to seem plausible. However, at present, there is insufficient theoretical or empirical 
work to conclude that the benefits outweigh the costs and that the operational hurdles can be overcome, see Bayoumi 
et al. (2014). 
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2.3 Unconventional Monetary Policy   
The 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath of the worst global recession since the 1930s pose a 
number of challenges for Conventional Monetary Policy. The proposed policy alternative namely 
Unconventional Monetary Policy (UMP) can take several forms. The more common form of 
UMP involve a massive expansion of Central Banksˈ balance sheets in order to influence interest 
rates other than the usual short-term official rates.20 For instance, the Federal Reserve 
implemented policies known as Credit Easing (CE) when they purchased Mortgage-Backed 
securities. The purchase of these assets expands Central Banksˈ balance sheet. It can also provide 
liquidity to market facilitating lower mortgage interest rates directly, see Joyce et al. (2012).21  
This section studies UMP measures. First, we study the theoretical background for UMP 
instruments, and the way that they differ from CMP. Then we briefly explain UMP transmission 
mechanism, followed by addressing some of the limitations of UMP.      
2.3.1 The Theory of Unconventional Monetary Measures  
UMP can mainly be implemented in three ways. First, to adopt forward guidance policies in order 
to shape public expectations about the future course of interest rates, namely signaling. Second, 
to increase the size of the Central Bankˈs balance sheet, namely Credit Easing (CE). Third, to 
alter the composition of the Central Bankˈs balance sheet through large-scale asset purchases, 
namely Quantitative Easing (QE), see Bernanke et al. (2004), Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. 
(2011, 2012), and Woodford (2012).22 We now continue to explain these UMP instruments as 
follows. 
 
                                                     
20 As discussed in Joyce et al. (2012) in some cases, for instance Denmark, UMP involves the use of negative interest 
rates. Other unconventional measures include suspension or changes to inflation targets. 
21 Some studies compare US-UMP with "Operation Twist", which was implemented in 1961, conclude that there is 
not much difference between these two. In Operation Twist, the Federal Reserve sold short-term government bonds 
to buy long-term bonds. Because its sales and purchases were of equal amount, the Central Banksˈ balance sheet 
stayed unaffected. However, as Joyce et al. (2012) discuss, the purchase of long-term bonds induced the price of 
bonds to increase and lowered long-term interest rates.  
22 The assets side of the balance sheet of a Central Bank usually consists of domestic government debt, domestic 
private sector debt, and foreign exchange reserves including gold. The principal category on the liabilities side is 
base money, i.e. bank notes, and non-cash reserves that banks hold with the Central Bank, see Chadha and Holly 
(2011), and Chudha et al. (2012) for a detailed description of Central Banksˈ balance sheet. 
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Forward Guidance  
According to standard macroeconomic theory, peopleˈs expectations about future policy are a 
critical aspect of the way in which monetary policy decisions affect the economy.23 As Equation 
(2.1) suggests the price and yield of long-term assets depend on expectations about the future 
path of short-term rates. In particular, risk and liquidity premiums held constant, signaling that 
short-term rates will be kept low can induce a reduction in long-term bond yields and a fall in the 
price of equities, see Bernanke et al. (2004). 
For example, in the absence of any change in expectations about short-term interest rates in 
the future, the level of the overnight rate would not greatly affect spending decisions. It is instead 
the anticipated path of short-term rates as well as longer-term interest rates, the exchange rate, 
and other asset prices, that are a more important determinant of expenditure decisions, see 
Woodford (2012). The crucial role of expectations on the conduct of monetary policy can be 
found under historical approaches to monetary policy, although it may not involve much Central 
Bank communication before, see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). Indeed, as Woodford (2012) 
explains, CMP through policy rate decisions should attribute mainly to the fact that a change in 
the current policy rate would have implications for the forward path of interest rates as well, even 
if the Central Bank did not explicitly comment on this.24 
It follows from this view that, even when the current policy rate is constrained by the ZLB, 
a variety of different short-run outcomes for the economy should remain possible, depending on 
what is expected about future policy. Theory implies that expectations about future policy matters 
even more at the lower bound as it may continue to constrain policy for several more quarters. 
                                                     
23 The crucial role of expectations for the conduct of monetary policy in normal times as well as at the ZLB, has 
been discussed in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). Within a theoretical model, they obtain solid results suggesting 
that shaping the interest rate expectations of the public is a key monetary policy tool not only when the ZLB binds, 
but also under normal circumstances as well. 
24 Communication by the Central Bank may affect expectations of the path of expected interest rates. As discussed 
in Moessner (2014) communication by the Central Bank is generally relevant for the formation of interest rate 
expectations. Consequently, even when the policy rate can no longer be reduced, the Central Bank can still influence 
long-term interest rates through this expectations channel, see Bernanke and Reinhart (2004). Eggertson and 
Woodford (2003) show that by committing to future monetary accommodation at the ZLB, the Central Bank can 
circumvent the ZLB to be binding.  
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The reason is that an expectation of a fixed nominal interest rate for several quarters, makes 
interest rates insensitive to the aggregate condition over that interval. This creates incentives for 
a greater expenditure inducing prices to increase, see Woodford (2012). If the situation is 
expected to persist for some time, the effect should amplified. Hence, when the ZLB is expected 
to be a binding constraint for some time, the expectations about the conduct of future monetary 
policy can have a large effect on current economic conditions.  
The extent of the influence depends on the way that shift in expectations about future 
condition would influence current expenditure, see Woodford (2012). As discussed in Woodford 
(2012), two conditions should be met to achieve the policy objects: (i) having an explicit forward 
guidance by the Central Bank, and (ii) stating the commitment in an unambiguous way. 
Credit Easing and Quantitative Easing  
Credit Easing entails an expansion of the Central Bankˈs balance sheet to reduce specific interest 
rates and does not alter the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet, see Lenza et al. 
(2010), and Fawley and Neely (2013). It means that the portfolio of assets held by Central Banks 
is constant without any changes in the asset types. Thus, the increase in the monetary base 
induced by the expansion of the balance sheet is reflected in an accumulation of Central Bank 
reserves, see Lenza et al. (2010), Woodford (2012), and Fawley and Neely (2013).  
On the other hand, Quantitative Easing describes any policy that unusually increases the 
size of Central Bank liabilities, currency and bank reserves, particularly at the ZLB, see Lenza et 
al. (2010), and Fawley and Neely (2013). Under a pure QE, the focus of policy is the quantity of 
bank reserves, which are liabilities of a Central Bank, and the composition of loans and securities 
on the asset side of the Central Bankˈs balance sheet, see Fawley and Neely (2013).25 
                                                     
25 Both the Bank of Japan in the early 2000s, and the Bank of England in the recent financial crisis explicitly 
described their objectives as expanding bank reserves that is QE. The Bank of England described its policy in this 
manner even though its purchases of medium and long-term bonds would tend to reduce the corresponding interest 
rates. The European Central Bank and Bank of Japan have recently initiated lending programs that could also be 
considered pure QE in the sense that they targeted reserves and typically accepted a wide range of assets as collateral, 
see Fawley and Neely (2013). 
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The comparison of CE and QE is controversial. Some argue that CE can entail QE but it 
specifically targets interest rates. For example, as explained in Fawley and Neely (2013), Ben 
Bernanke considers the Federal Reserveˈs Large Scale Asset Purchases as CE since it targets to 
improve the functioning of long-term bond markets and to decrease long-term interest rates rather 
than simply increase the monetary base. Alternatively, Woodford (2012) distinguishes between 
CE and QE on the basis of an increase in base money associated with policy interventions. He 
defines an UMP as pure QE if there are substantial changes in liabilities column of Central Bank 
balance sheet, while any changes in the size of the balance sheet may refer to CE even if it 
successfully influences long-term interest rates. Finally, according to Lenza et al. (2010), non-
conventional policies can be considered as CE until the failure of Lehman. Thereafter, the Central 
Bank balance sheets expanded strongly even as the composition of the asset side continued to 
evolve, implying a combination of both QE and CE. 
Having noted the difference between CE and QE, however, the most high-profile form of 
UMP has been QE. Quantitative Easing was urged upon and applied by the Bank of Japan after 
it had reduced its target for the overnight interest rate essentially to zero, to deal with the bursting 
of the real estate bubble and the deflationary pressures that followed since the late 1990s, see 
Borio and Disyatat (2010), Joyce et al. (2012), Woodford (2012), and Bayoumi et al. (2014). 
With interest rates at the ZLB, the Bank of Japan aimed to purchase government securities from 
the banking sector and thereby to increase the level of cash reserves, the banks held in the system. 
The hope was that by targeting a high level of reserves, eventually this would facilitate lending 
to the broader economy that can induce asset prices to increase and remove deflationary forces. 
However, it appeared that the policy was ineffective as prices continued to fall, and economic 
activity remained sluggish, see Woodford (2012). The Central Banks of the US, the Euro Area, 
and the UK have all followed Japan in adopting UMP that have led to a substantial increases in 
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their balance sheets, see Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2011, 2012), Kapetanios et al. (2012), 
and Woodford (2012).26  
The objective of QE is to support aggregate economic activity in periods when the short-
term nominal interest rate is constraint at the ZLB. The general idea is that asset purchases operate 
directly on different segments of the yield curve and reduce interest rates at different maturities 
while the short-term rate is at zero, see Chen et al. (2012).  
The mechanism of affecting the long-term interest rate through QE can be explained as 
follows. When non-banking private sector sell their long-dated government bonds, their holding 
of these assets falls. The Central Bank, credits the bank account of the asset sellers rather than 
printing currency. In fact, the Central Bank finances the purchases through issuing base money 
in the form of reserves held by commercial banks, which expands its own balance sheet, see 
Bowdler and Radia (2012). Thus, QE increase both bank deposits and broad money. This 
expansion in the balance sheet of both the Central Bank and the banking sector can lead to a 
portfolio rebalancing that induces long-term interest rates to fall.  
Furthermore, Central Banks purchases of long-term government securities can lead to an 
increase in the monetary base. This would influence the market prices of the securities being 
purchased and the other assetˈs prices through portfolio-balance channel until the economy starts 
its expansion through increasing aggregate expenditure. For the policy to take effect, the relative 
prices of the assets is required to change encouraging private holder of the assets to rebalance 
their portfolios accordingly, see Joyce et al. (2011, 2012). 
In order for such an effect to exist, assets must be imperfect substitutes for one another, see 
Bernanke et al. (2004), and Woodford (2012). Woodford (2012) argues that when the short-term 
interest rates are at the ZLB, a Central Bank exchange of very short-maturity Treasury bills for 
overnight balances at the Central Bank should have little consequence. Thus, the instruments 
                                                     
26 Note that there are significant differences between the UMP implemented in Japan and those of the above-
mentioned Central Banks. For an overview and taxonomy of the various UMP measures taken by these Central 
Banks during the crisis, see for example, Borio and Disyatat (2010), and Gambacorta et al. (2014).  
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being exchanged are close to being perfect substitutes. However, this should not be equally true 
when Central Bank purchases other types of assets with longer-maturity Treasury securities.27 
In addition, Curdia and Woodford (2009) within a NK framework, argue that the 
effectiveness of QE is conditional upon the changes in agentˈs expectation of the future interest 
rates path. For example, suppose that a Central Bank commits itself to keep the reserves at a level 
above that needed to ensure a zero short-term interest rate, until certain economic conditions are 
met. Theoretically, this action is equivalent to a commitment to keep interest rates at zero until 
the policy targets are achieved, a type of policy we have already discussed. However, as Bernanke 
and Reinhart (2004) explain, the act of setting and meeting a high reserves target is more visible, 
and hence may be more credible, than a purely verbal promise about future short-term interest 
rates.  
So far, we explain the conduct of UMP and its effectiveness. From our discussion, we can 
notice that both CMP and UMP may involve asset purchases through Open Market Operation. 
The key distinctions between the two, however, is related to the circumstances under which the 
asset purchases are taking place, the purchases scale, and whether the purchases targets short or 
longer-term assets, see Bowdler and Radia (2012). Moreover, as Woodford (2012) explains UMP 
involves a direct injection of a specified quantity of broad money rather than influencing bonds 
price through variation in the price of base money.   
Having discussed UMP instruments, the next section studies the UMP transmission 
mechanism to identify the way that the policy achieves its target.  
2.3.2 The Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy  
Unconventional monetary measures may affect the economy through several possible channels. 
These channels include portfolio balance, liquidity, and policy signalling, see Bernanke et al. 
(2004), Borio and Disyatat (2010), Lenza et al. (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), Bowdler and Radia 
                                                     
27 Woodford (2012) explains that according to the Monetarist view, the deliberate expansion of the Central Bankˈs 
monetary liabilities matters, regardless of the nature of the assets acquired with the newly created base money to 
support the desired level of aggregate nominal expenditure. 
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(2012), and Joyce et al. (2011, 2012).28 Several studies identify the portfolio balance channel, 
described by Tobin (1969), as the main transmission channel for UMP through influencing the 
asset prices, see Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2011), Baumeister and Benati (2012), 
Kapetanios et al. (2012), and Pesaran and Smith (2012) among others. In particular, if money 
were an imperfect substitute for other financial assets, then large increases in the money supply 
will lead investors to seek to rebalance their portfolios raising prices and reducing yields on 
alternative non-money assets.29  
When a Central Bank purchases assets, the price of assets, both those assets that have been 
purchased and their close substitutes, may rise. This would cause assetsˈ expected return to fall. 
This in turn is expected to stimulate aggregate demand through a positive wealth effect and a 
reduction in companiesˈ cost of finance. It may also increase marketˈs liquidity, as asset holders 
perceive that Central Banks will purchase their assets at the time they needed, see Gagnon et al. 
(2011). 
The portfolio balance channel builds upon the assumption that money and other financial 
assets are imperfect substitutes, see Bernanke et al. (2004), Borio and Disyatat (2010), Gagnon 
et al. (2011), and Joyce et al. (2011). The portfolio balance channel also influence risk premia 
within long-term interest rates structure. When Central Banks purchase massive quantities of a 
certain type of assets then the nominal yield of the assets would fall due to a reduction in the 
term premia component. As Bernanke et al. (2004) explain this view is associated with both the 
monetarist expositions, such as Meltzer (2001), and Keynesians, such as Tobin (1969). 
According to this view, open market purchases of securities would increase the amount of money 
relative to non-money assets in the publicˈs portfolio. The private asset holders, then, consider 
to rebalance their portfolios. This would tend to increase the prices and lower the yields of assets 
                                                     
28 Bernanke et al. (2004) introduce fiscal channel as another potential channel for QE to influence the economy. 
They explain that fiscal channel relies on the observation that sufficiently large monetary injections would relieve 
the governmentˈs budget constraint, permitting tax reductions or increases in government spending without 
increasing public holdings of government debt.   
29 The possibility that monetary policy works through portfolio substitution effects, even in normal times, have been 
advocated by both Keynesians, i.e. Tobin (1969), and Monetarists, i.e. Brunner and Meltzer (1972). 
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if money and non-money assets are imperfect substitutes. Higher asset values and lower yields, 
in turn, would stimulate the economy, see Bernanke et al. (2004), Borio and Disyatat (2010), 
Gagnon et al. (2011), and Joyce et al. (2011).  
In contrast, if the private holder of assets were indifferent between holding assets and 
money, which implies assets are perfect substitutes, asset purchases by Central Banks will not 
affect yields and despite the policy intervention portfolios would remain unchanged, see Bowdler 
and Radia (2012), and Joyce et al. (2012). In particular, at the ZLB, money and one-period bonds 
are both assets bearing zero interest and carrying little credit risk. Thus, the money created 
through purchases these short-term bonds may be passively absorbed by the private sector, see 
Bowdler and Radia (2012). Hence, under this circumstance, an expansionary UMP has no impact 
on the economy.30 However, if the asset purchases program targets longer-term assets, it would 
affect the composition of portfolios, as these assets are less close substitutes for money. This 
implies that the two assets are imperfect substitutes, thus, changes in relative holdings of the two 
would induce portfolio rebalancing to influence asset prices and yields as recognized by Tobin 
(1969) and Meltzer (2001), see Bowdler and Radia (2012) for a detailed discussion.31 
There are at least two theory-motivated explanations for the imperfect substitutions of bonds 
and bank deposits: (i) preferred habitats, and (ii) the pricing of duration risk, see Joyce et al. 
(2012). When investors sell their bonds to Central Banks, they exchange a long-dated asset for 
bank deposits. Many investors with long-dated liabilities, such as pension funds and insurance 
companies, prefer to match their liabilities with equally long-dated assets. Thus, they are likely 
to invest the earned money from asset trading to purchase other long-dated assets, such as 
corporate bonds, to restore the duration of their portfolio. This would lead to a reduction in the 
stock of long-dated assets hold by the Central Bank. With less duration risk to hold in the 
                                                     
30As explained in Bowdler and Radia (2012) QE conducted by the Bank of Japan between 2001-2006 can be taken 
as an example of nutural asset purchases program as the program targeted to purchase short-dated bonds. The result 
was only injection of a large sum of money into the economy with no tangible impact on the output.        
31 As explained in Bowdler and Radia (2012), the QE conducted by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England 
are reported to be effective to influence output. Their programs focused on purchasing long-dated assets rather than 
short-dated bonds as practiced by the Bank of Japan.       
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aggregate, those in the market should require a lower premium. This tends to reduce the term 
premium for all long-dated assets. As the result, prices of long-dated risky assets, corporate bonds 
and equities are likely to rise, see Joyce et al. (2012).32  
As discussed in Gagnon et al. (2011), Central Bankˈs purchases of long-duration assets, 
such as medium-to-long-term government bonds, would reduce the average duration of the stock 
of bonds held by the private sector. This in turn would cause a fall in the premium required to 
hold duration risk raising their prices.33 The impact of asset purchases by Central Banks on the 
yields on risky assets is the sum of any impact on government bond yields plus the impact on the 
spread between the yields on risky asset and government bonds. Thus, a reduction in bond yields 
is not necessary for asset purchases by the Central Bank to have an effect on the real economy 
via the portfolio-balance mechanism. If the spread falls, asset purchases would affect the cost of 
finance for the private sector and potentially generating capital gains even if bond yields are 
unchanged, see Gagnon et al. (2011), and Joyce et al. (2012).  
The effectiveness of portfolio-balancing channel depends on the extent to which changes in 
the supply of assets would cause changes in absolute and relative price of assets. Higher asset 
prices should stimulate an increase in spending through both reducing the cost of capital and 
increasing wealth. The mechanism in which how a lower cost of capital for households and firms 
may lead to increase in borrowing can be explained as follows. The interest on funding available 
                                                     
32 For Treasury securities, the most important component of the risk premium is referred to as the "term premium", 
and it reflects the reluctance of investors to bear the interest rate risk associated with holding an asset that has a long 
duration. The term premium is the additional return that investors require, which is above the average of expected 
future short-term interest rates, for accepting a fixed, long-term yield. As reported in Gagnon et al. (2011), the US- 
UMP have removed a considerable amount of assets with high duration risk from the markets. With less duration 
risk to hold in aggregate, the market should require a lower premium to hold that risk. This effect may arise because 
those investors who willing to bear the risk are the ones left holding it. In addition, even if investors do not differ 
greatly in their attitudes toward duration risk, they may require lower compensation for holding duration risk when 
they have smaller amounts of it in their portfolios, see Gagnon et al. (2011). 
33 Note that as discussed in Gagnon et al. (2011) the portfolio-balance effect has nothing to do with the expected 
path of short-term interest rates. Longer-term yields can be decomposed into two components: the average level of 
short-term risk-free interest rates expected over the term to maturity of the asset, and the risk premium. The former 
represents the expected return that investors could earn by rolling over short-term risk-free investments, and the 
latter is the expected additional return that investors demand for holding the risk associated with the longer-term 
asset. In theory, the effects of the Large Scale Asset Purchases on longer-term interest rates could arise by influencing 
either of these two components. Thus, any reduction in longer-term yields has likely come through a narrowing in 
risk premiums. 
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for borrowing highly depends on the risk free rates at the maturity that borrowers are willing to 
take. Thus, any reduction in the yield curve would indicates a reduction in interest rates. This 
would lower the cost of borrowing and would encourage private spending and investment, see 
Bowdler and Radia (2012). Increase in asset prices also implies increase in net wealth for the 
asset holders. This positive wealth effect also is expected to stimulate the economy through 
private expenditure, see Bowdler and Radia (2012). As explained in Joyce et al. (2012), if 
households consume part of that increased wealth, or companies invest some of the extra funding 
raised on capital markets, demand and output will be higher.  
Having explained the portfolio balance channel, another channel for transmitting QE is 
liquidity provision to banks that may influence the level of very short-term interest rates through 
liquidity effects in the interbank money market, see Joyce et al. (2012). To the extent that such 
measures would result in excess Central Bank liquidity accumulating in the market, QE can cause 
a spread between the key policy rate and the overnight market rate. This in turn can reduce market 
interest rates, thereby stimulating private expenditure. The liquidity channel works as follows. 
When Central Banks purchases government bonds owned by the non-banks holders, banksˈ 
deposits would rise together with reserve balances at Central Banks. To the extent that a bankˈs 
reserve holdings would exceed its demand for liquidity, lending would expand. Alternatively, if 
a bank had already lost some other funding, it might be able to avoid a contraction in its lending 
or a sale of less liquid assets, see Joyce et al. (2012).34 
The final channel through which asset purchases may influence longer-term interest rates is 
signalling. Similar to CMP, the information revealed about likely path of future monetary policy 
is an integral part of their transmission mechanism. Communication about monetary policy 
                                                     
34 The bank-funding channel would be weak when the funds generated by the Central Bank asset purchases come to 
banks as very short-term wholesale deposits, and banks feel the need to increase their liquid asset holdings in the 
form of reserve balances at the Central Bank to insure against the risk that these deposits might be withdrawn at 
short notice. However, even then it may be that banks increase their liquid assets by less than the amount of short-
term inflows. However, if the money inflow to a bank generated by asset purchases were in the form of longer term 
funds, then it is more likely that the additional funds could help banks to expand, or at least to avoid contracting, 
their lending, see Joyce et al. (2012). 
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operations will influence public expectations about key factors that underpin the assetˈs market 
valuation. These factors are expectations regarding the future course of policy, relative scarcities 
of different assets, and their risk and liquidity profiles, see Bowdler and Radia (2012), and Joyce 
at al. (2011, 2012). Communication will also manage expectations of the path of future monetary 
policy decisions and thus affect the slope of the money market yield curve. In addition, the 
announcement that the Central Bank will engage in operations involving illiquid assets may have 
a positive effect on investorˈs confidence in those assets, thereby reducing liquidity premia.  
Having discussed UMP instruments and its transmission channels, we conclude the section 
by explaining the limitations of UMP.    
2.3.3 Limitations of Unconventional Monetary Policy  
There are conditions under which asset purchases by Central Bank, irrespective of whether they 
are private sector or government securities, are neutral. We consider exploring UMP limitations 
as follows.  
The first one is in line with the monetarist interpretation of QE. The monetarists hold the 
view that QE is equivalent to a shock to the supply of money. Thus, its transmission mechanism 
can be better explained through broad money supply and demand analysis, see Bowdler and 
Radia (2012). According to the monetarist view, any increase in the deposit holdings of the non-
bank private sector, can generate a shock to the supply of money. The non-bank private sector 
would consider holding this increased supply of money if the determinant factors for the demand 
of money change. The demand for money depends on three variables: (i) the nominal expenditure, 
(ii) the overall value of asset portfolios, and (iii) the relative rate of return on money compared 
to other assets, see Bowdler and Radia (2012). Thus, changes in these variables may cause a 
change in the demand and supply of money. The sellers of bonds would continue to balance their 
portfolio until the prices and yields of non-monetary assets change. This would lead the asset 
holders to hold a higher stock of deposits. Thus, from the monetarist view, for UMP shocks to be 
effective broad money must change instead of base money, see Bowdler and Radia (2012).  
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Another critic is related to the plausibility of assumption that holds assets are imperfect 
substitutable.  Eggertson and Woodford (2003) argue that while the imperfect substitutability of 
assets is a key assumption for QE to work through portfolio balance channel, this condition has 
not been met in most state-of-the-art macroeconomic models. In addition, even with imperfect 
substitutability condition, some models have no role for any portfolio balance channel. The 
essence of their argument is that if the private sector see the assets held by the government and 
by the Central Bank as indistinguishable from their own assets, then any swap of assets with the 
Central Bank cannot change anything. This argument is analogous to Ricardian Equivalence 
proposition, namely the irrelevance proposition on QE.  
The irrelevance proposition states that while Central Banks trade private sector assets with 
money, they cannot eliminate the credit risk associated with the assets. In fact, the risk 
characteristic of the assets would be shifted from the private sectorˈs balance sheet to the Central 
Bankˈs balance sheet, see Bowdler and Radia (2012). Thus, purchases of riskier assets makes the 
governmentˈs net wealth more uncertain which would increase the possibility of additional tax 
burden for households in the future. Given that households can recognize that the risk component 
has not been eliminated from their portfolios as a whole, they would anticipate further taxes in 
the future. Thus, the asset purchases program would not stimulate private expenditure, as 
households would consider the governmentˈs intertemporal budget constraint to anticipate future 
tax burdens, see Bowdler and Radia (2012), and Woodford (2012).35 
Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, QE has been criticised upon the argument of 
policy neutrality initiated in Wallace (1981).36 Chen et al. (2012), within a NK model, argue that 
injecting reserves in exchange for longer-term securities is a neutral operation. They explain that 
                                                     
35 As explained in Woodford (2012), although the Central Bank purchases of Mortgages Backed Securities (MBS) 
would take the real estateˈs risk on its own balance sheet meaning that households would not bear any direct risk in 
the event of housing market crisis. But this would result in lower earnings for the Treasury and would lower private 
spending.          
36 According to Wallace neutrality argument, in a complete market environment, the government cannot remove 
risk. It can simply transfer that risk from the private balance sheet to the public balance sheet. Since the public 
balance sheet is ultimately backed by the tax liabilities of the private sector, the risk does not disappear, it is simply 
relabeled. As it can be recognized by the rational agents, the Central Bank balance sheet policy have no influence 
on realized security prices, see Farmer (2012) for further discussion. 
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QE may be an effective tool to stimulate the economy if the government purchases securities, 
which are not equivalent to reserves, either because not all households can invest in those assets 
or because financial frictions impair investment. Thus, to the extent that market participants take 
full advantage of arbitrage opportunities, QE should have no effect on real economic outcomes. 
Curdia and Woodford (2009) extend this result to a NK model with credit frictions. They 
explain that if households perceive the assets purchased as equivalent to reserves, again QE has 
no effect on the economy. Woodford (2012) argues that the effectiveness of QE through 
portfolio-balance channel is invalid, and, if Central Bank asset purchases are to be effective, their 
effectiveness must rely on their ability to alter the publicˈs expectations of future Central Bank 
policies. He proposes that it is better to generate higher inflation expectations for stimulating 
aggregate demand, instead. He explains that this can be performed by signalling to keep the 
interest rates low for longer term. However, he does not explain how agents will finance the 
increase in aggregate demand.  
Note that in these models, Open Market Operations are assumed to be neutral on the ground 
that at the ZLB, money and bonds become perfect substitutes and any swap of one for the other 
does not change the wealth position of the private sector, see Curdia and Woodford (2009). They 
argue that QE can be described as a form of commitment strategies that provide forward guidance 
on the long-term intentions of the Central Bank to hit a given inflation target and to act differently 
in the future once the economy exits the ZLB, see Breedon et al. (2012), and Woodford (2012).37 
Another challenge in implementing UMP is related with Central Banksˈ credibility, see 
Bowdler and Radia (2012). The Central Bankˈs credibility is the extent to which that a Central 
Bank can convince the private sector that the interest rates will be kept lower and inflation higher 
                                                     
37 As is discussed in Breedon et al. (2012) the NK argument that monetary policy can only work through the 
management of expectations is not a universal result as it relies on particular assumptions. In these models, financial 
markets are complete and financial wealth is allocated over an infinite life. Idiosyncratic risk in these economies can 
be hedged and asset prices depend on state-contingent payoffs. In this case, the price of financial assets is not 
influenced by changes in their net supply, as demand is perfectly elastic. It seems quite possible, though, that demand 
curves for assets, particularly those which are issued in large quantities, may become downward sloping, in which 
case changes in net supply can affect their relative prices. This possibility then means that the relative supply of 
money or credit can influence market interest rates and so impact directly on expenditure paths without having to 
rely on pure signaling effects. It is this possibility which gives QE its influence, see Breedon et al. (2012). 
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in the future. The higher the Central Bankˈs credibility, the more UMP succeeds to achieve its 
target.   
Finally, the other issues concern the effectiveness of UMP include delaying in balance sheet 
adjustments, the risk of encouraging a new round of risk taking and leveraging in the financial 
system, concern that financial markets lose their capacity to discover prices, a too dominant role 
of Central Banks in market making that may contribute to weakening markets, and complexities 
concerns the exit, see Bowdler and Radia (2012), and Bayoumi et al. (2014) for a detailed 
discussion.  
Having discussed conventional and unconventional monetary policy, we now turn to 
another important element of this thesis. That is we discuss fiscal policy in the next section.  
2.4 Fiscal Policy 
The literature on the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policy is extensive and controversial, see 
Bernheim (1987), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Canzoneri et al. 
(2011), and Afonso et al. (2012) among others. Some studies provided evidence that fiscal policy 
is not as competent as monetary policy to stimulate the economy, see Barro (1974, 1978,1983), 
Evans (1985,1987), and Plosser (1987). In a seminal paper on monetary and fiscal policy 
interactions Leeper (1991) explains how the macroeconomic impact of monetary and fiscal 
policy can differ depending on the assumption that which policy is constrained while the other 
policy can actively respond to the shocks. Building up on this ground, some recent studies find 
evidence in favour of the effectiveness of fiscal policy when monetary policy is constrained in 
the form of a policy commitment, i.e. a Taylor Rule or inflation targeting. For example in 
recession a constrained monetary policy in conjunction with an expansionary fiscal policy can 
stimulate the real economy, see Canzoneri et al. (2011), Sims (2011), and Woodford (2011).  
While the general agreement holds that macroeconomic stabilization should be controlled 
mainly by monetary policy in normal times, recent studies about the conduct of monetary policy 
emphasize that fiscal policy has important implications for the choice of desirable monetary 
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policy, see Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), Sims (2011), and Woodford (2011). They argue that 
when there is no concern about the economy and the government shows a strong fiscal discipline, 
known in the literature as the Ricardian view in the terminology of Woodford (1995), or passive 
fiscal policy in the terminology of Leeper (1991), then monetary policy can be set without paying 
any attention to fiscal policy.  
However, there are circumstances in which monetary policy would run into constraints that 
impair its effectiveness. For example, the economy may find itself in a liquidity trap when the 
interest rates hit the ZLB that prevents further reductions in the interest rate.38 Under these 
situations some recommend fiscal policy as an effective tool to stimulate the economy, see 
Bernanke et al. (2004), Ito et al. (2011), Sims (2011), Farhi and Werning (2012), and Leeper 
(2013) among others. Nevertheless, there is disagreement and the issue remains deeply 
controversial as evidenced by vigorous debates on the magnitude of fiscal multipliers, see Farhi 
and Werning (2012) for a detailed discussion.  
Having considered the important implication of fiscal policy for the economy, and its 
potential impact on the conduct of monetary policy, the follow subsections study the 
macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy. In doing so, first we briefly explain the way that a fiscal 
policy shock is transmitted into the economy. Then, different views on the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy shocks are discussed including the Keynesian approach, the Ricardian and non-Ricardian 
views on fiscal policy, and fiscal policy at the ZLB. Finally, we explain the Fiscal Theory of the 
Price Level (FTPL) to study the potential impact of fiscal policy on prices.      
2.4.1 The Transmission of Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal policy is transmitted mainly through two channels: (i) the exchange rate, and (ii) the 
interest rate, see Perotti (2007).39 The policy initially is transmitted through the interest rates 
                                                     
38 For a detailed theoretical foundation of the discussion, see Smets and Wouters (2007).  
39 The transmission mechanism very much depends on the degree in which the price levels adjust in response to the 
policy shock, see Wickens (2008). 
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channel by causing either an upward or a downward pressure on the interest rates dependent 
upon whether fiscal policy is expansionary or contractionary, respectively.  
The outcome of fiscal policy is very much depends upon the exchange rate regime. For 
example, under a flexible exchange rate regime, an expansionary fiscal policy is expected to raise 
the demand for money that appreciates the currency. This in turns is expected to cause a reduction 
in aggregate demand due to an appreciation in the exchange rate that crowd out the net export. 
The outcome, therefore, would be a lower output counteracting the effect of initial policy. 
However, under a fixed exchange rate regime a fiscal expansion tends to magnify the effect of 
policy on output suggesting a relatively larger fiscal multiplier, see Corsetti et al. (2011).  
Thus, although the interest rate is the key transmission channel, the extent to which fiscal 
policy may stimulate the economy is highly dependent upon the way that the exchange rate 
responds to policy shock. The next sections explain different views on the macroeconomic 
impact of fiscal policy.   
2.4.2 The Keynesian Approach 
According to Keynesian view, an expansionary fiscal policy, in the form of eigher an increase in 
government expenditure or a reduction in tax rates, can stimulate aggregate demand in the short-
run by increasing disposable income and generating positive wealth effect, see Branson (1989), 
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), and Wickens (2008). This is especially the case when prices are 
sticky. Thus, when the economy faced with a recession one potential short-run solution is to run 
an expansionary fiscal policy and to increase the level of government debt. However, it is 
generally believed that in the long-run fiscal policy shall increase prices but not output that is 
refered in the literature as the Neoclassical view, see Wickense (2008), and Romer (2011). This 
could be due to the potential crowding out of private sctor activity caused by the higher interest 
rates associated with expansionary fiscal policy.     
Thus, in the short-run, an expansionary fiscal policy tends to be Keynesian that influences 
the real economy, while its effect in the long-run may turn to be Neoclassical. Note that the 
46 
 
process of adjustment between Keynesian to Neoclassical depends upon the degree of price 
flexibility, see Farhi and Werning (2012). In addition, the effectiveness of fiscal policy depends 
on the way that monetary policy reacts to fiscal policy, in terms of potential changes in the 
nominal interest rates, money supply, or policy commitments, see Woodford (2011). 
Furthermore, a debt-financed fiscal expansion can contribute to the accumulation of the 
government debt that in turns can reduce net national saving and may generate countercyclical 
macroeconomic effects, see Neck and Sturm (2008).  
The profound effect of fiscal sustainability on the effectiveness of fiscal policy is an 
important issue. When public debt is high, further increases in debt may lead to lowering 
economic growth, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), and Cecchetti et al. (2011).40 This is the case 
as reducing a high-level public debt can be obtained by either an increase in taxes, or a reduction 
in the government expenditure. However, both of these two policy options tend to lower output. 
Moreover, while an unexpected increase in inflation can reduce the real cost of the debt, the 
efficiency of the inflation channel to stimulate the economy is highly dependent upon the 
maturity structure of the debt.41  
 As regards public debt sustainability, literature suggests that public debt can be 
unsustainable if the nominal interest rate on debt exceeds nominal output growth, see Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010). In this case, the debt-to-GDP ratio increases even if the government manages 
to match its primary expenditure with revenue. This would require the issuance of new debt to 
cover the interest payments on the outstanding debt, see Neck and Sturm (2008). Furthermore, 
the relationship between the risk premium and fiscal sustainability is negative implying that any 
increase in the risk premium may cause interest rates to rise. This in turns leads to a higher public 
debt and less fiscal sustainability, see Neck and Sturm (2008).  
                                                     
40 According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) in both advanced and emerging economies, a higher level of debt-to-
GDP is associated with markably lower growth outcomes. They propose a threshold of the debt ratio around of 90 
percent and above for advanced economies and 60 percent and above for emerging economies. 
41 Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) explain that long-term nominal government debt is highly sensitive to inflation, 
whereas it is extremely less for the short-term debt.  
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 Given that the debt policy can cause a higher interest rates, monetary authorities may be 
forced to reduce these rates through implementing an expansionary monetary policy. In the short-
run the accommodative expansionary monetary policy may lower the interset rates. But in the 
long-run the real interest rate would remain unchanged with a higher inflation and nominal rates, 
see Baldassarri et al. (1993), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), and Cochrane (1991, 2001).  
Further to the perverse effect of unsustainable government debt, open economy argument 
poses another challenge for the effectiveness of fiscal policy. In an open economy, the increase 
in interest rate is associated with a real appreciation of the currency and crowding out of the 
foreign sector, see Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), and Wickens (2008). The early work to 
discuss the outcome of fiscal policy in an open economy context was the Mundel-Fleming model. 
It was capable of capturing the exchange rate flexibilities under perfect capital mobility and rigid 
prices and wages. Their model consists of three core equations, namely the IS-LM and the 
Uncovered Interest rates Parities (UIP) condition.42 Within the model, any increase in 
government spending will increase domestic output. This will cause an increase in nominal 
interest rates followed by a domestic currency appreciation inducing a fall in net export. This 
implies that there would be potential import leakages that can offset the expansionary effect of 
the policy on output. Thus, the Mundel-Fleming model suggests that fiscal policy is more 
effective under a fixed exchange rate regime while within a flexible exchange rate regime 
monetary policy is more potent to influence the real economy, see Baldassarri et al. (1993), and 
Beetsma et al. (2006).  
                                                     
42 The Mundel-Fleming model is constructed upon the following equations.  
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2.4.3 The Ricardian and non-Ricardian approaches 
Having discussed the Keynesian view on the fiscal policy and the main issue concern its 
effectiveness, the impact of fiscal policy on the economy can be categorized under two different 
views: (i) the Ricardian view, and (ii) the non-Ricardian view. The idea of Ricardian Equivalence 
on fiscal policy is popularized by Barro (1974, 1979, 1983) in the 1970s. The Ricardian view 
refers to a situation in which either taxes and/or seigniorage adjust to ensure that the 
governmentˈs budget constraint is satisfied. In contrast, when the fiscal authority set its budget 
independently without considering the governmentˈs intertemporal budget equation, fiscal policy 
is described as the non-Ricardian, see Sims (1994), Woodford (1995), Cochrane (1999), and 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000).43  
As explained, the Keynesian analysis holds that a fiscal expansion, say a tax reduction 
without any cut in expenditure, can stimulate the economy by increasing private expenditure 
through the waelth effect channel. However, the Ricardian view states that this policy is 
ineffective as the situation with tax cut is equivalent to the non-policy situation, see Elmendorf 
and Mankiw (1999), and Wickense (2008).44  
The Ricardian argument is based upon the perception that a tax cut which generates debt, 
implies a higher taxes in the future to finance the incurred debt. Thus, this policy only postpones 
the tax burden and does not reduce it. Given that forward-looking housholds would expect that 
future taxes shall rise, they would respond to this policy by increasing saving rather than 
consumption. Thus, the fall in public saving would be matched with an equal increase in private 
saving implying national saving is unchanged, see Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), and Wickense 
(2008). This is also the case with additional interest-bearing government bonds to finance debt. 
The Ricardian view holds that further tax is required in the future to ensure the debt repayment. 
                                                     
43 The mathematical presentation of the governmentˈs intertemporal budget is provided in Appendix 2.A.  
44  As discussed in Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) some argues that while government bonds represent an asset for 
the bond holders, simultaneously they represent a liability for tax payers. Thus, the positive wealth effect created by 
a debt-financed tax cut would be balance out by taxpayersˈ liabilities implying that there generated no wealth effect 
in the economy as a whole. 
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Thus, any government debt will also contribute to an increase in private saving rather than 
consumption with no impact upon prices.   
In essense, the Ricardian argument has been constitued upon two ideas: (i) the government 
budget constraint, and (ii) the permenant income hypothesis, see Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), 
and Walsh (2010). According to the government budget constraint lower taxes today will imply 
a higher taxes in the future if government purchases remain unchanged as the present value of 
the tax burden would be invariant to the path of tax burden.45 As regards the permenant income 
hypothesis, it states that households make their spending decisions based on their permenant 
income which is a function of the present value of their after-tax income. Given that the Ricardian 
argument asserts that a debt-financed tax cut will change the path of the tax burden but not its 
present value, therefore, it will not change permenant income and consumption either, see 
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).46  
Furthermore, under the Ricardian view a tax cut policy would not affect householdsˈ net 
wealth as they believe that the present value of their tax liabilities has not changed. This would 
lead to an increase in private saving as households expects that they will be taxed in the future to 
pay the government debt arises from tax cuts, see Canzoneri et al. (2011). Thus, the policy cannot 
change aggregate expenditure and prices. 
Whilst the Ricardian view holds that only monetary policy can shift the aggregate demand 
and influences prices and output, the non-Ricardian view holds the opposite. It holds that a tax 
reduction policy can generate a positive wealth effect as agents expect that government will issue 
new bonds to finance the deficit. This would affect the price levels. When the monetary authority 
follows an interest rate rule, say Taylor Rule, if fiscal policy requires the issuance of new debt, 
                                                     
45 See Appendix 2.A for a mathematical presentation of the argument. 
46 It is worth noting that the Ricardian argument does not imply that all fiscal policy as irrelevant. For example, if 
households expect that government tax cut policy would be finnaced with a cut in government purchases in the 
future, then permenant income does rise stimulating private expneses and output. Note that it is the expected cut in 
government purchases that stimulate the economy rather than the tax cut, see Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999). 
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then the Central Bank will accommodate the price of bonds at a level implied by its interest rate 
target. This would affect the aggregate economy, see Canzoneri et al. (2011).  
In contrast, the Ricardian view of fiscal policy, that is monetary dominance, holds that 
changes in the money stock or its growth rate will require either taxes, expenditures, or borrowing 
in the budget constraint to adjust. Thus, the Ricardian view presumes that the price levels 
primarily determined by the money supply in the long-run. In contrast, under the non-Ricardian 
view, that is fiscal dominance, changes in government debt require changes in inflation even if 
monetary policy is exogenous. Therefore, a complete analysis of price level determinacy requires 
taking monetary and fiscal policy interactions into account, see Canzoneri et al. (2011). It argues 
that government debt would eventually be paid by seignorage through issuing base money. Thus, 
the increase of the governmentˈs debt indicates issuing more base money in the future.47 
Having said that the non-Ricardian view on fiscal policy says that fiscal policy is important 
for the determination of the price level, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) explains the 
consequences of the non-Ricardian view for inflation. We continue to discuss this theory in the 
follow section.  
2.4.4 The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level  
There are two independent views on the price level determination: (i) the Quantity Theory of 
Money, and (ii) the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL).48, 49 According to the FTPL, Central 
Banks purchases of government bonds would affect the price levels, See Leeper (1991, 2013), 
Sims (1994, 1997, 2013), and Woodford (1995, 1998). Note that the key defining characteristic 
of the FTPL is the non-Ricardian assumption on fiscal policy.50 As Woodford (1998) explains, 
the FTPL is in particular useful to examine the outcome of macroeconomic policy interactions. 
                                                     
47Woodford (1995), and Cochrane (2001) explain that the demand for assets and changes in base money is an 
increasing function of the agentˈs anticipations of fiscal policy.   
48 Among the classic works on the Quantity Theory of Money are Friedman (1956), and Patinkin (1965). The FTPL 
is initiated first by Sargent and Wallace (1981), and further developed by Cochrane (1999, 2001), Leeper (1991), 
Sims (1994, 1997), and Woodford (1994, 1995, 1998). 
49 See Buiter (2000), and McCallum (1998) for a critical review of the FTPL. 
50 As is noted in Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), Michel Woodford argues that under a non-Ricardian fiscal policy, 
fiscal shocks should produce the same results as shocks to prices, regardless of monetary policy. They call this event 
as "Woodfordˈs really unpleasant arithmetic".   
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For example, the period of the 1960s and 1970s is a time when the government budget constraint 
was not considered in macroeconomic policy making. Therefore, it might be reasonable to 
consider that the non-Ricardian assumption held for this period, see Christiano and Fitzgerald 
(2000). 
Having said that fiscal policy might matter for the price level, it can impact prices in two 
ways, see Walsh (2010). First, equilibrium requires that the real quantity of money to be equal 
with the real demand for money. Given that fiscal variables influence the real demand for money, 
the equilibrium price level will also depend on fiscal policy. Second, the FTPL emphasises that 
the governmentˈs budget represents an equilibrium condition rather than a constraint.51 As 
explained in Walsh (2010), the standard monetary models, which are built upon forward-looking 
expectations of the prices levels, show that there may be multiple price levels consistent with a 
given nominal quantity of money, and equality between the supply and demand of money. Thus, 
an additional equilibrium condition may be required to obtain the unique price level. Woodford 
(1995) argues that the governmentˈs intertemporal budget constraint can provide this additional 
condition for determining the equilibrium price level in which the fiscal stance replaces the 
money supply as the key determination of the price level, see Cochrane (1999), Leeper (1991), 
Sims (1994), Woodford (1995), and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000).52 It is also possible that 
the fiscal autuority forces the monetary authority to finance the government debt with 
seigniorage. This can cuase a higher inflation under the FTPL, see Walsh (2010).   
The FTPL is an extension of Sargent and Wallaceˈs unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.53,54 
According to Sargent and Wallace (1981), an economy is referred to as the monetarist economy 
                                                     
51 Over the periods that government performs balanced budget, the monetary authority conducts routine Open Market 
Operations, see Walsh (2010).        
52 In some cases, the equilibrium price level can even be determined by fiscal policy independent of the nominal 
supply of money, see Walsh (2010) for a detailed discussion.  
53 Sargeant and Wallace (1981) develop a framework in which fiscal policy drives inflation. In their example, 
limitations on tax receipts can result in a fiscal responsibility for the monetary authority. This explanation places 
responsibility for both the monetary and fiscal authorities to control inflation.      
54 Sargent and Wallace (1981) discussion is based on the assumption that the governmentˈs debt is financed by 
seigniorage which means issuing currency rather than bonds. However, this source for financing the governmentˈs 
debt is small compared with the other sources. The key difference between the FTPL and unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic is that the former considers the nominal government debts while the latter relies on real debt, see Leeper 
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if it satisfies these two requirements: (i) the monetary base is closely connected to the price level, 
and (ii) the monetary authority can raise seignorage by generating revenue through money 
creation. On the other hand, within a monetarist economy, the publicˈs demand for government 
bonds would constraint the government budget mainly in two ways: (i) by setting an upper limit 
on the real stock of government bonds relative to the size of the economy, and (ii) by affecting 
the interest rate that the government must pay on the bonds. 
The extent to which these constraints enable the monetary authorities to control inflation 
depends on the way that fiscal and monetary policy interacts. In the case of an active monetary 
policy, the monetary authority independently set monetary policy by announcing the growth rate 
of the base money. An active monetary policy is one that pursues its inflation target independent 
of fiscal policy, see Leeper (1991).55 This would determine the amount of governmentˈs 
seignorage revenues. Thus, the fiscal authority would face the constraints imposed by the demand 
for bonds. Then, the government must set its budget to ensure that any deficit is financed through 
a combination of the seignorage determined by the monetary authority, and bond sales to the 
public. In this case, the monetary authority is able to control inflation.         
In contrast, in the case of an active fiscal policy, the fiscal authority independently plans its 
budget and announces all current and future deficits and surpluses in terms of the amount of 
revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. An active fiscal policy is one in 
which the tax and government expenditures are determined independent of intertemporal budget 
constraint, see Leeper (1991).56 Under this circumstance, the monetary authority would face the 
constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds. Thus, the monetary authority would 
finance any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount 
                                                     
and Walker (2012). For example, consider a rise in the price level. Under the FTPL, it implies more cash flows but 
no changes in the real surplus or seigniorage. However, unpleasant monetarist arithmetic interpretation suggests that 
the higher the price level, the lower would be the real cash flows and seigniorage revenues. 
55 As explained in Leeper (1991) under an active monetary policy, the nominal interest rate responses aggressively 
to inflation, that is more than one-to-one. In contrast, a passive monetary policy is one that the monetary authority 
sets interest rates to accommodate fiscal policy. 
56 Leeper (1991) explains that under active fiscal policy taxes do not respond sufficiently to government debt. In 
contrast, a passive fiscal policy is one in which the fiscal authority raises or reduces taxes to balance the budget 
intertemporally.   
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of bonds that can be sold to the public. If the fiscal deficits cannot be solely financed by the new 
bonds sales, the monetary authority is forced to create money and endure additional inflation. 
Therefore, it seems that the monetary authority has less power to control inflation when fiscal 
policy dominates. This will be more pronounced if the demand for government bonds required 
an interest rate on bonds greater than the growth rate of the economy that limits the monetary 
authorityˈs power to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation, see Sargent 
and Wallace (1981).57 
Note that the FTPL and the conventional view on inflation differs based on two different 
views on the governmentˈs intertemporal budget equation. This equation can be expressed in a 
simple form as follows. 
       
P
B
= Present Value of Future Surpluses 
(2.2) 
In Equation (2.2), B represents the outstanding nominal government debt and P is the price level. 
The conventional view holds that this equation is a constraint on the governmentˈs budget policy 
regardless of the value of P. Thus, if for any reason Equation (2.2) is disturbed, the government 
must alter either its expenditure or taxes to restore the equality, see Christiano and Fitzgerald 
(2000). In contrast, the FTPL argues that the intertemporal budget equation is an equilibrium 
condition in a way that under any situation that disturbs Equation (2.2), the value of P, the price 
level, would adjust to restore equality. Thus, if the real value of government debt were to increase, 
no adjustment to fiscal and monetary policy would be made to satisfy Equation (2.2). This 
indicates a non-Ricardian fiscal policy, see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000).58  
                                                     
57 When the fiscal authority plans to finance the government debt by issuing new bonds, this would increase the real 
stock of bonds held by the public. As discussed in Sargent and Wallace (1981) if the principal and interest due on 
these additional bonds are raised by issuing more bonds to maintain the limitation on the growth rate of the base 
money, the real stock of bonds will grow faster than the size of the economy. This circumstance cannot stay in the 
long-run since there is an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Thus, once the limit 
is reached, the principal and interest on the bonds must be financed by seignorage. This makes the creation of 
additional base money inevitable. Therefore, in a monetarist economy the result of government debt would be 
inflation, eventually. 
58 While Sims (1994), Woodford (1995), and Cochrane (1999) argue that Equation (2.2) is an equilibrium condition, 
Buiter (2002) strongly argues that the intertemporal balanced budget condition represents a constraint on government 
budget. Note that interpreting the intertemporal governmentˈs budget as a constraint on government budget 
54 
 
As Woodford (1995) discusses if households believe that there would be no future tax 
consequences for government debt policy, this would create a positive wealth effect and increase 
private spending. If aggregate supply remains unchanged, both good-market equilibrium and the 
governmentˈs budget constraint require that the price level increase enough to reduce real debt 
to its initial value.59  
In addition, the FTPL holds that government bonds are imperfect substitutes for money that 
provides liquidity. It means that banks can use both money and bonds in managing the liquidity 
to meet their demand deposits. In this framework, fiscal policy plays a substantial role in 
determining the total supply of liquidity, while the Central Bank through the Open Market 
Operation determines the composition of liquidity see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), and 
Canzoneri et al. (2011). 
Having discussed the impact of fiscal policy on prices, the next section consider explaining 
the conduct of fiscal policy at the zero lower bound.  
2.4.5 Fiscal Policy at the Zero Lower Bound 
Up to this point, we discuss different views on the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy. 
Another challenge for macroeconomic policy management is the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) on 
the interest rates. The ZLB changes the implication of fiscal and monetary policy as clearly 
monetary policy is constrained. Under Keynesian view at the ZLB, monetary policy is less 
effective to influence the economy, see Bodenstein et al. (2009), Devereux (2010), Eggertsson 
(2010), Romer and Romer (2013), and Coresetti and Muller (2012) among others. While the 
nominal interest rates are close to zero, the main question here is the potential ways to influence 
aggregate demand and to raise the level of current inflation and hence to decrease the real interest 
rate, see Ramey (2011), Romer and Romer (2013), and Woodford (2011). Given that the main 
                                                     
represents a Ricardian view, while the non-Ricardian view considers it as an equilibrium condition, see Christiano 
and Fitzgerald (2000). 
59 In contrast to Sargent-Wallace analysis, Woodford proposition does not depend on any particular response by the 
monetary authority to changes fiscal policy. 
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problem at the ZLB is insufficient spending, macroeconomic policies are required to increase 
expenditure to stimulate the economy, see Eggertsson (2012). 
Further to our discussion regarding the use of UMP at the ZLB, the literature also 
emphasizes the effectiveness of fiscal policy to stimulate the economic activity given that there 
is no crowding-out effect through higher interest rates, see Correia et al. (2013).60 For example, 
Eggertsson (2010), Christiano et al. (2011), and Woodford (2011) have shown that government 
spending multipliers can be very large at the ZLB, and that increasing government spending can 
be welfare improving.61  
The special circumstance of the interest rates at the ZLB can support the use of active fiscal 
policy. As discussed in Cogan et al. (2010) at the ZLB fiscal multipliers can be much larger 
compared with the normal times given that interest rates are constant. It implies that any increase 
in government expenditure cannot crowd-out investment, but also it can crowd-in private 
consumption.  
So far, we discuss that monetary and fiscal policy are interrelated and their interactions have 
important implications for prices and the aggregate economy. Now we proceed to explaining the 
way that monetary and fiscal policy interacts. 
2.5 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions 
As noted, in textbook treatments of monetary policy it operates mainly through the interest rate 
channel, which influences investment decisions while prices are fixed in the short run, and clearly 
interacts with fiscal policy. In addition, an expansionary fiscal policy is expected to increase 
                                                     
60 Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and Farhi and Werning (2012) within a NK model, show that 
at the ZLB it is optimal to commit to keeping the interest rate at zero for longer. This policy would increase output 
and inflation both in the present and in the future and optimally would trade off the mitigation of a recession in the 
present and the creation of a boom in the future.  
61 As Eggertsson (2012) discussed it is possible that at the ZLB the government spending multiplier turns to be 
negative if the rise in government spending is expected to be permanent. This can be better explained using a 
monetary policy role as the below equation: 
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demand and output.62 However, an expansionary fiscal policy may be undermined by a Central 
Bank using contractionary monetary policy to offset the potential positive demand effect. 
Likewise a Treasury authority seeking to implement fiscal austerity to ensure, say, debt is 
sustainable, may undermine an expansionary monetary policy, see Branson (1989) and Wickens 
(2008).       
Despite the existence of a vast literature on the impact of monetary policy on the economy, 
monetary studies often neglect to consider potential role for fiscal policy in their analysis.63 
However, as discussed in Sims (2011) the fluctuations in the price levels cannot be solely 
explained by monetary policy since fiscal policy may play an important role.64 The underlying 
mechanism can be explained as follows. Consider a standard NK model with government budget 
constraint. A contractionary monetary policy may require additional debt to be issued to pay 
higher interest rates on the public debt. This policy shock can generate inflation if rational-
forward looking agents believe that the debt will not be fully backed by future taxes. Thus, a 
monetary contraction can lead to an increase in nominal government debt through higher interest 
rates. As Sims (2011) explains, this monetary policy-generated increase in the interest rate can 
increase inflation through a positive wealth effect. An increase in the interest rates can affect 
bondholdersˈ disposable income. The impact would intensify when interest expenses are a major 
part of the government budget due to a fiscal-induced increase in the interest expenditure share 
of government debt. If agents perceive that the rise in governmentˈs debt would be financed by 
issuing further bonds or seigniorage rather than taxes, it would increase the aggregate demand 
by encouraging private expenditure. This can cause a higher inflation rate and output, see Davig 
and Leeper (2007, 2011), Sims (2011), Leeper and Walker (2012), and Leeper (2013). 
                                                     
62The short-run aggregate supply curve may be either vertical, i.e. with anticipated shifts in monetary or fiscal policy, 
or have a positive slope when the shift in the policy is unanticipated. Thus, a shift in demand curve can change either 
only prices, with a vertical supply curve, or both output and prices with a positively slopped supply curve, see 
Branson (1989).     
63 For exceptions, see Sargent and Wallace (1981), Cochrane (1998, 2001, 2009), Leeper (1991, 2013), Sims (1994, 
1997, 2011), and Woodford (1996, 1998). Nordhaus (1994) provides a theoretical model in which monetary and 
fiscal policy can undermine one another. 
64 This does not imply that monetary policy shocks as a substantial factor in determining the price level can be ruled-
out. It indicates that monetary shocks may not be the dominant factor, see Sims (2011).    
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Sims (2011) argues that a debt-financed fiscal expansion, may account for volatility in US 
inflation over the 1960-1980. He discusses that an expansionary fiscal policy shock under an 
active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy coordination may contribute to increasing the 
price level. Accordingly, he strongly suggests that the econometric models intended to analyse 
monetary policy outcome entirely should explicitly account for the fiscal stance given that fiscal 
policy can be a primary source for changes in the inflation rate.  
The literature on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies explains that 
alternative macroeconomic policy coordination may yield different policy outcomes.65,66 An 
active monetary policy and a passive fiscal policy can be described in the form of aggressive 
response of monetary policy to current inflation while fiscal policy adjusts taxes sufficiently in 
response to government debt. This combination produces the conventional outcome that inflation 
is always a monetary phenomenon while tax policy ensures sustainability of government debt. 
In the case of an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy, both prices and money 
growth will increase while the monetary authority is forced to accommodate this shock, see 
Canzoneri et al. (2011), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), and Leeper and Walker (2012). Under 
this policy management, the fiscal authority sets its expenditure without taking into account the 
balanced budget requirements, which is tax revenues are not sufficient to finance the 
expenditures, and seigniorage must adjust to ensure that the governmentˈs budget constraint is 
satisfied. It implies that monetary policy must adjust to deliver the level of seigniorage required 
to balance the governmentˈs budget. Thus, as Walsh (2010) explains fiscal policy can alter the 
money supply and influences price levels.  
                                                     
65 There are three possible combinations of macroeconomic policy: (i) conventional combination in the form of an 
active monetary policy and a passive fiscal policy, (ii) a combination of a passive monetary policy and an active 
fiscal policy which mostly is described as the FTPL, and (iii) an unified monetary and fiscal policy in the form of 
either passive or active that generate unstable equilibrium, see Leeper (1991), and Canzoneri et al. (2011).   
66 Monetary and fiscal policy interactions can be either complementary or substitutive. They interact as substitutes 
when a monetary expansion is matched with a fiscal contraction and vice versa. For example, if the fiscal authority 
raises tax rates or cuts spending, then the monetary authority reacts to it by lowering the policy rates and vice versa. 
If they act as complements, both monetary and fiscal policy are either expansionary or contractionay, see Muscatelli 
et al. (2004). 
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Note that monetary policy has been switched to passive mainly when the concern of 
monetary policy moves away from inflation stabilization toward other issues such as output 
stabilization or financial crisis mitigation. In these circumstances monetary policy weakly adjusts 
the nominal interest rates in response to inflation, see Leeper and Walker (2012). However, the 
motivation for implementing an active fiscal policy mainly has been to prevent the deflationary 
spiral, see Davig and Leeper (2011), and Eusepi and Preston (2011).67  
Woodford (1998), Favero and Monacelli (2003), Chung et al. (2007), and Davig and Leeper 
(2007, 2011) argue that active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy during 1960s and 1970s 
may explain US inflation dynamics better than monetary factors. As discussed in Chung et al. 
(2007), and the references therein there is evidence that over this period the Federal Reserve 
weakly responded to inflation and failed to satisfy the Taylor principle. Then, from the mid-
1980s, it appears that the Taylor principle has been satisfied again.68 
Chung et al. (2007) argue that under a passive monetary policy and an active fiscal policy 
regime, the price puzzle can be explained as a normal response of prices rather than a puzzle. As 
explained earlier, if agents anticipate this macroeconomic policy coordination would have 
government debt implication, it would generate a positive wealth effect.  The consequence would 
be an increase in private expenditure leading to a rise in prices and output. Thus, inflation can 
sharply increase in short-run in response to a monetary contraction.69 However, an active 
monetary policy with a passive fiscal policy would yield a Ricardian equilibrium, implying that 
debt-management policy has no monetary consequences, see Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), 
and Eusepi and Preston (2011).  
                                                     
67 The Federal Reserveˈs bond-price pegging policy after World War II, or the Quantitative Easing policy after the 
recent financial crisis that shift the focus from targeting inflation, stand out as examples for passive monetary policy, 
see Leeper and Walker (2012). Another example is the case with Japanese economy since the mid-1990s, as their 
economy experienced a prolonged period of low interest rates combined with massive fiscal packages. In both these 
two circumstances interest rate reaches the zero lower bound.  
68 Taylor Rule, as a monetary rule, shows that how much a Central Bank should change the nominal interest rates in 
response to changes in inflation and output gap. In particular, Taylor Rule recommends that for each one percent 
increase in inflation, the Central Bank should raise the nominal interest rate by more than one percent. This is called 
the Taylor principle, see Taylor (1993).     
69 Chung et al. (2007) present results, within a Markov-Switching VAR model using Choleski identification, 
suggesting that there is a positive correlation between interest rate and inflation under the non-Ricardian case.  
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Having studied the literature on monetary and fiscal policy and their interactions, the next 
section provides a brief review of our applied econometric methods.             
2.6 Review of Econometric Methodology  
In this section, we set out key methodological issues important for our empirical work. In Macro-
Econometric modelling, the choice of model depends on the purpose of study, and whether the 
study is theory-motivated or a statistical description of data is required.70 In general, dependent 
upon the modelling objectives, four main econometric approaches can be adopted as follows.  
First, there are large-scale macro-econometric models such as the Federal Reserve Boardˈs 
model of the US economy. Secondly, following the methodology developed by Doan, Litterman 
and Sims (1984), and Blanchard and Quah (1989), there are unrestricted, Bayesian, and Structural 
VAR specifications that are used extensively in the literature. VAR and Bayesian VAR (BVAR) 
models are primarily used for forecasting. The Structural VAR (SVAR) approach aims to provide 
the VAR framework with structural content by imposing restrictions on the covariance structure 
of different types of shocks. The basis of the SVAR analysis is the distinction made between 
shocks with temporary effects from those with permanent effects, which are then related to 
economic theory. The third approach is closely associated with the Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) methodology originally employed in the Real Business Cycle (RBC) 
framework and developed following the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long 
and Plosser (1983). The DSGE method can provide an explicit intertemporal general equilibrium 
model of the economy based on optimizing decisions made by households and firms. The fourth 
approach is the Structural Co-integrating VAR approach aims to develop a macro econometric 
model with a transparent theoretical foundation providing insights on the behavioural 
relationships. In practice, this approach is based on a log-linear VARX model, that is VAR model 
                                                     
70 As Pesaran and Smith (2011) discuss, theory is required to recognize the prior knowledge about a problem in a 
coherent and consistent way. However, the formal theory must be confronted with the data if it is to enhance our 
understanding and has relevant to the macroeconomic policy. They argue that macroeconomic modelling can benefit 
from a more flexible approach when does not rely on a narrow adherence to a specific theoretical framework.  
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augmented with weakly exogenous variables such as foreign variables. This approach has also 
the flexibility to use the co-integrating VARX models to build the national and global macro 
econometric models. 
Having mentioned the main econometric modelling methods, on the other hand, an adequate 
model for analysing policy must account for a number of key elements as follows, see Pesaran 
and Smith (2011). First, the use of long-run co-integrating relations where they exists. Second, 
the use of flexible short-run dynamics to make it possible the estimation of the long-run relations 
within the context of co-integrating VAR structure. Third, the recognition of the wide range of 
inter-connections to allow heterogeneity that exist within and across countries. In a 
macroeconomic context, this requires a multi-country system involving trade and financial 
variables that provide the main channels of transmission of shocks across economies, such as that 
is used in the Global VAR (GVAR) of Dees et al. (2007).  Fourth, the wide range of inter-
connections in the economic system poses issues of dimensionality, as there will be a large 
number of variables involved. This would require the structure of the data to overcome the "curse 
of dimensionality".  
The curse of dimensionality is as the dimension of the system increase the number of 
parameters to be estimated grows and exhausts the available degree of freedom for large datasets, 
see Sims (1980).One practical approach for high dimensional inter-connected systems is Factor-
Augmented VAR (FAVAR) modelling framework as in Bernanke et al. (2005). Fifth, the wide 
range of inter-connections raises questions about the treatment of shocks. Multi-country VARX 
models, such as those that are the foundation of the GVAR model, which account for the 
international transmission of shocks, adopts the Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
(GIRF). The GIRF method which is useful to analyse the dynamic responses of the system to 
shocks, is a useful alternative for Orthogonalized Impulse Responses (OIR) that is invariant to 
the ordering of the variables and different shocks.   
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Given the motivation of our research, this section provides an insight into our applied macro 
econometric framework, which is based upon the VAR modelling approach. The VAR technique 
has been found very useful in macroeconomic policy analysis. As addressed in Chapter 1, we 
extend two recently developed VAR models to incorporate fiscal policy. First, following 
Bernanke et al. (2005) the FAVAR methodology has been applied to examine monetary and fiscal 
policy interactions and its implication for the US economy. Having considered the potential 
impact of fiscal policy on the economy, as discussed earlier, there is a potential omitted variable 
bias in the existent empirical literature on the FAVAR models. Our study attempts to fill the gap 
by providing new empirical evidence on the implication of US fiscal policy for the conduct of 
monetary policy and the monetary transmission mechanism. The curse of dimensionality that 
concerns the VAR models has been dealt with by employing the FAVAR model. We also apply 
the Time-Varing Parameter (TVP) FAVAR method, that accounts for the potential non-linearity 
of the parameters, to examine US monetary and fiscal policy interactions under different 
macroeconomic policy regimes. This non-linearity may occurred due to structural breaks, hence, 
is needed to be accounted for upon Lucus critiques.         
Second, following Dees et al. (2007) the GVAR methodology has been employed by 
augmenting fiscal policy to investigate the short-run dynamic responses of the model to monetary 
and fiscal policy shocks together with their international spillovers, while ensuring that the effects 
of the shocks on the long-run relations eventually vanish. This provides an important insight into 
the dynamics of co-integrating models where shocks have permanent effects on the levels of 
individual variables in the model.  
The GVAR methods employed enable us to undertake realistic policy evaluation exercises 
following one of two routes. The first route imposes no restrictions on the short-run dynamics of 
the model and investigates the model properties using GIRF analysis. This route addresses Simsˈ 
critique and provides insights on the macro economyˈs dynamic responses, which unlike the OIR 
is invariant to the order of the variables in the underlying VAR. The second route incorporates 
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long-run relationships restrictions based on the economic theory in the otherwise unrestricted 
country-specific models. This approach allows us to investigate the impact of policy innovations 
within a restricted model.  
These econometric methods enable us to study monetary and fiscal policy interactions 
within both national and international framework. Prior to proceeding to our empirical chapters, 
the follow subsections briefly review these recent developments in the VAR models.  
2.6.1 Basic VAR  
The VAR models, pioneered by Sims (1980) have acquired an important place as a useful 
econometric tool in applied macroeconomics. The popularity of these models is due to their 
ability to both summarize the information contained in the data and to conduct certain types of 
policy experiments, see Canova (2007). By construction, the VAR models focus on modelling a 
relatively small set of core macroeconomic variables to preserve parsimony. Thus, care is needed 
for the choice of variables to be included in the VAR analysis. Although VAR models are 
considered as a standard tool for policy analysing because of their ability which allows dynamic 
simulations and forecasting, they often produce counter-intuitive results due to lack of sufficient 
information, see Eichenbaum (1992).71  
In general, VAR models are commonly low dimensional to maintain the degree of freedom. 
This makes the choice of macroeconomic variables difficult.72 The literature on the VAR models 
argues that low dimensional VARs is likely to contribute to the appearance of various 
macroeconomic puzzles generated within the VAR models. A recurring puzzle is a rise in the 
                                                     
71 The most well-known example is the price puzzle case when prices increase in response to a monetary contraction. 
Some argue that the appearance of the price puzzle can be either due to the information set or as a result of the choice 
of the wrong identifying assumption, see Hanson (2004).  
72 The majority of VARs in the literature employ between three to eight variables due to the curse of dimensionality. 
The limitation of VAR models to include sufficient information is related to the degree of freedom required to 
estimate parameters. Increasing the dimension of VAR model may reduce the available degree of freedom, even for 
large datasets. Eichenbaum (1992), and Bernanke et al. (2005) provide a detailed discussion on the subject. 
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price levels in response to a monetary contraction, which is referred in the literature as the price 
puzzle.73,74  
In order to mitigate the curse of dimensionality, a number of approaches are proposed. 
These approaches mainly includes either calculating monetary policy shocks as innovations to 
short-term interest rates instead of monetary aggregate, extending the standard VARs by 
involving more variables to capture inflationary pressure, e.g. the commodity price index, or by 
variables representing the foreign sector of the economy, see Sims (1992), and Hanson (2004). 
However, according to Bernanke et al. (2005) there are two potential problems emerge by 
employing extra information in the VAR analysis. First, as both the dimension and the span of 
information in the employed VAR models are different among studies, the measurement of 
policy innovations is likely to be affected. Second, the Impulse Response Functions (IRF) can 
only be obtained for the variables included in the model and not all the required variables.  
In addition to the problem arising from the low-dimensional VARs, another issue that may 
affect the results is the potential changes in the conduct of macroeconomic policy and the nature 
of structural exogenous shocks over the time. This can cause parameter instability over the 
time.75 Accordingly, the VAR models with Time-Varying components can assess the policy 
outcome more precisely.  
Finally, identification of policy interventions is another issue concerns VAR models that 
may also contribute to producing the price puzzle. One proposed approach is that policy shocks 
to be identified by restricting the shape of the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables to 
them, see Uhlig (2005). According to this method, the variables included in a VAR model to 
                                                     
73 As mentioned earlier the practice for understanding the nature of the price puzzle sheds light on the low-
dimensionality problem of the VAR models. In fact, the majority of the VAR models employ a limited number of 
variables between three to eight variables to maintain the parsimony property of the estimation. However, it is hard 
to justify that the economic activity be measured by a few number of macroeconomic variables, see Bernanke et al. 
(2005) for a detailed explanation. 
74 It is a common practice in the VAR literature to interpret that the price puzzle appears because of the lack of 
sufficient information. However, there are two other alternative explanations for the price puzzle, namely the cost 
channel, and as a normal reaction of prices when the model accounts for the fiscal stance, see Barth and Ramey 
(2002), and Chung et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion, respectively.   
75 The potential structural changes in the economy mainly are induced by changes in the degree of integration in 
financial markets and a decline in the volatility of output and inflation that attribute to the Time-Varying Parameters 
(TVP) of the macroeconomic variables, see Korobilis (2013) for a detailed explanation.              
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study the monetary transmission mechanism are grouped into two subsets. Then sign restrictions 
are imposed on the impulse responses of the first subset of variables to monetary policy shocks, 
while no restrictions are imposed on the response of the second subset of variables. The response 
of the second subset of variables to monetary policy shocks is then used to answer the relevant 
empirical question on the monetary transmission mechanism, see, for example, Faust (1998) and 
Uhlig (2005). Thus, as monetary policy shocks are exclusively identified by imposing sign 
restrictions on the response of prices to the shocks, the price puzzle would never have been 
observed. Although the sign restriction approach has been found as an effective method to deal 
with the price puzzles produced in VAR models, there are potential role for misspecification in 
the explanation of the puzzle, see Favero et al. (2005).  
Having explained the main issues concerning the basic VAR models, the follow sections 
attempt to address the way that VAR models can be modified to include as many variables as 
required for policy analysing and to account for the potential changes in the transmission 
mechanism over the time.     
2.6.2 Factor-Augmented VAR  
The appearance of the price puzzle in the VAR models can be dealt with by the enlargement of 
the information set. There are a number of theory-motivated variables that must be included in 
the VAR model, but due to the curse of dimensionality they cannot all be modelled within a VAR. 
The practical solution is to employ the Principal Component (PC) approach to summarize key 
trends in a large dataset, see Favero et al. (2005).  
Stock and Watson (2005) develop a Dynamic Factor Models (DFM) to capture the dynamic 
of all macroeconomic information associated with economic activity. DFM seeks to go beyond 
PC by summarizing key information in a large dataset and accounting for data dynamics. The 
most important advantage of factor models is that a small number of factors extracted from the 
dataset can represent the main driving forces in a large set of cross-sectional data. As discussed 
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in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2010), their constructed factor model outperforms the forecasting 
accuracy compared with the standard VAR approach. 
Building on the DFM in Stock and Watson (2005), the idea to combine the standard VAR 
model with the Factor Modelling namely the FAVAR approach is proposed in Bernanke and 
Boivin (2003), and further advanced in Bernanke et al. (2005). Within the FAVAR framework, it 
is possible to summarize the information of a large number of time series into a small number of 
estimated factors and to take advantage of the simplicity of the standard VAR approach. In this 
way, all the available and the theoretical motivated information can be used to extract a few 
numbers of factors that improve the analysis of policy shocks. 
The presented results in the above-cited studies confirm that the idea of constructing a 
FAVAR model in a data-rich environment can mitigate the price puzzle to some extent, see the 
results presented in Bernanke et al. (2005) as an example. Moreover, the information extracted 
from the large data sets using the PC method proved to be quite useful for the empirical analysis 
of monetary policy. It decreases the uncertainty about parameter estimates and is capable of 
eliminating the main puzzle in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, see Bernanke et 
al. (2005), Favero et al. (2005), Koop and Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis (2013). Chapter 3 
provides a detailed technical description of the FAVAR modelling procedure.  
2.6.3 Time-Varying Parameter Factor-Augmented VAR  
As noted, another issue with the VAR models is the problem concerns time-invariant parameters 
estimated. Cogley and Sargent (2001) develop a VAR model with Time-Varying coefficients. 
They estimate a nonlinear VAR model with drifting coefficients but constant variance.76 In 
another approach, Sims and Zha (2006) estimate a Markov-Switching VAR model that explicitly 
allows for changes in monetary policy regimes. They find evidence suggesting that only the 
covariance matrix of their estimated VAR is time-dependant while the model coefficients remain 
time-invariant, indicating that there is regime change in the variance of structural disturbances. 
                                                     
76 Their estimated TV-VAR model has a dimension of three variables including inflation, unemployment, and short-
term interest rates. 
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Primiceri (2005) advances this approach by proposing a Time-Varying Parameter (TVP) 
VAR method which allows all parameters to vary over the time. He presents evidence for time 
variation of the responses to monetary shocks in 1960s and 1970s implying that the transmission 
mechanism of the policy shocks evolve over the time in both systematic and non-systematic US 
monetary policy.77 Furthermore, the results presented in Primiceri (2005) suggest that non-
systematic monetary policy becomes less important during the Greenspan administration while 
the systematic policy turns to become more aggressive against inflation and unemployment.78 
This finding implies that a Taylor-type Rule is less representative of US monetary policy over 
the 1960s and 1970s than in the last two decades. See Table 3.2 for a statistical description of 
changes in the macroeconomic policy indicators. Nevertheless, little evidence is found to support 
the link between systematic monetary policy and the high inflation and unemployment episodes.  
Note that the trivariate TVP-VAR model estimated in Primiceri (2005) potentially faces the 
problem of the low-dimensional VAR. Building on the FAVAR and TVP-VAR modelling 
approaches as the two important innovations prominent in the VAR literature, Koop and 
Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis (2013) propose the TVP-FAVAR to account for both the curse 
of dimensionality and potential changes in the parameters. The TVP-FAVAR model is 
constructed using a two-step approach. First, the factors are estimated using the PC approach 
obtained from the data matrix and treated as observed. Second, the Time-Varying Parameters are 
assumed to follow a random walk procedure computed using standard state-space method. Thus, 
employing the TVP-FAVAR modelling method make it possible to involve all the theoretical 
and empirical motivated information to trace the way in which policy shocks can affect the 
economy. The results obtained from a TVP-FAVAR model presented in Korobilis (2013) appear 
                                                     
77 Non-systematic monetary policy is referred to both policy errors and interest rate movements that are the responses 
to variables other than inflation and unemployment, which are exogenous. As opposed to the non-systematic policy, 
the response of interest rate to inflation and unemployment represents the systematic monetary policy, see Primiceri 
(2005).         
78Primiceri (2005) discusses that the peaks in inflation and unemployment in the Burns period can be better explained 
by non-systematic policy shocks as a less aggressive monetary policy was conducted in the 1970s.         
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to succeed in mitigating the price puzzle to a great extent.79 Chapter 3 discusses technical 
elements of the TVP-FAVAR approach in greater detail.    
2.6.4 Global VAR  
Further to extending the VAR models to incorporate as much as theory-motivated information to 
build up econometric models, it is also useful to consider the interactions of the VAR models 
across countries. The Global VAR (GVAR) approach allows us to do that. The GVAR framework 
introduced by Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004), and further advanced in Dees, di Mauro, 
Pesaran, and Smith (2007) is a powerful econometrics tool for global modelling. This method 
combines time series, panel data, and factor analysis techniques to address a wide range of 
economic and financial issues. Despite the fact that the GVAR model has been initially developed 
as a tool for credit risk analysis, many other applications of this approach proved it as a suitable 
policy analysis technique, particularly very useful for the analysis of the transmission of shocks 
among the worldˈs economies.  
The GVAR model is constructed of a large number of country-specific models. The 
interactions across these individual models take place by relating the domestic variables to their 
foreign counterparts and global observed variables such as oil price. We construct foreign 
variables as a weighted averages of foreign variables that correspond to the domestic variables 
to match the international linkages, such as bilateral trade, and serve as a proxy for common 
unobserved factors. As explained in di Mauro and Pesaran (2013), the curse of dimensionality 
associated with the VAR models is addressed by estimating the individual country-specific 
Vector Error Correcting models conditional on the foreign variables. The assumption of weak 
exogenity of the foreign variables satisfies that there are no long-run feedback from foreign 
specific variables to their domestic counterparts, see Pesaran et al. (2004), and Dees et al. (2007). 
It also concerns the size of economies compared to the global economy.  
                                                     
79 As is reported in Korobilis (2013), those IRF results which are estimated based on the Bernanke et al. (2005) 
identification approach, show that there is a price puzzle in 1975 while the price puzzle is disappeared in 1981 and 
1996.    
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The idea of pooling a large number of country-specific VAR models within a global model 
to study their interactions, emerged in response to the world increasing interdependencies. Given 
the limitation of the VAR models to capture the potential international linkages, the GVAR 
methodology has been demonstrated a practical and parsimonious procedure that can deal with 
the identification of common global factors in a theoretically coherent and statistically consistent 
approach, see Dees et al. (2007), and di Mauro and Pesaran (2013). The method can also provide 
a global framework for the quantitative analysis of policy shocks and their transmission channels. 
A detailed discussion of the GVAR modelling procedure is provided in Chapter 4.     
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2.7 Concluding Remarks 
For decades the common theoretical understanding has been that monetary policy is sufficient to 
achieve low inflation and stable economic growth. However, the 2008 financial crisis and the 
zero lower bound event caused most of the major Central Banks to adopt unconventional 
monetary measures. Further to the ongoing discussion on the impact of UMP, fiscal policy also 
received attention as an effective way to stimulate the economy. As discussed in Davig and 
Leeper (2011), the ultimate impacts on the economy depends on the way that monetary and fiscal 
policy interacts. This is one of our key research question.  
Given the motivation of our thesis, we study the macroeconomic impact of monetary and 
fiscal policy both in normal and unusual times. We explain that although CMP achieved a low 
and stable prices, but when the interest rates reach the ZLB, CMP is less effective. This accounts 
for adopting UMP. Having considered the literature on the effectiveness of UMP, fiscal policy 
may also have an important impact on the conduct of monetary policy and the economy.  
For this reason, we discuss the effectiveness of fiscal policy under different views. We 
explain that regardless of the Ricardian or non-Ricardian view on fiscal policy, at the ZLB 
monetary policy tools turn to be less competent to stimulate the economy. This accounts for the 
use of fiscal policy. In addition, we discuss that within the FTPL, fiscal policy has an important 
role to determine the price levels. Having discussed the literature on monetary and fiscal policy 
interactions, we conclude that the outcome of monetary and fiscal policy intervention depends 
on which policy dominates. This argument can provide an alternative explanation for the price 
puzzle. That is an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy can contribute to the 
appearance of the price puzzle.  
Finally, we review the literature on our applied econometric methods that are TVP-FAVAR 
and the GVAR methods. These methods have been proved useful in dealing with the curse of 
dimensionality, and the non-linearity of the parameters that concern the VAR models. Our 
applied methodology also accounts for the potentail international spillovers of the policy shocks.   
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Appendix 2.A- Government Intertemporal Budget  
The government-Treasury budget constraint can be identified as presented in Equation (2.A.1).  
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Where tG denotes government expenditure including transfer payments, 
T
tt Bi 11  denotes interest 
payments on the outstanding debt, tT denotes tax revenues, )( 1
T
t
T
t BB  denotes the new issues of 
interest-bearing debt, and RCBt denotes any direct receipts from the Central Bank such as the US 
Federal Reserve turn over to the Treasury.80 On the other hand, the monetary authority uses the 
following budget identity to balance changes in their assets and liabilities;   
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Where 
M
t
M
t BB 1  denotes the Central Bankˈs purchases of government debt, 
M
tt Bi 11   denotes the 
Central Bankˈs receipt of interest payment from the Treasury, and 1 tt HH  denotes the changes 
in the Central Bankˈs own liabilities.81 
We can write the consolidated government budget by combing the Treasury and the Central Bank 
budgets as follows. 
)()( 1111   tttttttt HHBBTBiG  (2.A.3) 
Where 
MT BBB   presents the stock of government interest-bearing debt that is held by the 
public. According to the consolidated budget, government purchases plus its interest payments 
on outstanding public debt ( 11  ttt BiG ) must be financed through one of these three alternative 
sources: tax revenues, tT , borrowing from the private sector, )( 1 tt BB , or printing currency 
to pay for government expenditures which can be represented by the change in the outstanding 
                                                     
80 Note that superscript T denotes the total debt that are issued in period t-1, and earns the nominal interest rate i t-1. 
81 These liabilities are called high-powered money or the monetary base as they form the stock of currency held by 
the public plus bank reserves to back deposits. 
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stock of non-interest-bearing debt )( 1 tt HH . It is possible to rewrite the consolidated 
government budget in the real values deflated by price level, tP , as Equation (2.A.4) shows. 
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  Thus, the consolidated government budget can take the form as in Equation (2.A.5). 
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Where      11/1 11   ttt ir    denotes the ex-post real return from 1t  to t.  
In Equation (2.A.5), the last term in bracket represents seigniorage or the revenue from money 
creation. Seigniorage can be written in the form of Equation (2.A.6). 
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According to Equation (2.A.6), seigniorage arises from two sources. The first source 
involves the changes in real high-powered money holdings  1 tt hh . An increase in the amount 
of high-powered money that the private sector holds, leads to an increase in the government 
revenue from money creation.82 The second part in Equation (2.A.6) shows that the private sector 
would increase their nominal holdings of money at the rate of inflation to offset the effects of 
inflation on their real holdings. To ensure this demand, the supply of money must be increased 
which generates extra revenue for government.83               
                                                     
82 Given that in steady state equilibrium h is constant, thus, this source of seigniorage equals zero, see Walsh (2010) 
for more details. 
83 As Walsh (2010) discusses, in contrast to the high-powered money holdings, the private sector demand for money 
can be non-zero even in steady state. 
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As the definition of seigniorage in Equation (2.A.6) suggests, for small values of the rate 
of inflation, 
t
t


1
 is approximately equal to t . Thus, the real value of base money is depreciated 
by inflation. The problem with this definition of seigniorage is the neglect of the real interest 
saving by the government for issuing h which is a non-interest-bearing debt compared to the 
interest-bearing debt, b , given that the level of governmentˈs total real liabilities is a combination 
of both , hbd  . Thus, a shift from interest-bearing to non-interest bearing debt would allow 
the government to reduce total tax revenues or increase its expenditures.  
It is possible to rewrite the governmentˈs budget constraint to express the total liabilities of 
the government as follows. 
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Accordingly, seigniorage in steady-state takes the form of Equation (2.A.8). 
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(2.A.8) 
Equation (2.A.8) shows that the relevant tax rate on base money depends directly on the nominal 
interest rate. Thus, by reducing the nominal rates to zero, the government earns no revenue from 
seigniorage meaning that this lost revenue must be replaced by an increase in other taxes, real 
borrowing, or a reduction in the government expenditures, see Walsh (2010). 
Now we turn our focus to infer the condition required for the Ricardian and non-Ricardian 
views on fiscal policy from the governmentˈs intertemporal budget constraint. The governmentˈs 
intertemporal budget constraint requires that government runs surpluses in present value terms 
equal to its current outstanding interest-bearing debt. 
To write the inter-temporal government budget constraint, that shows governmentˈs 
limitations for borrowing, recalling and rewriting Equations (2.A.5), and (2.A.6) yields:   
ttttttt sbbtbrg   )( 111  (2.A.9) 
This Equation can be solved forward to obtain 
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Where the interest factor r is a constant and positive value. The required condition to satisfy the 
inter-temporal balanced budget is that the last term in Equation (2.A.10) equals zero. 
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It implies that the present discounted value of all current and future tax and seigniorage 
revenues must be equal to the present discounted value of all current and future expenditures plus 
current outstanding debt. Accordingly, by defining the primary deficit as stg  , the inter-
temporal government budget can be formulated as in Equation (2.A.11). 
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As Equation (2.A.11) presents, if the government creates outstanding debt, )0( 1 tb , the present 
value of future primary deficits must be negative meaning that government must run a primary 
surplus in present value through adjustments in expenditures, taxes, or seigniorage. 
To focus on debt, taxes, and seigniorage, we assume that government expenditure equals 
zero. Thus, budget constraint can be rewritten in the form of Equation (2.A.12);  
ttttt sbtbr   11)1(  (2.A.12) 
Given that the macroeconomic policy outcome depends on how agents respond to the 
policy implemented, the budget constraint for the representative agents must also be identified. 
Assume that the agent receives an exogenous endowment y in each period, pays lump-sum taxes,
tt , and receives interest payments on bonds denoting by ttt PBi /)1( 11   where 1ti  is the 
nominal interest rate, 
1tB
is the number of bonds held at the start of period t , and tP is the price 
level. This relationship can be written as 
11)1(  tt br
where 1)1/()1( 11   ttt ir  represents 
the ex-post real interest rate. Furthermore, the agent has real money balances equal to 
1
1
1 )1(/ 

  tttt mPM   that are carried into period  t from period 1t . The agent allocates 
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these resources to consumption, real money holdings, and real bond purchases as Equation 
(2.A.13) presents. 
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To understand the extent to which the price level depends on the stock of debt and debt 
policy, let  denotes the fraction of the governmentˈs interest-bearing debt that is financed with 
taxes, with 10  . As Walsh (2010) explains, 1 means that government interest-bearing 
debt liabilities are completely financed by taxes. This is the Ricardian interpretation of fiscal 
policy. However, 1 represents the non-Ricardian view on fiscal policy meaning that 
seigniorage must adjust to maintain the present value of taxes plus seigniorage equal to the 
governmentˈs outstanding debt.  
Assume that 
tT denotes the present discounted value of taxes, the net liability of the 
government must equal tT , thus: 
11)1(  ttt brT   (2.A.14) 
Given that tT is a present value, it can be written in this form; 
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Combining Equations (2.A.14) and (2.A.15) yields 
)( 11 tttt bbRt    (2.A.16) 
Where )1( rR  . The same procedure can be employed to formulate seigniorage as follows; 
))(1( 11 tttt bbRs    (2.A.17) 
As Equation (2.A.17) suggests, )1(  represents the remaining fraction of the government debt 
that is not financed by taxes backed by seigniorage.  
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Using Equations (2.A.13) and (2.A.16), it is possible to rewrite the householdˈs budget constraint 
to distinct between the Ricardian and non-Ricardian view on fiscal policy in the form of Equation 
(2.A.18). 
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Equation (2.A.18) suggests that in the case of the Ricardian regime with 1 , the governmentˈs 
debt does not involve to determine inflation as the price level is proportional to the nominal stock 
of money. But, when 1 , both the nominal money supply and the nominal stock of 
governmentˈs debt are involved in the determination of the price level, see Walsh (2010).    
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Chapter 3 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in the United States: 
Empirical Evidence from a TVP-FAVAR 
 
 
Abstract  
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on the interaction between monetary and fiscal 
policy. We consider the impact of monetary and fiscal policy shocks on inflation and output 
dynamics using a Time-Varying Parameter Factor-Augmented VAR (TVP-FAVAR) method. In 
baseline results from a linear model, including fiscal policy in the factors has implications for the 
impact of monetary policy shocks on inflation. This can be explained by wealth effects. The 
wealth effect is the change in spending that accompanies a change in perceived wealth. Hence, 
increases in interest rates increase the wealth of bondholders. Moreover, results from our TVP-
FAVAR indicate that price puzzles from monetary policy shocks are more accentuated during 
particular regimes. For example, under an active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy, 
inflation rose in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. The underlying mechanism 
can be explained through the wealth channel. Finally, the results of a fiscal expansion provide 
support for the non-Ricardian view on fiscal policy within both the linear and non-linear FAVAR 
model. That is, inflation and output both responded to the fiscal shock.        
Keywords: Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction, Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Theory of the 
Price Level, Price Puzzle, Time-Varying Parameter Factor-Augmented VAR (TVP-FAVAR).  
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy in the United States. 
Before the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the consensus view of mainstream macroeconomics 
was that monetary policy should actively respond to inflation using the nominal interest rate. In 
contrast fiscal policy should have a less activist role and passively respond to the business cycle 
using automatic stabilisers, while focusing upon balancing the government budget, see Walsh 
(2010). During the Great Recession however, the United States actively responded to the 
economic downturn using both monetary and fiscal policy. Consequently, the mainstream view 
was called into question and the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy became much 
more important. Moreover, sovereign debt levels have grown significantly after the Great 
Recession. For example, US Central Government Debt as a percentage of GDP has grown from 
just over 50% at the start of the millennium to over 100% recently, see Figure 3.1. Consequently, 
this debt build up may present substantial challenges for the conduct of monetary policy in more 
normal times, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) for a detailed discussions. In addition, fiscal policy 
is potentially important in influencing aggregate demand and inflation. This has recently been 
argued in Chung et al. (2007), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), and Sims (2011) that monetary 
policy should not be examined in isolation from fiscal policy.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the standard theoretical view is that monetary policy affects 
aggregate demand, and hence output and inflation in the short-run. According to Keynesian, 
Monetarist, and New Keynesian models changes in Central Bank nominal interest rate may lead 
to changes in real rates and therefore economic activity.1 The latter emphasizes the importance 
of interest rate rules as a way of controlling inflation. Central Banks operating with discretion 
have a tendency to deviate from low inflation leading to an inflation bias in policy. Kydland and 
Prescott (1982) outline these incentives and emphasize the role of Central Bank credibility and 
                                                     
1 According to monetarists view monetary aggregates is the main determinant of inflation. The monetarists view is 
synthesized by Milton Friedmanˈs famous dictum that "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon", see Leeper and Walker (2012).   
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pre-commitment in resolving the bias of policy. Ultimately, Rogoff (1985) emphasised monetary 
policy should be implemented by an independent Central Bank which would in turn separate 
monetary and fiscal policy.  
In contrast, fiscal policy must reliably adjust surpluses to ensure that government debt is 
stable and fiscal policy should not seek to actively influence aggregate demand, see Walsh 
(2010), and Canzoneri et al. (2011). Ricardian Equivalence between debt and taxes suggests 
fiscal policy does not influence consumption. In the case that fiscal policy generates government 
debt, the issuance of new bonds to finance the incurred debt would imply additional taxes in the 
future; hence, bonds do not represent net wealth.  However, we can also contrast this position 
with the non-Ricardian view: the fiscal authority sets the government budget regardless of 
intertemporal budget constraint. It implies that the monetary authority is forced to fully 
accommodate a fiscal deficit by financing the incurred debt with current and future money 
creation. Thus, any change in the current stock of debt indicates future money growth, see 
Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), Woodford (1996, 1998), Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), 
Canzoneri et al. (2011), and Sims (1994, 2013).  
An alternative approach to understand why fiscal policy can be important for inflation 
dynamics is the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). As discussed in Chapter 2, the FTPL 
was introduced by Sargent and Wallace (1981) in their famous paper on Unpleasant Monetarist 
Arithmetic, and developed further by Cochrane (1999, 2001, 2009), Leeper (1991, 2013), Sims 
(1994, 1997, 2011), and Woodford (1996, 1998). The FTPL points to the possibility of an 
independent role for the fiscal stance in determining and controlling inflation. While the 
monetary-focused literature deems that fiscal policy must reliably adjust to ensure governmentˈs 
debt sustainability, the FTPL counter argues that there are situations when the Central Bank does 
not target inflation due to other concerns, such as output stabilization or a financial crisis. In these 
circumstances, monetary policy may lose its credibility to control inflation and influence the real 
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economy in the conventional way, see Chung et al. (2007), Davig and Leeper (2007), Sims 
(2011), Leeper and Walker (2012), and Leeper (2013).  
 Moreover, it is important to consider that monetary and fiscal policy interactions may 
change over time depending upon the macroeconomic framework. We can contrast two different 
regimes in particular in which monetary and fiscal policy interacts, see Leeper (1991) and 
Woodford (1996). Firstly, an active monetary policy and a passive fiscal policy, when the Central 
Bank responds to inflation and the fiscal authority satisfies the budget constraint. Secondly, a 
passive monetary policy and an active fiscal policy, when the fiscal authority independently 
determines its budget while the Central Bank is required to adjust monetary policy in order to 
satisfy the government budget constraint.2,3,4 
Much of the monetary-focused literature considers the fiscal stance irrelevant for achieving 
price stability, as long as the governmentˈs intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied. However, 
the fiscal authority’s decision can influence the impact of monetary policy. Bradley (1984), Sims 
(1994), Cochrane (1999), Canzoneri et al. (2011), Davig and Leeper (2011), Sims (2011), and 
Leeper and Walker (2012) discuss that the omission of the fiscal stance from models intended to 
evaluate monetary policy may produce inferior results, i.e. omitted variable bias. The reason is 
that fiscal variables can be a key source for changes in inflation, see Sims (2011).5 To illustrate 
the important implication of fiscal and monetary policy interactions for the determination of the 
                                                     
2 As discussed in Chapter 2, Woodford (1996) describes active monetary and passive fiscal policy case as the 
Ricardian because monetary shocks can change the price levels without involving the fiscal stance. This is generally 
considered as the conventional outcome. In contrast, the second case of passive monetary and active fiscal policy is 
the Non-Ricardian as the fiscal stance does impact the price levels by encouraging private expenditure. 
3 The importance of government liabilitiesˈ finance-source for the analysis of the inflation is first initiated by Sargent 
and Wallace (1981), and Sargent (1982).   
4 According to Sargent and Wallace (1981) when government deficits are considered as exogenous, monetary policy 
loses its ability to control inflation when the deficits reach the fiscal limit. It puts pressure on the monetary authority 
to generate seigniorage revenues for government to ensure the interest payments on the debt. In contrast to the idea 
that fiscal inflation is caused by monetizing deficits in Sargent and Wallace (1981), the FTPL relates the nominal 
bond to a nominal payoff in which the real value of the payoff depends on the price level. When the nominal debt is 
fully financed by real resources, i.e. real primary surplus and seigniorage, fiscal policy is inflationary only if the 
Central Bank monetizes deficits. However, when the government does not increase the real resources to finance the 
debt, the FTPL creates a direct link between current and expected deficits and inflation, see Leeper (2013).  
5 Sims (2011) provides a theoretical discussion of the way that fiscal authorities decisionˈs may impact the monetary  
transmission mechanism. He concludes that if a Central Bank aims to consider all the factors that impact inflation 
and output growth, they should not ignore the fiscal stance. 
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price level, Leeper (1991, 2013) argues that to ensure the uniqueness of equilibrium, either 
monetary or fiscal policy must be active and the other one passive. 
This chapter studies the impact of monetary policy on output growth and inflation, whilst 
accounting for the potential role for the governmentˈs fiscal stance. Earlier empirical evidence on 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions comes from either the VAR models or Structural Policy 
Rules approach, see Favero and Monacelli (2003), Davig and Leeper (2007), and Canzoneri et al. 
(2011) among others. As mentioned in Chapter 2, VAR models have been developed as one of 
the key empirical tools for analysing policy and evaluating theory.6 One major problem concerns 
VAR models, however, is the occurrence of the puzzling behaviour of some Impulse Response 
Functions (IRF), with the price puzzle as the most common one. The price puzzle is an increase 
in the price level in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. The dominant view in 
the literature relates the puzzle to the curse of dimensionality concerns VAR models to maintain 
the degree of freedom.7,8 The curse of dimensionality is that as the dimension of the system 
increases the number of parameters to be estimated grows. This exhausts the available degree of 
freedom even for large datasets, see Sims (1980).     
Several studies attempt to resolve the puzzle by changing the identification assumptions or 
by expanding the information set on which policy choices are based.9 However, Hanson (2004) 
argues that the price puzzle was more pronounced in the 1960s and the 1970s, which is considered 
to be a period of active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy. This implies that the price 
puzzle may be explained through the way in which monetary and fiscal policy interacts and 
influences inflation rather than adding extra information to the model.10 Chung et al. (2007) argue 
                                                     
6 See, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Boivin (2003), Bernanke et al. (2005), Del Negro and Schorfheide 
(2010), and Koop and Korobilis (2010). 
7Sims (1992) first commented on the price puzzle as an unconventional response of the price level to a monetary 
contraction. The "price puzzle" was named by Eichenbaum (1992). Sims (1992) explains that the price puzzle occurs 
as a result of imperfect information that the Central Bank may use to predict the future inflation.  
8 Hanson (2004) provides a comprehensive survey on the price puzzle literature. One most common interpretation 
for the price puzzle relates it to the VAR misspecification which would be either disappear or lessen by adding 
further information to the estimated VAR.   
9 See Bernanke et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion. 
10 Another explanation for the price puzzle relates the counterintuitive reaction of prices to a monetary contraction 
to the cost channel of monetary transmission which impacts the supply-side of the economy as opposed to the 
demand-side, see Barth and Ramey (2002). The cost channel explains that to the extent that firms must borrow to 
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that the price puzzle that emerges in monetary VARs can be a natural outcome of periods when 
an active fiscal policy coordinates with a passive monetary policy, rather than the identification 
problems. 
Recently, Factor-Augmented VAR models appear to help deal with the counter-intuitive 
price puzzle to some extent by incorporating additional information into the VAR, see Bernanke 
and Boivin (2003), Bernanke et al. (2005), and Stock and Watson (2005). However, FAVAR 
models are typically linear and it is difficult to justify this approach in the presence of changes in 
macroeconomic policy regimes. For example, there exists evidence of substantial fiscal regime 
instability, see Favero and Monacelli (2003), Chung et al. (2007), and Davig and Leeper (2007, 
2011). Favero and Monacelli (2003) argue that the constant-parameter analysis of fiscal policy 
studies would be misleading in that it would predict a stabilizing fiscal regime throughout the 
sample.   These arguments motivate us to employ a non-linear Time Varying Parameter approach 
to study the macroeconomic impact of monetary and fiscal policy interactions. 
The non-linear analysis of VAR models first proposed by Primiceri (2005), namely TVP-
VAR, to consider monetary shocks at different points in time. Another alternative to TVP-VAR 
method is the Regime-Switching models as proposed by Sims and Zha (2006). These models are 
developed to capture a determinant finite number of breaks representing rapid shifts in the 
policy.11 One clear advantage of TVP models over the Regime-Switching approaches is that TVP 
models capture smooth changes of the coefficients over time, see Primiceri, (2005).  
The idea of combining the FAVAR models with TVP was developed by Koop and 
Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis (2013). This has proved successful in addressing the problems 
associated with standard VAR models. That is low dimensionality and non-linear regimes. 
Comparing the results obtained from a Constant-Parameter FAVAR model in Bernanke et al. 
                                                     
finance the cost of production and new investment, higher interest rates increase the unit cost that induces an increase 
in the price level at least for some periods, see Barth and Ramey (2002), and Christiano et al. (2005). 
11 As explained in Primiceri (2005), the learning dynamics of the agents and the monetary authority can be better 
captured by a model with smooth and continuous drifting coefficients rather than a model with discrete breaks.  
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(2005) with those presented in Korobilis (2013) from a TVP-FAVAR model, it is clear that the 
latter approach corrects the price puzzle to a greater extent.  
However, despite the promising results obtained from different combination of TVP and 
FAVAR methods to address the price puzzle, the potential impact of the fiscal stance on the 
economy has been ignored, see Bernanke et al. (2005), Primeciri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), 
Koop and Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis (2013) among others. Table 3.1 presents a summary 
of the related literature in which this Chapter is closely related with. It shows that the empirical 
literature on the monetary transmission mechanism mainly relies on a Ricardian interpretation of 
the fiscal policy.12  
We identify a gap in the literature on both the monetary transmission mechanism, and 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions. While the former studies the impact of monetary policy 
on the real activity measures isolated from fiscal policy, the latter one provide evidence on the 
macroeconomic policy interactions within small VAR models. Thus, this Chapter contributes to 
the empirical literature on monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the following ways. Firstly, 
we examine monetary-fiscal policy interactions by examining the responses to a monetary shock 
in a FAVAR model including fiscal policy variables. Secondly, we compare whether monetary 
policy interactions change over time. We do so by using a TVP-FAVAR model, which accounts 
for different periods of monetary and fiscal dominance. Thirdly, we examine the macroeconomic 
impact of fiscal policy shock within both a linear and non-linear FAVAR model.  
To preview our results, firstly we find that including fiscal variables in the baseline linear 
FAVAR causes an increase in inflation in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. 
This response can be explained through a wealth effect. In the presence of government debt, a 
higher interest rate can stimulate private expenditure, as agents may perceive an increase in their 
                                                     
12 The monetary-focused literature on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy ignores the impact of the 
fiscal stance on the economy and implicitly assumes that fiscal policy can only change the composition of GDP 
rather than its level, see Table 3.1. 
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wealth, i.e. the issuance of new bonds or an increase in their disposable income. This in turns can 
encourage private consumption leading to an increase in aggregate demand and inflation.   
Second, the results from the TVP-FAVAR model suggest that the fiscal-augmented model 
produce price puzzles. The mechanism works as follows. Higher interest rates induce 
bondholders to consume more in periods when fiscal policy is active. As defined in Chapter 2, 
an active fiscal policy means that the fiscal authority determines taxes and government 
expenditure independent of inter-temporal budget constraint. This finding provides evidence for 
the role of fiscal policy on the price determinations. The influence tends to be more accentuated 
in the case of an active fiscal and passive monetary policy as higher interest rates can lead to the 
issuance of more government bonds. This would increase government debt given that an active 
fiscal policy is in place. Thus, the outcome of a monetary contraction can be an increase in private 
consumption through a positive wealth effect. Third, the non-Ricardian view on the fiscal policy 
can find empirical support within both Constant and TVP-FAVAR models as both inflation and 
output increase in response to the fiscal shock.  
Thus, the main contribution of this chapter is to empirically validate the alternative 
interpretation of the price puzzle explained in Chung et al. (2007). This fiscal interpretation 
differs from the Cost-Channel explanation of the price puzzle initiated by Barth and Ramey 
(2002), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Our study, also, confirms the empirical 
inference drawn by Favero and Monacelli (2003), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), and Leeper 
and Walker (2012), Leeper (2013) on the non-Ricardian view of fiscal policy in the United States. 
Finally, as regards the outcome of monetary contractionary policy shock within a fiscal-excluded 
TVP-FAVAR model, our results are consistent with those presented in Korobilis (2013) in 
mitigating the price puzzle. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 is a brief review of 
the related literature. In section 3.3, the econometric methodology is explained. Section 3.4 
presents model specifications and the empirical results. A brief summary of results is provided 
in section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes the study.  
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Table 3.1. Key Literature on Monetary and Fiscal Policy  
Study Methodology Monetary-Fiscal 
Policy Interactions 
Main Contribution 
Bernanke, Boivin,  
and Elliasz (2005) 
FAVAR Monetary-Focused The appearance of the price puzzle is 
due to the lack of information. Their 
results show that adding extra 
information can reduce the price puzzle.   
Primiceri (2005) TVP-VAR Monetary-Focused Non-Systematic shocks may better 
explain the peaks in inflation over the 
1970s and 1980s rather than weaker 
interest rate responses to inflation and 
real activity.   
Korobilis (2013) TVP-FAVAR Monetary-Focused Firstly, the responses of output, 
investment, and quantity of money to 
monetary shocks have been changed 
over the time. Secondly, the constructed 
TVP-FAVAR can correct the price 
puzzle to a great extent compared with 
those of Bernanke et al. (2005).    
Favero and Monacelli 
(2003) 
Markov-Switching 
VAR-Augmented 
Policy Rules  
Monetary-Fiscal 
Policy does interacts  
Monetary and fiscal policy 
interactions have inflationary effects. 
In addition, fiscal policy appears to 
perform as the non-Ricardian before 
1987, while it turns to be Ricardian 
after 1987.     
Chung, Davig, and 
Leeper (2007) 
Markov-Switching 
Policy Rules  
Monetary-Fiscal 
Policy does interacts 
The price puzzle can be a natural 
outcome of an active fiscal policy and 
a passive monetary policy. In addition, 
under this macroeconomic policy 
coordination, the Ricardian view on 
policy interactions appears to be 
implusible.   
Davig and Leeper 
(2007,2011)  
Markov-Switching 
Policy Rules 
Monetary-Fiscal 
Policy does interacts 
The outcome of an active fiscal policy 
and a passive monetary policy is the 
non-Ricardian. That is inflation and 
output increase in response to a fiscal 
expansion by generating a positive 
wealth effect which encourage private 
consumption.      
Note: This Table summarizes the related literature that the chapter is constructed upon it.    
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3.2 Review of the Literature on Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions  
The general consensus on the dominant role of monetary policy has recently been subject to 
critique. Indeed, monetary and fiscal policy do interact through the intertemporal government 
budget. However, the government budget can be considered either as a constraint or as an 
equilibrium condition upon different monetary and fiscal policy coordination, see Favero and 
Monacelli (2003), Walsh (2010), Leeper and Walker (2011), Sims (2011), and Leeper (2013) 
among others. This suggests that the Ricardian view on fiscal policy, which assumes fiscal policy 
is ineffective and the government budget is a constraint, is difficult to justify as a fact that can be 
held under all circumstances.  
Despite the existence of a vast literature on the impact of monetary policy on the economy, 
monetary studies often neglect to consider the potential role for fiscal policy in their analysis.13 
The empirical literature on the transmission of monetary policy shocks is mainly studied through 
VAR modelling.14 This literature mainly studies the effect of unanticipated monetary policy 
shocks that are constructed using VAR models, assuming that the specified VAR models contain 
the present and past information of the agents. For example, much research attempts to investigate 
the cause of the US inflation in the 1970s, concludes that it can be explained by misconduct of 
monetary policy and that inflation is induced by a rapid growth of the money supply. Christiano 
et al. (1999) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature.  
In contrast, Sims (1994, 2011) argues that in a fiat-money economy, inflation appears to be 
more a fiscal phenomenon rather than a monetary one, given that the value of fiat money always 
depends on public beliefs about future fiscal policy. Furthermore, when there is uncertainty about 
future fiscal policy, a monetary policy instrument may lose its influence on the economy, or 
produces unconventional effects such as the price puzzle.  
                                                     
13 The exceptions are noted in Chapter 2. 
14 Another alternative approach to study the monetary transmission mechanism is Structural Policy Rules approach. 
The literature in this area is built and developed mainly based on Taylor (1993) in a way that the policy rules reflects 
systematic response of monetary policy to exogenous shocks. These studies focus on examining monetary policy as 
systematic response to variation in observable variables within the estimated Structural Policy Equations, see for 
example Clarida et al. (2000).        
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Sims (2011) explains that a debt-financed fiscal expansion, can account for volatility in US 
inflation over the sample 1960-2010.15 He shows that an expansionary fiscal policy shock under 
an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy induces inflation and consumption to 
increase.16 Accordingly, Sims (2011) suggests that the econometric models intended to analyse 
monetary policy should explicitly involve the fiscal stance, as this may be a primary cause of 
inflation.  
Having said that fiscal policy is an important factor for the determination of inflation, the 
literature on the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy is divided between two views, namely the 
Ricardian, and non-Ricardian. The empirical literature on the impact of fiscal policy supports the 
both views.17 Examples for the Ricardian view include Barro (1979), Evans (1985,1987), Plosser 
(1987), Bohn (1998), and Canzoneri et al. (2001, 2011).18  In an empirical study, Bohn (1998) 
examined the US fiscal policy and concluded that a rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio leads to an 
increase in the primary surplus and taxes respond to ensure that the intertemporal budget 
constraint is satisfied. According to his findings, fiscal policy appears to act in a Ricardian way. 
In another study, Canzoneri et al. (2011) examine the response of US liabilities to a positive shock 
to the primary surplus within a VAR model. They argue that a positive shock to the primary 
surplus can reduce real liabilities without negative correlation. Thus, they provide evidence 
supporting a Ricardian interpretation for fiscal policy in the sense that output and inflation is 
unresponsive to fiscal policy shocks. In contrast, a monetary contraction causes output and 
                                                     
15 The results presented in Sims (2011) come from a structural VAR consists of real GDP, the personal consumption 
expenditure, price deflator, one-year US treasury rate, the 10-year treasury rate, the ratio of the primary deficit to the 
market value of privately held US government debt, the market value of privately held US government debt divided 
by nominal GDP, and interest expenses as a fraction of total receipts in the US federal budget.                
16 As explained in Chapter 2, an active fiscal policy refers to the situation in which the fiscal authority sets its 
expenditure without taking into account the governmentˈs intertemporal budget equation. It implies that tax revenues 
are not sufficient to finance the expenditure. A passive monetary policy implies that the monetary authority weakly 
adjusts the nominal interest rates in response to inflation.  
17 As explained in Chapter 2, the Ricardian view on fiscal policy states that an expansionary fiscal policy which 
generate debt implies higher taxes in the future to finance debt. Given that this policy only postpones the tax burdent 
and does not remove it, the outcome would be an increase in private saving rather than private expenditure. Thus, 
the policy cannot stimulate the economy. In contrast, a non-Ricardian fiscal policy holds that fiscal policy can 
effectively stimulate the economy by encouraging private expenditure, see Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), and 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000). 
18 Bernheim (1987) provides a critical survey of the empirical literature on the non-Ricardian view to support the 
Ricardian view on fiscal policy. 
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inflation to fall as higher interest rate would lower aggregate demand through a reduction in 
private expenditure. 
In contrast, several other studies show that a debt-financed fiscal expansion can be an 
effective policy to increase inflation and output that is a non-Ricardian view on fiscal policy. For 
example, Cochrane (2001, 2009) provide a non-Ricardian explanation for government debt 
dynamics in the post-war US data. Reade (2011) offers a non-Ricardian interpretation for fiscal 
policy in response to the 2008 financial crisis. Sims (2011) argues that the non-Ricardian view on 
fiscal policy can explain the high inflation of the 1970s and the early 1980s in the US economy. 
Davig and Leeper (2007) find that a monetary contraction combined with a fiscal expansion in 
which taxes do not respond sufficiently to debt, can induce a positive wealth effect leading to an 
increase in private consumption. This, in turns, would increase inflation and output. Note that the 
increase in interest rate induced by the monetary contraction may cause the incurred deficit more 
expensive to finance, thus more government liabilities needs to be issued. Until the price levels 
start to increase, the new issued bonds would create a positive wealth effect. Moreover, with sticky 
prices the wealth effect would stay for some time to affect householdsˈ consumption.  
As another example from the literature that accounts for the role of fiscal policy in the 
monetary transmission, we can refer to Bradly (1984). He estimates two semi-structural equations 
representing the demand and supply equations for reserves to examine the influences of fiscal 
policy on monetary policy.19 Bradly (1984) finds that during 1970s-1980s monetary policy does 
react to fiscal policy both directly, i.e. through changing the reserves, and indirectly, i.e. through 
changing the nominal interest rates. He concludes that the government deficits induce an increase 
in money demand due to increasing the public demand for bonds. Consequently, the monetary 
authority would be forced to accommodate the growth in money demand.  
                                                     
19 The demand representative equation relates the Fed funds rate to non-borrowed reserves, government debt, and 
other demand determining variables. The supply equation is a Federal Reserve reaction function which determines 
the supply of reserves.    
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Given that the outcome of fiscal policy depends on the way that the governmentˈs 
intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied, i.e. the Ricardian and non-Ricardian views, different 
monetary and fiscal policy regimes also contribute to the outcome. In a seminal paper, Leeper 
(1991) argues that under an active monetary policy and a passive fiscal policy regimes, the 
monetary authority targets nominal interest rate and does not respond to the governmentˈs debt. 
In this case, the fiscal authority would adjust taxes to ensure the governmentˈs intertemporal 
budget requirements. In contrast, an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy suggests 
that the monetary authority adjusts seigniorage revenues to satisfy the governmentˈs budget 
balance while the fiscal authority remains unresponsive to the debt.20  
Having said that different monetary and fiscal policy regimes may substantially change the 
policy outcome, it is also crucial that macroeconomic policy analysis accounts for the potential 
policy changes. The literature on monetary and fiscal policy interaction provides evidence for 
monetary and fiscal policy regime changes. For example, Favero and Monacelli (2003) estimate 
fiscal policy regime changes, using a Markov-switching VAR model, to illustrate the post-war 
US inflation and output dynamics. They find that fiscal policy has been active before 1987 and 
then switched to passive until 2001.21 They also find that the behaviour of fiscal policy has 
changed over the time: after a prolonged period of fiscal policy instability, it switches to a stable 
period in 1986:Q3 with a Ricardian feature coupled with an active monetary policy. In addition, 
they provide evidence that fiscal policy significantly influences the price level when fiscal policy 
is active and monetary policy is passive, exactly as it was before 1987. Their finding support the 
hypothesis that an active monetary policy may not have been a sufficient condition to stabilize 
                                                     
20 As discussed in Leeper (1991) a combination of active monetary policy and active fiscal policy would generate 
unstable inflation. Also, the price levels would be undetermined if both policies performs passively. 
21 Favero and Monacelli (2003) report active episode for fiscal policy in periods 1965:Q3-1968:Q1; 1974:Q2-
1986:Q2, and passive fiscal policy in periods 1960:Q4-1965:Q2; 1968:Q2-1974:Q1; 1986:Q3-2000:Q4. As regards 
monetary policy regime changes, Davig and Leeper (2007,2011) find that monetary policy has been active in 
1980:Q3-1990:Q4 and 1995:Q1-2000:Q2; and passive in 1950:Q3-1980:Q2, 1991:Q1-1994:Q4, and 2000:Q3-until 
recently. Note that they define an active monetary policy when interest rates respond aggressively to inflation while 
a passive monetary policy refers to a weak response of interest rates to inflation when the monetary authority sets 
interest rates to accommodate fiscal policy. In addition, an active fiscal policy means that the fiscal authority sets its 
budget regardless of intertemporal budget constraint while the opposite is considered as passive fiscal policy.  
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inflation. They explain that under a constant fiscal regime assumption, the policy-generated 
inflation switches to a divergent path even if the monetary authority continue to respond 
aggressively to any rise in inflation expectations. They argue that a more accurate description of 
the US macroeconomic policy outcome for the post-1987 can be obtained using monetary and 
fiscal policy interactions, rather than solely relying on a Taylor Rule-based monetary policy.22 
Favero and Monacelli (2003) conclude that neglecting the monetary and fiscal policy interactions 
can lead to an imprecise assessment of the macroeconomic policy outcome.  
Woodford (1998), Favero and Monacelli (2003), Muscatelli et al. (2004), Chung et al. 
(2007), and Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) argue that active fiscal policy and passive monetary 
policy during 1960s and 1970s may explain the inflation dynamics better than monetary factors.23 
As discussed in Chung et al. (2007) and the references therein, there is evidence that over the 
1960s and 1970s the Federal Reserve followed an interest rate rule that weakly responded to 
inflation, failing to satisfy the Taylor principle.24 Then, from the mid-1980s, it appears that the 
Taylor principle has been satisfied again. 
As another evidence for monetary and fiscal policy regime changes, we can refer to Davig 
and Leeper (2007, 2011). They provide evidence for substantial regime changes in 
macroeconomic policy during the 1970s and 1980s, see Figure 3.B.1. Their finding, within a 
Markov-Switching model, suggests that the Federal Reserve has switched from a passive 
monetary policy to an active one, with an opposite shift for fiscal policy. They explain that with 
an active fiscal policy in place, any increase in government expenditure is not expected to be 
financed with higher taxes. Therefore, an increase in government debt would induce an increase 
in aggregate demand, prices, and output.  
                                                     
22 This issue also is noted in Primiceri (2005). 
23 Muscatelli et al. (2004), within a NK model, find evidence suggesting that over the 1980s the US monetary and 
fiscal policies were as substitute, and then turned to be complementary since the 1990s. They show that the linkage 
between fiscal and monetary policy has shifted post-1980. Monetary and fiscal policies are called as complements 
if a fiscal expansion is jointed with monetary expansion, and vice versa. In the case of substitute policy coordination, 
a fiscal expansion is jointed with a monetary contraction and vice versa.    
24 As explained in Taylor (1993), Taylor principle indicates that for each one percent increase in inflation, the Central 
Bank should raise the nominal interest rate by more than one percent.  
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Furthermore, Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) discuss that when agents expect that the fiscal 
authority would switch to an active fiscal policy regime, their spending decisions in response to 
a monetary contraction can generate a positive wealth effect. This in turns can stimulate the 
aggregate economy. They find that the price puzzle in response to monetary contraction is more 
severe when the monetary regime is passive and fiscal policy is active. According to this finding, 
with a passive monetary policy, nominal interest rates do not respond sufficiently to inflation, so 
the real rates declines. The lower real rates reduces saving that causes an increase in current 
consumption. On the other hand, an active fiscal policy can indicate that the government 
expenditure would not be financed with higher tax revenues. This can be perceived as an increase 
in wealth by agents leading to a further increase in private expenditure and inflation. Thus, an 
active fiscal policy can contradict the effect of monetary contraction.  
The potential role of different monetary and fiscal policy regimes in the appearance of the 
price puzzle is also investigated in Chung et al. (2007). They provide an alternative explanation 
for the appearance of the price puzzle following a contractionary monetary policy shock. They 
comment on the potential rule of the fiscal stance in generating the price puzzle as monetary and 
fiscal policy interactions have substantial implications for prices. They argue that when an active 
fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy are in place, the price puzzle can be explained as a 
normal response of prices rather than a puzzle. As discussed in Chapter 2, if agents anticipate 
that the monetary and fiscal authoritiesˈ decisions would have debt implication, it can generate a 
positive wealth effect. This in turns can increase private expenditure leading to an increase in 
prices and output. Thus, it is possible that inflation increases in the short-run in response to a 
monetary contraction.25 Thus, as Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), and Sims (2011) argue 
understanding the price puzzle is a prerequisite for measuring the effect of monetary policy.   
As regards the appearance of price puzzle in monetary studies, a large number of studies 
find that the price puzzle is associated with a monetary contraction, see Hanson (2004) for a 
                                                     
25 Chung et al. (2007) presents results suggest that there is a positive correlation between interest rate and inflation 
under the non-Ricardian case. The results come from a Markov-Switching VAR model using Choleski identification.         
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survey of the literature. Several approaches have been proposed to correct the puzzle including 
the addition of extra information related with inflation, i.e. commodity price indices or global 
inflation measures.26 However, Hanson (2004) argues that it is not a plausible solution. He 
examines a number of alternative indicator variables that contains extra information for inflation 
forecasting, and reports little correlation between the price puzzle and indicator variables to 
explain inflation. More importantly, Hanson (2004) finds that the appearance of the price puzzle 
primarily is associated with the 1959-1979 sample period. This period is known in the literature 
as a combination of active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy, or the non-Ricardian 
episode of US fiscal policy as is acknowledged in Woodford (1998).           
Further to the potential role of different macroeconomic policy regimes, and lack of 
information in the appearance of the price puzzle in monetary literature, Barth and Ramey (2002) 
explain the cost-channel interpretation of the price puzzle that focuses on the impact of shock on 
the supply-side of the economy. They argue that in circumstances in which capital is an essential 
component of output, a monetary contraction can influence output through the supply-channel 
together with the traditional demand-type channel. Their empirical results come from an industry-
level VAR model. Their results support the idea that for many industries output falls in response 
to monetary contraction, while the price-wage ratio increases. This is consistent with a supply 
shock. They also, find that the effects are noticeably more pronounced for the period before 1979.     
Having discussed the literature on monetary and fiscal policy interactions and before 
proceeding to the empirical analysis, the next section presents some stylised facts of the US 
macroeconomic policy indicators for the various Chairmen of the Federal Reserve.        
  
                                                     
26 The reason for the role of commodity prices in mitigating the price puzzle may be due to an information channel 
that commodity prices respond more quickly than aggregate goods prices to future inflationary pressures, rather than 
serving as a proxy for marginal costs of production, see Hanson (2004), and Bernanke et al. (2005). 
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Table 3.2. Key Indicators of the US Macroeconomics policy  
 
Policy 
Coordination 
 Federal 
Funds Rate 
Inflation Industrial 
Production 
Growth 
Government 
Debt-to-GDP 
Martin   
(1959-1970) 
PM  
AF&PF 
Mean 4.57 2.08 0.01* 37.00 
 Std 1.68 1.91 0.02† 2.95 
Burns    
(1970-1978) 
PM 
AF&PF 
Mean 8.36* 7.06* 0.01* 32.08 
Std 3.52† 2.45† 0.02† 1.04 
Volcker 
(1978-1987) 
AM 
 AF&PF 
Mean 6.62 4.72 0.01 50.56 
Std 2.36 1.42 0.01 10.73 
Greenspan 
(1987-2006) 
AM&PM 
PF&AF 
Mean 3.60 4.45 0.01 59.20 
Std 1.71 1.98 0.01 2.97 
Bernanke 
(2006-2013) 
PM 
AF 
Mean 1.23 4.18 0.00 82.09* 
Std 1.85 2.39 0.02† 15.03† 
Note: This Table reports the mean and standard deviation for key indicators of the US economy under the selected 
representative chairmanships of the Federal Reserve. Inflation is the change in CPI. Values marked by asterisks, *, 
present the largest Mean, and values marked by † present the largest Standard deviation. The policy coordination is 
reported according to monetary and fiscal policy regimes estimated by Favero and Monacelli (2003), and Davig and 
Leeper (2007, 2011). AM and PM abbreviate active and passive monetary policy, respectively. In addition, AF and 
PF abbreviate active and passive fiscal policy, respectively.        
Stylised Facts 
Table 3.2 details a descriptive account of the US macroeconomic policy indicators over the 
1959:Q1-2013:Q2 sample. A probability estimation of different macroeconomic policy regimes 
for the sample is illustrated in Appendix 3.B that is adopted from Davig and Leeper (2011). We 
can see from the Table that between 1959 and 1970, the Chairman Martin raised short-term 
interest rate to control inflation. However, this is identified as a period of passive monetary 
policy, see Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), and Figure 3.B.1. Although the average nominal 
interest rates were more than two percent points above inflation during the time, but the monetary 
authority has not endogenously responded to the accumulation of debt.  
As presented in Table 3.2, during Burns administration an expansionary monetary policy 
contributed to the high inflation in 1970-1980 with a weak response of interest rates to inflation, 
referred as a passive monetary policy. Then, tight monetary policy under Paul Volcker dragged 
the economy into a deep recession. From 1987, Greenspan was associated with a decline in both 
short-term interest rates and inflation. Then, the short-term rate further falls and reaches its zero 
lower bound in Bernanke period, while inflation fluctuates around the mean value over the 
sample.  
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Figure 3.1. US Macroeconomic Policy Indicators 
 
Note: This Figure presents US Interest rates, Inflation, Debt, and GDP growth over the period 1959:Q1-2013:Q2. 
All time-series are taken from the St Louis Fed FRED database as detailed in Appendix 3.A. The policy coordination 
is reported according to monetary and fiscal policy regimes estimated by Favero and Monacelli (2003), and Davig 
and Leeper (2007,2011). AM and PM abbreviate active and passive monetary policy, respectively. In addition, AF 
and PF abbreviate active and passive fiscal policy, respectively.     
 
Figure 3.1 plots key macroeconomic variables. As can be seen, inflation and short-term 
interest rate are positively correlated as expected. A higher real interest rate would generate lower 
inflation. A higher nominal rate is expected to be positively related to inflation through the Fisher 
Equation. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, Chairman Burns adopted a passive approach to monetary 
policy; between the late 1960s and 1970s, we see a small increases in interest rates in response to 
inflation. Then, in Volcker administration, interest rates responded more aggressively to 
inflation.27 Notice that 1980 stands out as a peak for both inflation and interest rates. After 1980, 
a more active, anti-inflationary, monetary policy seems to be responsible for real interest rates 
being persistently above the real growth rate of the economy. 
 
                                                     
27 These policy breaks have also been identified in Davig and Leeper (2007).  
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Regarding fiscal policy, US government debt-to-GDP fell until 1982.28 After 1982, debt 
rose until 1995. This can be explained as the period 1974-1986 contains at least three episodes:  
(i) the 1975 fiscal expansion caused by tax cut following the oil price increase, (ii) the US military 
build-up, (iii) the 1982 tax cut. Hence the pre-1980 period appears as one in which the government 
budget constraint is more binding relative to the post 1980 period as government debt starts to 
accelerate, see Favero and Monacelli (2003). The debt accumulation trend continues until 1995. 
Then, it starts to fall up to 2002 followed by a sharp increase after that, see Figure 3.1.  
Then, the tax cuts program in early 1979 in order to stimulate the economy, initiates a period 
of active fiscal policy that persisted by the mid-1980s. In 1984, fiscal policy switched to passive 
that has been lasted until 2002, in response to the sharp increase in debt-to-GDP ratio. Finally, 
fiscal policy switches to active in response to the 2008 crisis, see Davig and Leeper (2011). These 
changes in fiscal policy regimes account for adopting a non-linear approach to examine 
macroeconomic policy interactions.       
Note that we follow Favero and Monacelli (2003), and Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) to 
define periods of active fiscal policy when the fiscal authority sets its expenditure regardless of 
whether tax revenues are sufficient to finance the expenditure or not. While periods of passive 
fiscal policy are when the fiscal authority considers the balanced budget requirements to set its 
expenditure.29    
With reference to the outcome of monetary and fiscal policy as presented in Table 3.2, four 
features emerge. First, inflation peaked in 1970s, around of 7.06 percent on average, when an 
                                                     
28 We pick the government debt-to-GDP as our fiscal policy instrument. Favero and Giavazzi (2011), and Farhi and 
Werning (2012) argue that government debt-to-GDP as fiscal policy instrument can capture the dynamic of 
government budget over the time rather than representing the current figure as with government budget deficit.  
29 Favero and Monacelli (2003) estimate US fiscal policy regime changes within a Markov-Switching VAR model. 
They report active fiscal regimes, or "fiscal indiscipline" in their terminology, spans 1965:Q3-1968:Q1, and 
1974:Q2-1986:Q2. As is explained in Favero and Monacelli (2003), active fiscal policy covers these periods of fiscal 
discretionary expansion: (i) government spending on the Vietnam War and the War on poverty during 1965-1967 
that ended by the tax increase of 1968, and (ii) the 1975 Fordˈs tax cut following the oil price increase and the 
military build-up, and (iii) the 1982 Reganˈs tax cut. They identify passive fiscal regimes, or "fiscal discipline", are 
during 1960:Q4-1965:Q2,1968:Q2-1974:Q1, and 1986:Q3-2000:Q4. Favero and Monacelli (2003) note that 
1986:Q3 makes a clear breaks in the conduct of fiscal policy as after a prolonged regime instability fiscal policy 
seems to switch to a stable regime with a strong concern on output gap stabilization and a typical Ricardian feature 
of systematic reaction to the evolution of the government debt.    
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active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy regime have been in place. Second, the highest 
volatility of inflation, around of 2.45 percent on average, is associated with active fiscal policy 
and passive monetary policy regimes. Third, the highest mean and standard deviation values for 
the Federal Funds rate are experienced under active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy 
regimes. Forth, the highest debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with active fiscal and monetary policy 
coordination when the macroeconomics policy has responded to the 2008 financial crisis 
aggressively.30  
These are consistent with our overall discussion of different macroeconomic policy regimes. 
According to the literature, the post 1986:Q3 period can be characterized by an active monetary 
and a passive fiscal policy. That is the Ricardian view on the fiscal policy indicating a regime of 
monetary dominance. The policy outcome under this management is expected to be conventional. 
However, the literature acknowledges that 1965-1979 period can be characterised as the non-
Ricardian episodes, see Favero and Monacelli (2003), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011).            
Having discussed the literature on the monetary and fiscal policy interactions, the next 
section discusses our econometric methodology. 
3.3 Econometric Methodology  
Recall from Chapter 2, the Factor-Augmented VAR approach by construction summarizes the 
information of a large number of time-series into a small number of estimated factors providing 
an econometric model for policy evaluation purposes within a data-rich environment. In doing 
so, this section studies the construction of the FAVAR model followed by the Time-Varying 
Parameter FAVAR approach.  
3.3.1 The Factor-Augmented VAR Framework 
Consider a standard reduced-form VAR model to study the transmission of monetary policy in 
the economy as presented in Equation (3.1): 
                                                     
30 This happens as a result of a rapid decline in the Federal Funds rate up to the ZLB jointed with the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act that increases government debt-to-GDP ratio. 
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tPtPtt uYBYBY   11  (3. 1) 
Where ],[
''
ttt RZY  , tZ is a )1( L  vector of variables representing the economy, and tR is a 
single serie representing the policy instrument. The coefficients PiBi ,,1,   have 
)1()1(  LL dimensions, and ),0(~ Nut  where   is a covariance matrix and has 
)1()1(  LL  dimensions. The number of variables included in 
'
tY  depends on the modelling 
objectives. In a standard VAR model, it usually does not exceed 20 variables in order to avoid 
the over-parameterization problem, see Bernanke et al. (2005), and Korobilis (2013). To address 
this problem the FAVAR approach produce results that are more precise by involving as many 
theory-based variables as possible into the VAR model. In other words, it is possible to 
decompose the N dimensional vector of observable variables, tX  with )1( N dimension into a 
lower dimensional vector of K factors namely tF , where NK  , see Bernanke et al. (2005).  
Let tY  be a vector with dimension of 1M  representing a set of observable economic 
variables as indicators of the economy. Likewise the standard approach for assessing monetary 
policy in the VAR literature, tY  can contain a policy indicator and some observable variables to 
measure real activity and price levels. Given the possibility of imprecise results when the 
economy is represented by a few variables, addition of supplementary economic information 
motivated by theory can increase the explanatory ability of the estimated model. Suppose that 
this additional information can be outlined into a 1K  vector of unobserved factors, tF where 
K  is small. These unobservable factors can capture the fluctuations in main economic indicators 
such as economic activity, price forces, or credit conditions that are hard to be proxied by a few 
numbers of variables.  
As Bernanke et al. (2005) explain, the FAVAR model includes the joint dynamics of tY  
and tF  nested in the standard VAR framework formulated as follows. 
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Where )(L is a lag polynomial of finite order d , and tu  is error term vector with 1)( MK
dimension that  ),0(,..~ QNdiiut . Equation (3.2) represents a Factor-Augmented VAR. It can 
be reduced to a standard VAR in the form of tY  if )(L that relates tY  to 1tF  equals zero. 
Equation (3.2) cannot be estimated directly because the factors, tF , are unobservable. 
Given that these factors are representing forces that potentially affect many economic variables, 
it is possible to infer some information about the factors from observation of large number of 
economic time series, see Bernanke et al. (2005). Let tX  represents the informational time series 
with the dimension of 1N , while NMK  . Assuming that the informational time series tX  
are related to the unobservable factors tF  and the observed variables tY , the unobservable 
components summarized in tF  can be estimated as formulated in Equation (3.3). 
tt
y
it
f
iit eYFX   (3. 3) 
Where f is an KN   matrix of factor loadings, y  is an MN  , and 
ie  is the vector of error 
terms with 1N  dimension, which are mean zero and assumed to be either normal and 
uncorrelated or weakly cross-correlated depending on the model estimation method.31 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the error terms of Equations (3.2) and (3.3) are independent of 
each other. Thus, tX  measures the unobservable factors conditional on tY , see Bernanke, et al. 
(2005).   
There are two approaches to estimate the state and measurement Equation denoted as 
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) herein: (i) a two-step Principal Component method, and (ii) a single-
step Bayesian Likelihood method. As is discussed in Bernanke et al. (2005), it is hard to favour 
one approach over the other one, given that the two methods are different in many dimensions. 
                                                     
31 As is discussed in Bernanke et al. (2005), the Principal Components method allows for some cross-correlation in 
te that disappears as N .       
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However, the factors estimated using the PC method might carry more information compared 
with the likelihood method that imposes additional structure on the model. Furthermore, the two-
step approach is non-parametric, implying that there is no requirement for imposing restriction 
in the measurement Equation (3.3). In contrast, the likelihood-based approach is fully parametric 
that the accuracy of the results depends very much on the model specification and the imposed 
restrictions.  Hence, for the sake of computation-simplicity, we employ the two-step PC method 
to estimate our FAVAR model.32  
As mentioned the PC approach provides a non-parametric solution to uncover the common 
space spanned by the factors of tX , denoted by  tt YFC , . In the first step, PC analysis is applied 
to the measurement Equation (3.3) in order to estimate the space spanned by the factors based on 
the first MK   Principal Components of tX , denoted by  tt YFC ,ˆ . It must be mentioned that the 
estimation of the first step does not rely on the fact that the observed variables, tY  are among the 
common components, see Bernanke et al. (2005). Thus, the factors )ˆ,,ˆ,ˆ(
21 K
ttt FFF   are 
estimated in the first step as follows. 
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 (3. 4) 
Furthermore, the loadings )ˆ,,ˆ,ˆ( 21
t
K
tt    are obtained by estimating Equation (3.5) that 
employs the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. 
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32 It is worth noting that Bernanke et al. (2005) compute and present the results using the both approaches. Given 
the comparison of the results therein, there is no clear advantage between these two methods for the estimation of 
factors.    
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In the second step, we replace the unobserved factors in the transition Equation (3.2) by their PC 
estimates, and run a standard VAR model to obtain )(ˆ L  as follows. 
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As is mentioned earlier, computational simplicity together with allowing for some degree 
of cross-correlation in the idiosyncratic error terms te , and the fact that the two-step estimation 
method impose few distributional assumptions are the main advantages for this approach. One 
disadvantage of the approach, however, is the presence of "generated regressors" in the second 
step. As is addressed in Bernanke et al. (2005) it is possible to obtain accurate confidence 
intervals on the IRFs by implementing Kilianˈ bootstrap procedure that accounts for the 
uncertainty in the factor estimation.33 Following Bernanke et al. (2005) this procedure is 
employed for estimation of IRFs confidence intervals.  
3.3.2 The Time-Varying Parameter FAVAR Framework 
The parameters of the linear FAVAR model presented earlier are time-invariant. However, 
having considered structural changes in the economy induced by the conduct of different 
macroeconomic policies, it is important to measure the impact of monetary policy shocks over 
different points in time by allowing the parameters of the model to change over the time, see 
Primiceri (2005), Del Negro and Schorfheide (2010), and Korobilis (2013). 
Parameters can vary either gradually over time following a Multivariate Autoregressive 
process, or they can change abruptly as in a Markov-Switching or Structural-Breaks pattern. 
Following Primiceri (2005), Koop and Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis (2013) we adopt the TVP 
approach to capture structural changes in the economy within the two-step PC approach to 
                                                     
33 As explained in Bernanke et al. (2005) and the reference therein, in theory, when N  is large relative to T , the 
uncertainty in the factor estimates can be ignored.  
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estimate the FAVAR model. However, the estimated factors now are allowed to drift in both the 
mean and variance parameters with a random walk pattern.    
Thus, to assess the effects of policy actions over the time, the parameters of the FAVAR 
model now are allowed to vary over the time. Accordingly, the TVP-FAVAR version of Equation 
(3.1) will take the below form. 
tPtPtttt uYBYBY   11  (3. 7) 
Where ],,[ ''' tttt RZFY  , and tF  is a )1( K  vector of latent factors. Likewise, the standard VARs 
],[ ' tt RZ  is a vector consists of observed variables and the monetary policy tools with )1)1(( L
dimension. Also, PjB jt ,,1,   are a MM   matrices of coefficients, and ),0(~ Nut  
where   is a MM   full covariance matrix for each Tt ,,1  , with 1 LKM .        
Comparable with the FAVAR model, a general specification for the TVP-FAVAR can be 
written as follows. 
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X it   (3. 9) 
Where Equations (3.8) and (3.9) represent the state and measurement equation, respectively. 
Each of the Ni ,,1  original observed series 
itX  is linked to the factors, the other observed 
variables,
'
tZ , and the monetary policy tool, tR , by a factor analysis regression with cross auto- 
correlated errors and stochastic volatility defined as follows; 
itt
R
it
Z
it
F
iit uRZFX 
ˆˆˆ  (3. 10) 
And 
itqitiqitiit uuu    11  (3. 11) 
Where RZ  ˆ,ˆ are )1( N , and 
Fˆ  is )( KN  . The errors are ))exp(,0(~ itit hN  , and are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the factors. As is explained in Korobilis (2013), working with 
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uncorrelated errors required that Equation (3.10) to be transformed as formulated in Equation 
(3.12); 
ttt
R
t
Z
t
F
t XLRZFX  )(  (3. 12) 
Where ))(,),(()( 1 LLdiagL n  , 
q
iqil
i LLL   )(  ,and 
f
n
i LI  ˆ))((  for
RZFj ,, .  Also, ),0(~ tt HN  where ))exp(,),(exp( 1 ntt hhdiagH  , and the individual log-
volatilities evolves as a drift-less random walk as follows; 
h
titit hh  1  (3. 13) 
Where ),0(~ t
h
t N  . As has been discussed in Korobilis (2013), in attempt to parameterize the 
large covariance matrices related to Equation (3.7) which presents a VAR system on the factors 
and observable variables, 
'
tZ  and tR , with drifting coefficients and stochastic volatility, it is 
possible to decompose the FAVAR error covariance matrix in the following form; 
ttttt AA   (3. 14) 
Where tA  is a unit lower triangular matrix, and t is the diagonal matrix. 
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To proceed with parameter estimation, let ))(,,)(( 1  pttt BvecBvecB   be a vector 
consists of all the parameters of the Equation (3.7). In addition, ),,(
'
),1(
'
1
  tjjjt aa  where 
mj ,,1  be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix tA , and 
)log,,(loglog ''1  nttt    be the vector of the diagonal elements of the matrix  t . Assuming 
that all these three drifting parameters, 
'log,,  ttB  follow random walks, for each period the 
innovations of the parameters can be formulated as follows;       
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B
t
B
ttt JBB  1  (3. 15) 
 tttt J 1  (3. 16) 
 tttt J 1loglog  (3. 17) 
Where ),0(~ 
 QNt  are independent innovation vectors, Q  are innovation covariance 
matrices associated with each of the parameters vectors, and }log,,{ tttt B   .
34  
Furthermore, the random variables 

tJ  are defined to take only two values: one and zero at 
each period t. This property allows that the state errors be a mixture of a normal component with 
covariance 
Q , and a second component that places all probability point mass at zero, see 
Korobilis (2013). The random variables 

tJ  are updated and determined based on the data 
likelihood allowing them to take either the specification of constant-parameters as
TtJ t ,,1,0 
 , or Time-Varying Parameters as TtJ t ,,1,1 
 .      
The unobserved variables and the model parameters can be estimated in one-step by 
employing the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach. However, as has been discussed 
in Koop and Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis (2013) the MCMC method makes the estimation 
procedure unnecessarily complicated for computing the latent factors compared with the two-
steps PC estimator method. As explained earlier it is simpler to obtain the factors from PC method 
and employ them in a TVP-FAVAR model allowing that the drifting mean and variance 
parameters to follow a random walk. This assumption, which is based on a standard state-space 
method, simplifies the estimation procedure, see Koop and Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis 
(2013). Thus, likewise FAVAR model, the PC method is applied to estimate the factors, while 
the MCMC simulation method is adopted to estimate the Time-Varying Parameters in Equations 
(3.15) to (3.17).    
                                                     
34 A detailed discussion can be found in Primiceri (2005) and Korobilis (2013).    
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The next section proceeds to estimate a FAVAR model with Constant-Parameters followed 
by estimating a TVP-FAVAR model with monetary and fiscal policy variables. These two 
versions of the FAVAR model are employed for monetary and fiscal policy analysis. 
3.4 Empirical Results    
This section presents the empirical findings. As mentioned earlier the study pursues two 
objectives. First, examining the impact of monetary and fiscal policy interactions and 
investigating whether the impact is changes over the time. Second, identifying the extent to 
which the transmission of monetary policy is affected by US fiscal policy. For this purpose, we 
extend the Constant-Parameter FAVAR and the TVP-FAVAR models presented in Bernanke et 
al. (2005), and Korobilis (2013) in two regards.  
First, we account for fiscal policy to examine the impact of fiscal policy on monetary policy 
and its effect on the economy. Second, we incorporate the period after the financial crisis in our 
analysis. Prior to presenting the results, the model specification together with the dataset is 
explained followed by the identification approach. Then, the section proceeds to estimate the 
linear and TVP-FAVAR models.     
3.4.1 Model Specification 
Given this chapter motivation, we estimate two different models namely the simple model and 
the fiscal-augmented model under Constant-Parameter FAVAR and TVP-FAVAR 
specifications. The simple model is specified as it excludes fiscal-related information while the 
fiscal stance is captured in the fiscal-augmented model. 
The model is estimated over the 1959:Q1-2013:Q2 sample. The choice of the sample is 
driven by the idea to assess the conduct of monetary policy over four representative periods: 
1975:Q1, 1981:Q3, 1996:Q1, and 2006:Q2 as representative of the chairmanships of Burns, 
Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke respectively. The study involves dataset consists of 195 US 
macroeconomic time series collected from the St Louis Fed FRED database.35 Following common 
                                                     
35 A detailed description of database is provided in Appendix 3.A section.  
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practice in this literature, all variables are transformed to be stationary using a number of methods 
including the computation of their first difference.36 Appendix 3.A provide a detailed explanation 
of the procedure. All the time series are seasonally adjusted were this is applicable.37   
Consistent with the Factor Modelling literature, macroeconomic time series is selected to 
represent the following categories: Real Output and Income, Employment and Hours, 
Consumption, Housing Starts and Sales, Real Inventories and Orders Indices, Exchange Rates, 
Interest Rates, Money and Credit Quantity Aggregates, Price Indices, Average Hourly Earnings, 
the Fiscal Stance, and Consumers Expectations, see Appendix 3.A. As regards determining the 
number of factors involved in the FAVAR model, we follow Bernanke et al. (2005) approach that 
is based on the sensitivity of the results to the alternative number of factors.  As have been reported 
in Bernanke et al. (2005), and Korobilis (2013) the qualitative results are not altered when the 
number of factors increased from three to five factors. We also estimate our specified Constant-
Parameter FAVAR model with three and five factors. As the obtained results appear to have fairly 
the same qualitative pattern, both the linear and TVP-FAVAR models are constructed with three 
factors to maintain parsimony.38 
The lag length of the state Equations (3.2) and (3.8) is another important specification to be 
determined. The lag lengths are selected in the VAR literature based on statistical criterion such 
as AIC, BIC, or SIC. In the FAVAR literature, however, no specific criterion is used, to our 
knowledge. Bernanke et al. (2005) employ 13 lags in order to allow sufficient dynamics in their 
model. On the other hand, Stock and Watson (2005) estimate a 2-lag model. We follow Bernanke 
et al. (2005) approach and construct our model with 13 lags.    
                                                     
36 We follow Bernanke et al. (2005), Stock and Watson (2005), and Korobilis (2013) procedure to ensure stationary 
properties of the time series.   
37 The time series are seasonally adjusted using the Demetra+ package developed by Eurostat. To seasonally adjust 
the time series, the TRAMOSEATS method has been employed. This method can be divided into two main parts: a 
pre-adjustment step, which removes the deterministic component of the series by means of a regression model with 
Arima noises and the decomposition part itself. See Grudkowska (2013) for a detailed explanation.  
38 As discussed in Bernanke et al. (2005) increasing the number of factors does not appear to improve the results.  
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With reference to the observable variables required to be isolated in the VAR part,
tY , our 
VAR includes inflation, Industrial Production growth, and the Federal Funds rate.39 Thus, our 
FAVAR is a trivariate VAR augmented with three unobservable factors, tF , which are extracted 
from the large set of time series macroeconomic variables as is addressed in Appendix 3.A, and 
includes fiscal variables. We use the PC approach to extract the factors. The use of PC method 
ensures identification of the model since it normalizes all factors to have zero mean and unit 
variance, see Korobilis (2013).  
3.4.2 Monetary Policy Shock Identification  
There are a number of approaches for identification of monetary policy shocks in the VAR 
literature. These includes recursive identification approach, long-run restrictions, or structural 
VAR procedures that can also be implemented in the FAVAR framework, see Bernanke et al. 
(2005). The recursive identification is standard in much of the VAR literature and 
straightforward to apply.40 On the other hand, the other competing identification approaches 
would require restrictions to be imposed on the factors to identify them as specific economic 
concepts.41      
Thus, we follow Bernanke et al. (2005) and focus upon a recursive approach to identify 
monetary policy shock. This approach assumes that the monetary authority reacts simultaneously 
to macroeconomic shocks. However, macroeconomic variables react to monetary impulses with 
lags. Thus, monetary policy actions influence inflation and Industrial Production growth with at 
                                                     
39 We followed Bernanke et al. (2005) approach to put Industrial Production growth as observable variable in the 
VAR to proxy output. As Bernanke et al. (2005) explain, "Output in the theoretical model may correspond more 
closely to a latent measure of economic activity than to a specific data series such as real GDP". Thus, we include 
GDP as a time series in our information to extract the unobserved factors. We, then, present the IRFs of GDP to the 
policy shock within the FAVAR model.     
40 See Christiano et al. (1999), Favero and Monacelli (2003), Bernanke et al. (2005), Primiceri (2005), Koop and 
Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis (2013) among others. 
41 As is addressed in Bernanke et al. (2005) implementing long-run restrictions requires these restrictions to be 
identified separately from the other factors. One potential way to achieve this is extracting Principal Components 
from blocks of data corresponding to different dimensions of the economy. For example, real-activity measure is 
possible to be considered as is obtained solely from the output gap. This identification approach is explored in 
Korobilis (2013) together with the recursive approach. Comparing the IRFs results obtained from recursive 
identification approach and those from the block factors in Korobilis (2013), it appears that there is no substantial 
difference between responses.                    
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least one period of lag, while the time lag for interest rate is zero by ordering it last in the VAR 
part.42 Furthermore, it treats inflation as predetermined, which is consistent with estimating a 
Taylor Rule that regresses the nominal interest rate on inflation, see Bernanke et al. (2005), and 
Chung et al. (2007).   
The standard recursive approach implies that the Fed Funds rate, tR , as monetary policy 
instrument is ordered last and its innovations are treated as the policy shocks while the 
unobservable factors and variables respond to the policy shock with time lags which is a quarter 
in this study. As discussed in Bernanke et al. (2005) two blocks of information variables can be 
defined: (i) the slow-moving variables, and (ii) the fast-moving variables. The slow-moving block 
of variables is assumed that respond to monetary policy shocks with a quarter lag. In contrast, the 
fast-moving block of variables reacts instantly to the policy shocks.43      
To estimate the FAVAR model using the two-step PC approach, the first step ),(ˆ tt YFC  must 
be calculated. Given that tY  is not explicitly imposed as a common component in the first step, 
it is possible that any of the linear combinations of  ),(ˆ tt YFC  involves the policy instrument, tR . 
Thus, the dependency of ),(ˆ tt YFC  on tR  must be eliminated in order that the policy shock 
recursive identification to be valid, see Bernanke et al. (2005). One potential solution here is to 
estimate the coefficients of ),(ˆ tt YFC  from a multiple regression as follows. 
ttRtCtt eRbFCbYFC  )(*
ˆ),(ˆ *  (3. 18) 
Where )(*ˆ tFC is an estimate of all the common components subtracted tR . Then, )(*
ˆ
tFC can 
be obtained by extracting PC from the slow-moving block of variables which cannot be affected 
                                                     
42 As explained in Primiceri (2005) ordering interest rates last in the VAR is not simply an ordering issue, but an 
identification condition that is essential for isolating monetary policy shock.   
43 The slow-moving block of variables includes Real Output and Income, Employment and Hours, Consumption, 
Price Indices, Average Hourly Earnings, the Fiscal Stance, and Consumers Expectations. The fast-moving block of 
variables includes Housing Starts and Sales, Real Inventories and Orders Indices, Exchange Rates, Interest Rates, 
and Money and Credit Quantity Aggregates, see Appendix 3.A for details. 
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instantly by tR . Now, tFˆ  can be constructed as tRtt RbYFC
ˆ),(ˆ  , and a VAR between tFˆ  and tY
will be estimated which is identified recursively, and the monetary policy instrument, tR , is 
ordered last.44  
Now we proceed to the TVP-FAVAR model identification. To study the way that monetary 
policy interactions may evolve over the time, the parameters of the FAVAR are allowed to vary 
through time. The sources of time variation are both coefficients and the variance-covariance 
matrix of the shocks. This way, it is possible to distinguish between the exogenous shocks and 
changes in the transmission mechanism, see Primiceri (2005). As is discussed in Koop and 
Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis (2013) obtaining sensible results from TVP-FAVAR model 
requires the imposing of restrictions to allow only particular parameters to vary over time. 
A general specification for TVP-FAVAR model can be acquired using these following 
restrictions imposed to the measurement and the state equation of the TVP-FAVAR in the form 
of Equations (3.19) and (3.20) respectively. Note that tX  represents all the information in time 
series using to extract the unobservable factors, tF  represents the factors, and tR represents the 
monetary policy instrument.  
   ittittitoitit RFX   (3. 19) 
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As regards the estimation of Equations (3.19) and (3.20), the following issues must be taken 
into account. 
1. Each innovation term, it , in the measurement equation follows an univariate stochastic 
volatility process,       
2. 
F
t
F
t 
ˆ)ˆ(var   has a multivariate stochastic volatility process, 
                                                     
44 A detailed explanation of the identification using the PC approach can be found in Bernanke et al. (2005).  
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3. ptt 
ˆ,,ˆ 1  Which are the coefficients of the state equation are allowed to vary in 
accordance with random walk model.45  
Following Primiceri (2005), Koop and Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis (2013) the simulations is 
carried based on 10,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler, discarding the first 2000 for 
convergence. Given the dimension of the model and the presence of TVP, some shrinkage in the 
model is required. One potential approach to provide shrinkage in the model is to employ the 
prior. This study follows Koop and Korobilis (2010) and employs the Minnesota prior that is a 
standard one in the VAR literature. The key property of this prior is that the own lags of each 
variable is weighted more than lags of other variables.46   
Having established the identification of monetary policy shock, the next section presents 
the IRFs for both the linear and TVP-FAVAR models.  
3.4.3 The FAVAR Model Specification Results to Monetary Shock 
This section presents the empirical results for the Constant-Parameter FAVAR model estimated 
by the two-step Principal Components approach. The objective is to investigate the impact of 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions on the US economy. In particular, it aims to examine the 
way in which monetary policy transmission mechanism may be influenced by the fiscal stance.  
Two FAVAR models are specified for estimation: a simple FAVAR model, and a fiscal-
augmented FAVAR model. The simple model is based on the Bernanke et al. (2005) FAVAR 
model that excludes the fiscal variables. It is instructive to compare the results obtained from the 
simple FAVAR model with the fiscal-augmented one to understand the potential impact of the 
fiscal stance on the economy.  
Figure 3.2 presents the Impulse Response Functions (IRF) to a recursively identified 
contractionary monetary policy shock. The IRFs are generated within the simple FAVAR model 
with three unobserved factors and three observed variables in the VAR. The three observed 
                                                     
45 As explained in Koop and Korobilis (2010), it is difficult to estimate time variation of coefficients in both the 
measurement and the state equation in absence of strong prior information.   
46 A more detailed discussion of this choice compared with the alternative prior specification can be found in Koop 
and Korobilis (2010), and Korobilis (2013). 
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variables in the VAR section include Inflation, Industrial Production growth, and the nominal 
Federal Funds rate.47 It is expected that a monetary contraction shall induce small and transitory 
effects on interest rates with a rather large and persistent impact on output and prices, see Barth 
and Ramey (2002) and Eichenbaum (1992). As can be seen in the graph, inflation is unresponsive 
first, and then slightly falls in response to a monetary contraction although this is statistically 
insignificant. There is no evidence of the price puzzle. Moreover, Industrial Production growth 
declines in response to the shock that is consistent with the conventional view in the literature. 
However, the response of output appear to be statistically insignificant.  
The FAVAR model provides us with a broad set of responses to the monetary shocks, to 
which we turn now. According to IRFs plotted in Figure 3.2, the responses of the other 
macroeconomic variables in the FAVAR are generally consistent with economic intuition. A 
monetary contraction reduces the growth rate of real activity measures including GDP, new 
orders index, new housing starts, and average hourly earnings. Unemployment also increases. 
The response of these real activity indicators appears to be statistically significant.  In addition, 
both durable and non-durable consumption fall in response to the shock that appears to be 
statistically significant.48 This can be explained through a negative wealth effect. A rise in Fed 
Funds rates would induce asset prices to fall as equities would be substituted by bonds, see 
Mishkin (1995). This, in turns, would generate a negative wealth effect leading to a reduction in 
private expenditure including consumption and new housing starts.   
Moreover, the response of money aggregate measures such as monetary base, money 
supply, and loans is consistent with the intuition: all appear to decline in response to a monetary 
contraction as the opportunity cost of holding money increases. As Figure 3.2 shows, the 
responses of monetary aggregate measures appear to be statistically significant.   
  
                                                     
47 We follow Bernanke et al. (2005), Primeceri (2005), and Korobilis (2013) and construct both the FAVAR and 
TVP-FAVAR models using nominal variables.  
48 Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) point out that expenditure on durable goods is the most interest-sensitive 
components of aggregate consumption.    
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Figure 3.2.The IRFs to a US Monetary Contraction within the Simple FAVAR  
 
Note: This Figure illustrates IRFs to a contractionary monetary shock from a FAVAR with constant parameters. The 
VAR part of the model includes the Federal Funds rate, Industrial Production growth, and Inflation on top panel. The 
IRFs of other key variables in the monetary transmission mechanism is estimated based on three unobserved factors. 
The Impulse Responses together with their confidence intervals (10th, 50th, and 90th) are generated based on Bernanke 
et al. (2005) FAVAR model specification corresponds to a one standard deviation increase to the Federal Fund Rate. 
The FAVAR model is estimated using the Two-Step Principal Components approach from Bernanke et al. (2005) over 
the 1959:Q1-2013:Q2 sample. 
 
We are now looking at the monetary transmission in which monetary policy influences the 
economy. As regards the impact of the policy upon the exchange rate, it is expected that higher 
interest rates appreciate the domestic currency and cause asset prices to fall. As is visible in 
Figure 3.2, the US exchange rate to Japanese Yen remains unresponsive up to 12 quarters and 
falls after that. An increase in the Federal Funds rate, also, induces the long-term interest rate to 
increase which remains significant up to 9 quarters. Furthermore, as the opportunity cost of 
holding money increasing, it would induce bank reserves to fall, see Mishkin (1995). Confronting 
the IRFs results presented in Figure 3.2 with the literature on the monetary transmission, it 
appears that responses are consistent and excluding inflation, industrial production growth, and 
the exchange rate, the response of others remains statistically significant for quite some time. 
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Comparing the results from the simple FAVAR, which excludes fiscal variables in the 
factors, with those of Bernanke et al. (2005) a few notable features emerge.49 Unlike Bernanke et 
al. (2005) there is no evidence of the price puzzle in our simple FAVAR model specification, 
however, inflation stays unresponsive to the policy shock for half of the period and then slightly 
falls.50 This is a dissatisfactory aspect of our most basic FAVAR model, since it is generally 
believed that monetary policy can influence inflation. It appears that increasing the time span 
under study and involving extra information for extracting factors could contribute to 
disappearance of the price puzzle. According to Sims (1992) if the addition of extra information 
mitigates the price puzzle, it can be concluded that the new time series contain useful information 
for the economy. Moreover, the response of average hourly earnings is counterintuitive in 
Bernanke et al. (2005), that is the same pattern as inflation in response to monetary contraction. 
However, our results seem to be reasonable as it falls in response to the policy shock that 
statistically is significant for quite large interval, see Figure 3.2.         
Having presented the main results from the simple FAVAR model, now we proceed to 
consider the impact of fiscal policy on the economy and the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Figure 3.3 presents the IRFs results of the benchmark linear FAVAR model augmented with the 
fiscal variables in the factors.51 We consider the case of a contractionary monetary policy shock. 
In general, as the IRFs suggest including the fiscal stance influence the responses and the 
transmission mechanism. Similar to the simple FAVAR model specification, Industrial 
Production growth falls in the fiscal-augmented model in response to a monetary contraction. 
                                                     
49 Note that the simple FAVAR models is estimated based on information from 165 macroeconomic time series 
representing economic activity except the fiscal stance, while those presented in Bernanke et al. (2005) relies on 120 
macroeconomic time series.   
50 The results obtained from a FAVAR model in Bernanke et al. (2005) display the price puzzle which disappears 
after a short while.   
51 In order to study the impact of monetary policy shock, the fiscal-augmented FAVAR model, in both linear and 
non-linear approaches, is constructed by including the fiscal-stance related variables in Xt to estimate the factors as 
Appendix 3.A details. The VAR part of the model,Yt , stays the same as the simple specification that includes the 
Federal Funds rate, Inflation, and Industrial Production growth. Given that we employ IRF results and not the GIRFs 
or OIFs, by inserting both fiscal and monetary policy shocks instruments into the VAR, orthogonality would be an 
issue to obtain reasonable results. Note that both the GIRFs and OIFs guarantee that various imposed shocks to the 
system are uncorrelated. Chapter 4 explores this idea further.            
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However, comparing the response of inflation from the simple model with the fiscal-FAVAR, it 
is evident that inflation increases in the latter model while it remains unresponsive and eventually 
falls within the simple model. It worthy to note that the response of both Industrial Production 
growth and inflation remains statistically insignificant.    
Taking account of fiscal variables may explain the response of inflation within the fiscal-
augmented FAVAR model. In the presence of large and persistent government debt, the monetary 
authorities are forced to increase the money supply in order to accommodate the growth in money 
demand induced by the debt,  see Bradley (1984). The mechanism works as follows. A monetary 
contraction would force the fiscal authority to issue new bonds to finance the increase in 
government debt induced by higher interest rates. This would increase the demand for money as 
the demand for bonds increase. This can lead to an increase in inflation. In addition, the issuance 
of new bonds and the higher interest rates can generate positive wealth effects, see Canzoneri et 
al. (2011). This positive wealth effect can induce aggregate demand to increase through private 
consumption leading to a raise in inflation.  
Turning to Figure 3.3, we can see that consumption increases and then falls in response to 
monetary contraction. Consumersˈexpectations also rises on impact, and then gradually returns 
to zero. The increase in consumption, both durable and non-durable, can suggest that this policy-
induced increase in the interest rates generates a positive wealth effect contributing to an increase 
in inflation. Thus, it appeared that involving fiscal policy within linear fiscal-augmented can 
influence the response of inflation to a monetary policy shock compared with the more limited 
model FAVAR.    
With reference to a fall in Industrial Production growth and a rise in inflation associated 
with a monetary contraction, these results might be in line with the cost-channel interpretation of 
the price puzzle as proposed by Barth and Ramey (2002). That is a policy-induced increase in the 
interest rate causes the unit cost of production to increase leading to a rise in prices and a fall in 
output when capital is an important component of output.   
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Figure 3.3. The IRFs to a US Monetary Contraction within the Fiscal-Augmented FAVAR  
 
Note: This Figure illustrates IRFs to a contractionary monetary shock within a constant parameter FAVAR 
augmented with fiscal variables. The VAR part of the model includes the Federal Funds rate, Industrial 
Production growth, and Inflation on top panel. The IRFs of other key variables in the monetary transmission 
mechanism is estimated based on three unobserved factors. The Impulse Responses together with their confidence 
intervals (10th, 50th, and 90th) are generated based on Bernanke et al. (2005) FAVAR model specification corresponds 
to a one standard deviation increase to the Federal Fund Rate. The FAVAR model is estimated using the Two-Step 
Principal Components approach from Bernanke et al. (2005) over the 1959:Q1-2013:Q2 sample. 
 
 
Another clear distinction between the two FAVAR model specifications is related to the 
measure of monetary aggregate. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, both monetary base and money 
supply increase in response to the policy shock in the fiscal-augmented model while both fall in 
the simple FAVAR. This finding is consistent with Bradley (1984) explanation of the impact of 
debt on monetary aggregate and prices consequently, which can be referred to as the debt 
monetizing.  
 Within the simple FAVAR, there is a fall in other real activity measures, i.e. GDP, 
unemployment, the average hourly earnings, new housing starts, and new orders index, in 
response to monetary contraction. The fiscal-FAVAR also indicates that real activity falls. As 
regards the fiscal variables, Figure 3.3 indicates that total government expenditure and the interest 
payments on the public debt increase in response to a monetary contraction, while government 
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debt-to-GDP is particularly unchanged. However, the fiscal variables responses are statistically 
insignificant.  
To summarize, the IRFs so far suggests that a monetary contraction reduces output growth 
and real activity measures within a linear FAVAR, irrespective of whether the fiscal stance is 
included or not. However, while inflation falls within the simple model, it increases in response 
to the policy shock in the fiscal-augmented model. It worthy of note, though, that the responses 
of Industrial Production growth and inflation are statistically insignificant for the both model 
specifications. The insignificant results may suggest that the impact of monetary policy shocks 
are time varying, given the existing literature on monetary and fiscal policy regime changes, see 
Favero and Monacelli (2003), and Davig and Leeper (2007, 2012). This can also be seen in the 
results presented in Bernanke et al. (2005) as the response of inflation and Industrial Production 
growth are not statistically significant.    
To study the way that monetary and fiscal policy interactions may evolve over the time, the 
next section presents the results from a TVP-FAVAR model.     
3.4.4 The TVP-FAVAR Model Specification Results to Monetary Shock 
Several studies find evidence supporting that macroeconomic policy in the United States changed 
regimes, see Favero and Monacelli (2003), Chung et al. (2007), and Davig and Leeper (2007, 
2011). Given this chapter motivation, we examine the potential influence of changes in monetary 
and fiscal policy performance on the economy, and the transmission mechanism of policy 
shocks. Likewise the linear FAVAR model, the impact of the fiscal variables on the monetary 
policy over the time is examined within both the simple and the fiscal-augmented TVP-FAVAR 
model. The model specification and identification of the shocks is the same as explained in the 
linear FAVAR model.  
Figures 3.4 to 3.11 present the results for both the simple and the fiscal-augmented TVP-
FAVAR models. The monetary policy shock is assumed as non-systematic. It means that the 
policy shock can captures policy mistakes and movements in the Federal Funds rate and not the 
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changes in the structure of the economy, see Primiceri (2005), and Korobilis (2013). The 
posterior mean estimates of the standard errors for the three unobserved factors and the three 
observable variables in the VAR are plotted in Figures 3.4 to 3.7. The standard deviation values 
are the square roots of the main-diagonal elements of the matrix 
t , for all t . Hence, higher 
standard deviation of monetary policy shocks is associated with higher policy mistakes, see 
Korobilis (2013). 
As Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate, including the fiscal stance to the TVP-FAVAR model 
decreases the posterior mean of the standard deviations for the estimated factors. In comparison 
with those presented in Korobilis (2013), that is estimated under Bernanke et al. (2005) 
identification, it appears that the mean values of the standard deviations in our results within both 
the simple and the fiscal-augmented model are much lower. This decline in the standard 
deviations of the residuals may imply that including the fiscal stance and extending the sample 
have influence on reducing policy errors, specifically after the 1980s.      
As can be observed in Figures 3.6 and 3.7, the standard deviations of the residuals of the 
observable variables in the VAR decrease when fiscal variables are included in the model 
compared with the simple TVP-FAVAR. As regards with the posterior mean of the standard 
deviations of inflation, mainly two episodes within the fiscal-augmented model can be identified: 
one before 1975 that the mean values ranging around of 0.8, and another one after 1981 that the 
mean values falling around of 0.4. 
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Figure 3.4. Posterior Mean of the SD of Residuals of the Factors within the Simple TVP-
FAVAR  
 
Note: Figure presents the Time-Varying Standard Deviations (SD) of the errors within the simple TVP-FAVAR 
model with Three Unobserved Factors over the 1959:Q1-2013:Q2 sample. The FAVAR part of the model is 
estimated using the Two-Step Principal Components method based on Bernanke et al. (2005) identification 
approach.   
 
 
Figure 3.5. Posterior Mean of the SD of Residuals of the Factors within the Fiscal-
Augmented TVP-FAVAR  
 
Note: Figure presents the Time-Varying Standard Deviations (SD) of errors within the fiscal-augmented TVP-
FAVAR model with Three Unobserved Factors over the 1959:Q1-2013:Q2 sample. The FAVAR part of the model 
is estimated using the Two-Step Principal Components method based on Bernanke et al. (2005) identification 
approach.   
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Figure 3.6. Posterior Mean of the SD of Residuals for the Observable Variables within the 
Simple TVP-FAVAR  
 
Note: Figure presents the Time-Varying Standard Deviations (SD) of errors within the simple TVP-FAVAR model 
with Three Unobserved Factors over the 1959:Q1-2013:Q2 sample. The FAVAR part of the model is estimated 
using the Two-Step Principal Components method based on Bernanke et al. (2005) identification approach.   
 
 
Figure 3.7. Posterior Mean of the SD of Residuals for the Observable Variables within the 
Fiscal-Augmented TVP-FAVAR  
 
Note: Figure presents the Time-Varying Standard Deviations (SD) of errors within the fiscal-augmented TVP-
FAVAR model with Three Unobserved Factors over the 1959:Q1-2013:Q2 sample. The FAVAR part of the model 
is estimated using the Two-Step Principal Components method based on Bernanke et al. (2005) identification 
approach.   
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There is an overlap between the higher mean value and the periods that have been known 
as the active episodes of fiscal policy and vice versa. As is visible in the fiscal-augmented model, 
Figure 3.7, the highest peak in volatility of residual for inflation occurred in 1975. This finding 
is reported by Primiceri (2005), and Korobilis (2013). They relate these peaks in volatility to the 
Great inflation, e.g. the shock in price of oil in 1974, and the Monetarist experiment by the 
increase of interest rates in 1981. The interval is also associated with a change in the conduct of 
monetary policy targeting bank reserves, i.e. monetary aggregate, instead of interest rates that 
lead to a rapid increase in interest rates. Then, the second peak, which appears to be quite modest, 
is associated with the financial crisis in 2008. Having considered monetary and fiscal policy 
regimes as identified in Favero and Monacelli (2003), and Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) we 
can see that the both peaks are associated with an active fiscal policy coordinated with a passive 
monetary policy.  
As regards the residuals of Industrial Production growth, the highest peak in volatility for 
both model specifications is occurred in 1975. However, the mean value of residuals appears to 
be higher, around of 2, for the simple model compared with the fiscal-augmented model, around 
of 1.5. Furthermore, as can be observed in Figures 3.6 and 3.7, the volatility of the standard 
deviation of residuals for the Federal Funds rate reaches its highest value at 1981 that is consistent 
with the results presented in Primiceri (2005), and Korobilis (2013) that is referred as the 
Monetarist Experiment in the literature. In addition, as is visible in the graph, the mean value of 
the residuals falls in the model includes fiscal variables.   
The interval between 1985 and 2007 demonstrates a very modest pattern for the both 
estimated factors and indicator variables within both the simple and the fiscal-augmented model. 
This period is known in the literature as the Great Moderation associated with an active monetary 
policy and a passive fiscal policy regimes. This suggests that active monetary policy, when the 
119 
 
nominal interest rate responds aggressively to inflation, in coordination with a passive fiscal 
policy may attribute to a lower volatility in inflation and output.52   
Having compared the standard deviations of the errors for both the simple and the fiscal-
augmented models, it appears that the fiscal stance contributes to decreasing the volatility and 
the posterior mean of the responses to the monetary policy shock. The occurrence is more visible 
for residuals of inflation matched with an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy 
regimes. This suggests that involving the fiscal stance variables may contain important 
information to explain the volatility of inflation and may influence the monetary transmission 
mechanism.   
We now compare IRFs of the three observable variables in the VAR part to the identified 
monetary contraction shock from the simple model with the fiscal-augmented one as presented 
in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. The selected sub-samples are 1975:Q1, 1981:Q3, 1996:Q1, and 2006:Q2. 
These represent the chairmanships of Burns, Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke respectively. 
These different dates allow us to capture the transmission of monetary shocks under different 
macroeconomic policy regimes and business cycles phases.53 
Before discussing the results, it is useful to specify monetary and fiscal policy regime at the 
time when we impose policy shocks. Table 3.3 illustrate our policy shocks in terms of whether 
monetary and fiscal policy are active or passive. We follow Favero and Monacelli (2003), and 
Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) to specify these different macroeconomic policy regimes. 
  
                                                     
52 Primiceri (2005) mentions that a Taylor-type Rule, that the Federal Funds rate responds to inflation strongly, may 
better approximate US monetary policy over the Great Moderation.               
53 The 1975:Q1 represents a NBER business cycle trough date; 1981:Q3 is a NBER business cycle peak date, 
1996:Q1 represents both NBER trough and peak dates, i.e. 1991:Q1: trough and 2001Q1: peak, and 2006:Q2 
represents both NBER peak and trough, i.e. 2007:Q4: peak, and 2009:Q2: trough. The detailed historical record of 
US business cycles can be found in NBER US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions. 
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Table 3.3. US Macroeconomic Policy Regimes   
 Burns Volcker Greenspan Bernanke 
 1975 1981 1996 2006 
Monetary Policy  Passive Active Active Passive 
Fiscal Policy Active Active Passive Active 
Note: This Table reports different macroeconomic policy regimes. Different fiscal policy regimes are based on 
Favero and Monacelli (2003), and Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011). Monetary policy regimes are based on those 
reported in Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011).     
 
It is expected that a contractionary monetary shock cause both inflation and Industrial 
Production growth to decrease. Figure 3.8 shows that inflation declines within the simple TVP-
FAVAR model over the four representative periods. This is as expected. This is also consistent 
with the results presented in Korobilis (2013) using the same identification as in Bernanke et al. 
(2005) over the period 1981:Q3 and 1996:Q1.54 Moreover, Industrial Production growth falls in 
response to a monetary contraction within the simple TVP-FAVAR model. The response for both 
inflation and Industrial Production growth appears to be statistically insignificant which quickly 
returns to zero, see Figure 3.8. 
Figure 3.9 gives the TVP-FAVAR results with fiscal policy. In contrast to the simple 
model, a monetary shock now increases inflation for 1975:Q1, 1981:Q3 and very marginally 
1996:Q1. Inflation again falls with a shock in 2006:Q2. As Table 3.3 illustrates, fiscal policy has 
been active during the administration of Burns and Volcker. Then we can see that fiscal policy 
switched to be passive in Greenspanˈs Chairmanship. It again turned to be active during the 
administration of Bernanke. However, monetary policy was passive in the Burnsˈs administration 
and turned to be active over both the Volcker and Greenspan period. Then it switched to passive 
in Bernankeˈs administration.         
                                                     
54 Note that the results presented in Korobilis (2013) show the occurrence of the price puzzle over the 1975:Q1. His 
work, however, does not cover the 2006:Q2 period and is constructed upon 143 US macroeconomic time series.   
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Figure 3.8. IRFs of the Observable Variables within the Simple TVP-FAVAR     
 
Note: The Figure shows IRFs for monetary contraction. The Impulse Responses (10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles) are 
generated within the simple TVP-FAVAR model with Three Unobserved Factors corresponds to a one standard 
deviations increase to the Federal Funds rate. The Impulse Responses are presented for four representative points in 
time, 1975:Q1, 1981:Q3, 1996:Q1, and 2006:Q2 as representative of the chairmanships of Burns, Volcker, 
Greenspan, and Bernanke respectively.     
 
Figure 3.9. IRFs of the Observable Variables within the Fiscal-Augmented TVP-FAVAR  
 
Note: The Figure shows IRFs for monetary contraction. The Impulse Responses (10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles) are 
generated within the fiscal-augmented TVP-FAVAR model with Three Unobserved Factors corresponds to a one 
standard deviations increase to the Federal Funds rate. The Impulse Responses are presented for four representative 
points in time, 1975:Q1, 1981:Q3, 1996:Q1, and 2006:Q2 as representative of the chairmanships of Burns, Volcker, 
Greenspan, and Bernanke respectively.     
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It appears that the price puzzle is accentuated within the periods that fiscal policy is active 
and monetary policy is passive. This counter-intuitive response can be explained through a 
positive wealth effect induced by a monetary contraction in the presence of an active fiscal policy. 
The price puzzle then tends to reduce and disappear when fiscal policy switches to passive and 
monetary policy switches to active episode.55 
The mechanism can be explained as follows. An increase in the Federal Funds rate when 
coordinates with an active fiscal regime, may contribute to higher interest rate payments to 
bondholders. This is happening as the government debt becomes more expensive to finance. Thus, 
the government must issue more liabilities. Until the price levels start to increase, the new issued 
bonds create a positive wealth effect. Moreover, with sticky prices the wealth effect would stay 
for some time to influence householdsˈ consumption. Thus, this positive wealth effect can shift 
aggregated demand upward through increasing private consumption. This, in turns, would raise 
inflation and output. Consequently, the policy outcome can be higher prices and output.   
With reference to the price puzzle appeared in the fiscal-augmented model, our results are 
consistent with the provided argument in Chung et al. (2007). As is argued therein, inflation 
sharply increases in short-run in response to a monetary contraction. They show that the price 
puzzle, which emerges in monetary VARs, can be explained as a natural outcome of periods when 
monetary policy fails to obey the Taylor principle and taxes do not respond to the state of 
government debt.56 Their interpretation of the price puzzle is also consistent with those of Hanson 
(2004). He concludes that the price puzzle cannot be solved by the conventional method such as 
adding commodity prices to the Federal Reserveˈs information set. Hanson (2004) also finds that 
the puzzle is more pronounced in the 1960s and the 1970s that is identified as active fiscal policy 
and passive monetary policy.  
                                                     
55 See Favero and Monacelli (2003), and Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) for a detailed explanation on the estimation 
of active and passive monetary and fiscal policy regime changes. 
56 They find empirical results from a Markov-Switching VAR model suggest that there is a positive correlation 
between interest rate and inflation under the non-Ricardian and non-monetarist combination case.   
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Furthermore, the response of inflation for 1975:Q1 and 1981:Q3, under active fiscal policy 
regime, can validate the Sargent and Wallace (1981) view on the inflationary effects of monetary 
and fiscal interactions. However, it seems that monetary policy would better account for inflation 
determination for the Greenspan period, in 1996:Q1, when fiscal policy switches to passive and 
monetary policy is active. A similar finding is reported in Davig and Leeper (2007,2011).    
As regards Industrial Production growth, the same response as inflation within the fiscal 
model is obtained suggesting that the fiscal stance can influence the responses of inflation and 
output growth. The response of both inflation and Industrial Production growth is very short-
lived, in contrast to the results from the linear FAVAR, and remains statistically significant for a 
short while. 
The positive response of inflation and output growth to a monetary contraction are 
accentuated under active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy. This is consistent with the 
results presented in Chung et al. (2007), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), Eusepi and Preston 
(2011), and Leeper and Walker (2012). As Figure 3.9 shows, the price puzzle is more pronounced 
in the Burns and Volcker periods. Then, it tends to reduce in Greenspan period, and disappears in 
Bernanke administration. These are consistent with Primiceri (2005) interpretation of the non-
systematic monetary policy shock. He provides evidence supporting that monetary shock become 
less important in Greenspan period.   
Given the descriptive statistics on the US key indicator variables over the representative 
sub-samples as reported in Table 3.4, a number of features emerge that can shed light on these 
unconventional responses with reference to the macroeconomic policy coordination. First, the 
Federal Funds rate on average has been greater than inflation in Burns and Volcker administration. 
With an increase in public debt, it implies that the new government bonds issued in coordination 
with higher interest rate, due to monetary contraction, may generate positive wealth effect.57 This 
wealth effect, in turns, induces private spending and inflation to increase.       
                                                     
57As discussed in Chapter 2, a monetary contraction makes government debt more expensive to finance. This can 
lead the government to issue new debt. In the circumstance when government issues debt that is not fully backed by 
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Table 3.4. Mean Values for the Key Macroeconomic Indicators over the Representative 
Sub-Samples  
Chairmanships 
     
Policy 
Coordination 
Output 
Gap 
Inflation The Federal 
Funds Rate 
Real 
Rates 
 Government 
Debt-to-GDP 
Burns (1970-1978) PM- AF&PF -0.78 6.21 7.1 0.90 32.68 
Volcker (1978-1987) MP&MA-FA&FP -1.48 4.97 6.79 1.82 50.22 
Greenspan (1987-2006) AM-AF&PF 1.04 4.36 3.6 -0.76 59.16 
Bernanke (2006-2013) MA-FA -3.47 4.30 1.35 -2.95 81.36 
Overall Sample  -1.17 4.96 4.71 -0.25 55.86 
Note: This Table reports the mean values for the key indicator variables of the US economy under the selected 
representative chairmanships of the Federal Reserve.  The output gap information is collected from IMF database 
that shows the percentage deviation between the actual GDP and its potential level. Inflation is the percentage change 
in the CPI. The real rates are calculated by subtracting the inflation from the Federal Funds rate. The policy 
coordination is reported according to monetary and fiscal policy regimes estimated by Favero and Monacelli (2003), 
and Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011). AM and PM abbreviate active and passive monetary policy, respectively. In 
addition, AF and PF abbreviate active and passive fiscal policy, respectively.     
        
Second, during Greenspan and Bernanke periods, the Federal Funds rate has declined 
significantly while inflation nearly remains close to the overall sample mean value. Thus, the real 
rates turn to be negative. As reported in Table 3.4, the government debt continues to rise, in both 
sub-samples. However, it seems that the low Federal Funds rate coordinated with a passive fiscal 
policy in Greenspan period to be insufficient to stimulate the private spending. 
This explanation is consistent with the idea discussed in Clarida et al. (2000), and Romer 
and Romer (2004) stating that monetary policy has been mainly accommodative in Burns and 
Volcker period.58 Thus, the positive response of inflation to monetary contraction is in accord 
with the view that active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy may generate inflationary 
effects. In contrast, over Greenspan administration, monetary policy switches to active 
coordinated with a passive fiscal policy resulting in disappearance of the price puzzle. During 
Bernanke administration, fiscal policy switches to active with a passive monetary policy in a 
sense that the short-term interest rates stays irresponsive and there is no changes in inflation 
either. However, as an UMP has been adopted over this period, it makes the comparison difficult.      
                                                     
taxes, any policy-generated increase in the interest rate would increase inflation, instead of decrease, see Cochrane 
(2001, 2009), Sims (2011), and Canzoneri et al. (2011). Under this circumstance, the higher interest rates will lead 
to the expansion of nominal government debt, particularly when interest expenses are a major part of the government 
budget. 
58 A detailed discussion of policy actions and outcomes over the chairmanships of Burns, Volcker, and Greenspan 
can be found in Romer and Romer (2004), and Bae et al. (2012).   
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Figure 3.10. IRFs to a US Monetary Contraction within the Simple TVP-FAVAR   
 
Note: The impulse responses is generated within the simple TVP-FAVAR model with Three Unobserved Factors 
corresponds to a one standard deviations increase to the Federal Funds rate. The VAR part of the model includes the 
Federal Funds rate, Industrial Production growth, and Inflation. The factors are estimated using the Two-Step 
Principal Components approach from Bernanke et al. (2005). Posterior medians of Impulse Responses are presented 
for four representative periods, 1975:Q1, 1981:Q3, 1996:Q1, and 2006:Q2 as representative of the chairmanships of 
Burns, Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke respectively. 
 
Having discussed the impact of contractionary monetary policy on inflation and output, 
now we proceed to examine the monetary transmission mechanism as displayed in Figures 3.10 
and 3.11 within the simple and the fiscal TVP-FAVAR model, respectively. Figure 3.10 
illustrates that the response of other real activity measures, such as GDP, consumption, hourly 
earnings, new orders index, new housing starts, and unemployment, within the simple model are 
generally as expected.  
A monetary contraction induces the real activity to decline over Burns and Volcker periods. 
For Greenspan these variables remain unresponsive to the policy shock, while during Bernanke 
administration durable consumption, and GDP slightly increase in response to the shock that is 
counterintuitive. The very weak response of inflation in Bernanke period, as presented in Figure 
3.8, may clarify this result. As regards monetary variables, it can be seen that broad money, 
money supply, and loans fall in the Burns and Volcker period, while they increase in the 
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Greenspan and Bernanke periods, respectively. The IRFs results within the simple model are 
consistent with those presented in Korobilis (2013).     
The IRFs results from the fiscal model, as plotted in Figure 3.11, show that real activity 
measures variables increase during the Chairmanships of Burns and Volcker. This is 
unconventional. These two sub-samples are associated with an active fiscal policy. We can see 
the potential positive wealth channel in these two episodes as non-durable consumption increase.  
When fiscal policy switches to passive while there is an active monetary policy, the monetary 
contraction generates results that are more reasonable. 
Figure 3.11 indicates that over Greenspan and Bernanke administration, real activity 
measures shows a sharp increase on impact, and then fall. Our results are overall consistent with 
the discussion in Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), Sims (2011), and Leeper and Walker (2012) 
regarding inflationary impact of a monetary contraction under an active fiscal policy and a 
passive monetary policy regimes.   
The same unconventional responses are obtained for monetary aggregates. As Figure 3.11 
demonstrates, under active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy regimes, monetary base, 
supply of money, and loans increases instead of falling. In contrast, the IRFs results of these 
variables appear to be conventional in the case of a passive fiscal policy and an active monetary 
policy during Greenspan and Bernanke period. These results suggest that the fiscal stance may 
influence the monetary transmission mechanism. In addition, our results are consistent with 
finding presented in Favero and Monacelli (2003) that fiscal policy significantly influences the 
price level determination when fiscal and monetary policy appears in mismatch exactly as it 
appears to happen before 1987.                
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Figure 3.11. IRFs to US Monetary Contraction within the Fiscal-Augmented TVP-FAVAR  
 
Note: The impulse responses is generated within the fiscal-augmented TVP-FAVAR model with Three Unobserved 
Factors corresponds to a one standard deviations increase to the Federal Funds rate. The VAR part of the model 
includes the Federal Funds rate, Industrial Production growth, and Inflation. The factors are estimated using the 
Two-Step Principal Components approach from Bernanke et al. (2005). Posterior medians of Impulse Responses are 
presented for four representative periods, 1975:Q1, 1981:Q3, 1996:Q1, and 2006:Q2 as representative of the 
chairmanships of Burns, Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke respectively. 
 
As regards the fiscal stance variables responses, monetary contraction shock induces 
government debt and total government expenditures to increases as the interest payments on 
government debt increase under an active fiscal policy periods: 1975:Q1 and marginally over 
1981:Q3. During these periods, the Federal Funds rate has been much higher compared with the 
1996:Q1 and 2006:Q2. Then, as the interest payments on debt stay unresponsive and falls, both 
the debt-to-GDP ratio and total government expenditure follow the same path, see Figure 3.11. 
Table 3.5 clarifies the monetary-fiscal interactions with reference to the macroeconomic 
policy regimes. As can be seen in the Table, the generated wealth effect is associated with the 
periods that fiscal policy is active and the growth rate of the interest expenses of public debt are 
positive. It implies that a monetary contraction may contribute to the issuance of new government 
bonds. This, in turns, may induce an increase in consumption through a positive wealth effect. 
The impact can be traced under active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy regimes.  
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Table 3.5. The US Monetary-Fiscal Interactions and the Monetary Transmission Results   
Chairmanships 
    
Policy 
Coordination 
Wealth 
Effects 
Non-Durable 
Consumption 
Price Puzzle Growth Rate of 
Interest Share of 
Government Debt 
 
Burns (1970-1978) PM- AF&PF YES Increase YES 1.28  
Volcker (1978-1987) 
MP&MA-
FA&FP 
YES 
Small 
Increase 
YES 0.19  
Greenspan (1987-2006) AM-AF&PF NO Unresponsive NO -0.98  
Bernanke (2006-2013) MA-FA NO Falls NO -3.89  
Note: This Table reports the outcome of US monetary-fiscal interactions under the selected representative 
chairmanships of the Federal Reserve.  The policy coordination is reported according to monetary and fiscal policy 
regimes estimated by Favero and Monacelli (2003), and Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011). AM and PM abbreviate 
active and passive monetary policy, respectively. In addition, AF and PF abbreviate active and passive fiscal policy, 
respectively.     
 
Thus, the IRFs presented in Figures 3.9 and 3.11 confirm the different interpretation for the 
price puzzle discussed in Chung et al. (2007). They explain that an increase in prices in response 
to monetary contraction may be a normal response rather than a puzzle when fiscal policy is 
active and considered in the monetary transmission mechanism.    
In summary, comparing the IRFs results from the fiscal-augmented TVP-FAVAR with 
those from the simple model, three features emerge. First, including the fiscal stance to examine 
the monetary transmission mechanism can results in the price puzzles. Second, the price puzzle 
is accentuated under an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy coordination. Third, a 
positive wealth effects appears to contribute to increasing prices through consumption within the 
fiscal-augmented TVP-FAVAR. 
Now we proceed to examine the impact of fiscal policy on the economy within both 
Constant and TVP-FAVAR framework. The next section presents the results.    
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3.4.5 Fiscal Policy Shock Identification 
This section, first explains the identification approach for fiscal policy shock. Then, we proceed 
to presenting the IRF results in both constant and TVP-FAVAR framework. We are interested 
in particular in whether fiscal policy is non-Ricardian or Ricardian. That is, whether inflation 
and output respond to the fiscal shocks or not, respectively.   
With reference to the identification of fiscal policy shock, a number of approaches can be 
used.59 Following the common practice in the literature and to maintain the consistency with 
monetary policy identification we focus upon a recursive approach as employed in Favero and 
Monacelli (2005), and Fatas and Mihov (2006) to identify our fiscal policy shocks.   
As regards the policy instrument, we assume that the fiscal authority uses the first 
difference of government debt-to-GDP ratio as its policy instrument. Favero and Giavazzi (2011), 
and Farhi and Werning (2012) argue that government debt-to-GDP as fiscal policy instrument 
can capture the dynamic of government budget over the time rather than representing the current 
figure as with government budget deficit. Furthermore, the possibility of the wealth effects 
generated within the transmission mechanism justifies our choice of policy instrument.60   
The VAR part of our model consists of three observable variables including Inflation, 
Industrial Production growth, and government debt-to-GDP ratio as the fiscal policy instrument. 
The factor part of our model, also, consists of the other time series to extract three unobserved 
factors. As mentioned earlier, further to the addition of government debt-to-GDP to proxy the 
fiscal policy instrument, we include government budget deficits as time series information to 
                                                     
59 As a few example of identification approaches we can refer to narrative approach to isolate a specific event as in 
Ramey and Shapiro (1999), identification of fiscal shocks based on the elasticity of fiscal variables as in Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002), and sign restriction approach as in Mountford and Uhlig (2009). The sign restriction approach 
holds the assumption that under all circumstances the responses to the certain shocks would be equally the same. 
However, plausible responses to policy shocks require further restrictions combined with the sign restrictions to 
capture different circumstances, see Killian and Murphy (2012). Furthermore, as is explained in Korobilis (2013) it 
is hard to justify the results from sign restrictions when using a VAR with unobservable factors. 
60 We repeated the experiment with budget deficit as the policy instrument. It gives almost the same qualitative 
results. In addition, in Chapter 4, we study the international spillovers of a US contractionary monetary policy to 
some major economies. Since the data availability for budget deficit has been an issue for some of the selected 
economies, to ensure the consistency among the chapters, we choose governmentˈs debt as the fiscal policy 
instrument.        
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extract the factors upon it, too. Having established model identification, the next section presents 
the Impulse Response Functions results to an expansionary fiscal policy shock.  
3.4.6 The FAVAR Model Specification Results to Fiscal Shock  
This section presents the way in which an expansionary fiscal policy shock may influence the 
economy within a linear FAVAR model. Likewise monetary policy, the extent to which fiscal 
policy can impact the economy depends on its ability to stimulate aggregate demand through 
private expenditure. As discussed in Chapter 2, the impact takes effect mainly by generating a 
positive wealth effect. Assume that fiscal policy is associated with an increase in government 
debt through a debt-financed tax reduction. Further public debt requires the government to issue 
more bonds. Thus, extra government debt would increase the bonds holding by the public. This 
would create a positive wealth effect.61 Thus, households may adjust their demand patterns in 
response to the fiscal authoritiesˈ decisions, potentially leading to a rise in the private 
expenditure.  
Figure 3.12 illustrates the IRFs of the main macroeconomic indicators to an increase in 
government debt-to-GDP within the Constant-Parameter FAVAR. From the responses, we can 
see that the policy shock succeed in stimulating the economy through increased private 
consumption: an increase in government debt increase GDP and inflation. Furthermore, the shock 
stimulates other real activity measures such as new orders index and average hourly earnings, 
while it causes the unemployment rate to decline.  
As regards the impact of fiscal expansionary policy on the interest rates, it can be observed 
that the responses are consistent with the economic intuition: both short and long-term interest 
rates increase. This can be explained as the stock of government debt increase it crowds out the 
private saving that contributes to increasing the interest rates.  
 
                                                     
61 The positive wealth effect induced by the adjustment in fiscal policy can influence the asset values or change the 
composition of the wealth bundle, see Afonso and Sousa (2012).   
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Figure 3.12. IRFs to a US Fiscal Expansion within the FAVAR  
 
Note: This Figure provides IRFs to an expansionary fiscal shock from a linear FAVAR. The VAR part of the model 
includes the government debt-to-GDP, Industrial Production growth, and Inflation on top panel. The IRFs of other 
key variables in the fiscal transmission mechanism is estimated based on three unobserved factors. The Impulse 
Responses together with their confidence intervals (10th, 50th, and 90th) are generated based on Bernanke et al. 
(2005) FAVAR model specification corresponds to a 1 standard deviation increase to the Government Debt-to-GDP. 
The FAVAR model is estimated using the Two-Step Principal Components approach from Bernanke et al. (2005) 
over the 1959:Q1-2013:Q2 sample. 
 
 
As Figure 3.12 displays, this fiscal shock also increases money aggregates including the 
monetary base and supply of money while the total reserved balance only marginally falls. It can 
be explained by agentsˈ expectations about the government debt. If agents expect that the debt 
would be financed by future taxation, the shock would enhance private saving rather than 
spending. Thus, this may lead to a fall in aggregate expenditure and inflation with the same impact 
on the money aggregates. The opposite effect is anticipated if agents expect that there is no further 
taxation. This will be associated with higher inflation and an increase in money aggregates 
through an increase in consumption.  
Given that an increase in government debt has been caused on increase in monetary base, it 
can be inferred that new bonds has been issued. As explained in Bradley (1984) an increase in 
demand for bonds induced the increase in supply of money.  
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Concisely, the IRFs results of the linear FAVAR model suggest that an increase in 
government debt can stimulate the economy through increasing private consumption, which in 
turn would stimulate real activity measures and money aggregates. These results are in line with 
the non-Ricardian view of fiscal policy. Our results are consistent with those of Davig and Leeper 
(2007, 2011), Sims (2011), and Afonso and Sousa (2012) suggesting that government spending 
shock have a positive but small effect on inflation and output. The next section presents the IRF 
results for a fiscal expansion from a non-linear FAVAR.  
3.4.7 The TVP-FAVAR Model Specification Results to Fiscal Shock 
Now we proceed to examining the impact of an expansionary fiscal policy within a TVP-FAVAR 
model. Likewise the constant-parameter model, it is assumed that the fiscal authority uses the 
first difference of government debt-to-GDP as the policy instrument. The median posterior 
estimates of the standard errors for the unobservable factors, and the observable variables are 
presented in Appendix 3.B.62  
Turning to the IRFs of inflation and Industrial Production growth to this fiscal expansion, 
Figure 3.13 shows that they both increase and then sharply returns back to zero. Furthermore, 
while the response of Industrial Production growth remains statistically significant only for a 
quarter, those of inflation appears to be insignificant over the period. 
  
                                                     
62 The results presented in Appendix 3.B show that the mean values falls after 1985 as fiscal policy switches from 
active to passive. Furthermore, the volatility of residuals declines as fiscal regime changes. As regards the posterior 
mean values of the residuals of the observable variables, Figure 3.B.3 displays that while the standard deviations of 
residuals of inflation peaks in 1975, those of Industrial Production growth peaks in 1978 and 1981. This can be 
explained with time lags associated with fiscal policy to take effect. 
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Figure 3.13. IRFs of the Observable Variables within the TVP-FAVAR    
 
Note: The Figure shows IRFs to a US fiscal Expansion. The Impulse Responses (10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles) are 
generated within the simple TVP-FAVAR model with Three Unobserved Factors corresponds to a one standard 
deviations increase to the Government Debt-to-GDP. The VAR part of the model includes the Government Debt-to-
GDP, Industrial Production growth, and Inflation. The factors are estimated using the Two-Step Principal 
Components approach from Bernanke et al. (2005).The Impulse Responses are presented for four representative 
points in time, 1975:Q1, 1981:Q3, 1996:Q1, and 2006:Q2 as representative of the chairmanships of Burns, Volcker, 
Greenspan, and Bernanke respectively.     
 
The transmission mechanism of US fiscal policy expansion is presented in Figure 3.14. The 
IRFs appears to be generally conventional. Both short and long-term interest rates increase. This 
finding is reported in Laubach (2009) as he reports a raise in medium to long-term interest rates 
following an increase in debt-to-GDP ratio. With reference to the real activity measure, 
consumption, average hourly earnings, and GDP increase. In addition, new housing starts and 
new orders index show an initial raise which sharply drops. However, unemployment appears to 
increase on impact instead of falling followed by an immediate returning back to zero.  
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Figure 3.14. IRFs to US Fiscal Expansion within the TVP-FAVAR  
 
Note: The Impulse Responses is generated within the TVP-FAVAR model with Three Unobserved Factors 
corresponds to a one standard deviations increase to the Government Debt-to-GDP. The VAR part of the model 
includes the Government Debt-to-GDP, Industrial Production growth, and Inflation. The factors are estimated using 
the Two-Step Principal Components approach from Bernanke et al. (2005). Posterior medians of Impulse Responses 
are presented for four representative periods, 1975:Q1, 1981:Q3, 1996:Q1, and 2006:Q2 as representative of the 
chairmanships of Burns, Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke respectively. 
 
 
As regards the monetary aggregates, monetary base, supply of money, and loans increase 
in response that is conventional. Finally, both interest payments on public debt and government 
expenditure increase as a result of the increase in government debt-to-GDP ratio shock. Overall, 
these results provide evidence for the non-Ricardian view on the fiscal policy over the sample. 
To this end our results are consistent with those presented in Favero and Monacelli (2003), Davig 
and Leeper (2007, 2011), and Reade (2011). They also report that an expansionary fiscal policy 
has expansionary impact on the economy. 
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3.5 Results Summary 
This section summarizes the results. Table 3.6 presents the results summary for a US 
contractionary monetary policy obtained from both the Constant and TVP-FAVAR models. A 
number of features emerge from Table 3.6.  
First, the IRFs results from the simple linear FAVAR model show a conventional response 
as consumption, inflation, and GDP fall in response to the policy shock. Second, the IRFs results 
from the fiscal-augmented FAVAR to monetary contraction suggest that including the fiscal 
stance has inflationary impact on the economy by increasing consumption and generating a 
positive wealth effect. Third, while the policy shock induces a rise in prices, it reduces output. 
This may suggest that monetary contraction causes the unit cost of production to increase that is 
in line with the cost-channel interpretation of the price puzzle. 
Likewise the linear FAVAR, the simple TVP-FAVAR produces conventional responses as 
both inflation and output falls. However, the fiscal-augmented TVP-FAVAR generates the price 
puzzle. The price puzzle is more accentuated in the case of an active fiscal policy and passive 
monetary policy regimes. This influences the monetary transmission mechanism through 
generating positive wealth effect and increasing consumption, consequently. 
As regards the results of an expansionary fiscal policy shock, Table 3.7 summarizes the 
IRFs within both Constant and TVP- FAVAR model. According to the impulse responses, the 
policy shock induces both inflation and output to increase. Thus, the non-Ricardian view on fiscal 
policy can find empirical support within both linear and TVP-FAVAR model. Having examined 
the transmission of the policy shock, it appears that fiscal expansion takes effect through 
increasing private consumption. This, in turns, increases inflation and output. 
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Table 3.6. Impact of Monetary Policy Shock: Results Summary 
 
 
Federal Funds 
Rate 
Inflation 
Industrial 
Production 
Growth 
Non-Durable 
Consumption 
Broad 
Money 
The Simple 
Constant-Parameter FAVAR 
       +* - -        -*    -* 
     
The Fiscal-Augmented 
Constant-Parameter FAVAR +*           + -             +*             -* 
The Simple 
TVP-FAVAR  
1975:Q1 +        - - + - 
1981:Q3 +        - - + - 
1996:Q1 +         - - Unresponsive + 
2006:Q2 +        - - - + 
The Fiscal-Augmented 
TVP-FAVAR  
1975:Q1 +*        +* +* + + 
1981:Q3 +*        + +* + Unresponsive 
1996:Q1 +* Unresponsive +* + Unresponsive 
2006:Q2 +* Unresponsive +* - - 
Note: The Table summarizes the response of the selected macroeconomic variables to monetary contraction. The 
simple vs. the fiscal-augmented model indicates that the fiscal stance is excluded from the model. An asterisk ,*, 
indicates that the responses are statistically significant. Macroeconomic policy regimes are provided in Table 3.3.         
   
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7. Fiscal Policy Shock: Results Summary 
 
Government 
Debt-to-GDP 
Inflation 
Industrial 
Production 
Growth 
Non-Durable 
Consumption 
Broad money 
Constant-Parameter FAVAR +*    + + +* Unresponsive 
TVP-FAVAR 
1975:Q1 +* + +* Unresponsive Unresponsive 
1981:Q3 +* + +* Unresponsive Unresponsive 
1996:Q1 +* + +* + + 
2006:Q2 +* + +* + + 
Note: The Table summarizes the response of the selected macroeconomic variables to fiscal expansion. The simple 
vs. the fiscal-augmented model indicates that the fiscal stance is excluded from the model. An asterisk ,*, indicates 
that the responses are statistically significant. Macroeconomic policy regimes are provided in Table 3.3.      
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3.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter explores the impact of monetary and fiscal policy interactions on the US economy. 
Two main objectives are pursued in this study. First, to examine the potential role of fiscal policy 
on the conduct of monetary policy and its transmission mechanism. Second, to study the 
macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy on the real economy.  
We explain that the existing literature neglects macroeconomic policy interactions in 
assessing monetary policy outcome. We provide evidence from both Constant-Parameter and 
TVP-FAVAR models to support the substantial impact of fiscal policy on the conduct of 
monetary policy. Hence, we estimate both linear and non-linear FAVAR models with and without 
fiscal variables to study the impact of monetary and fiscal policy interactions. We discuss that 
employing a TVP-FAVAR method allows us to understand whether the impact of policy 
interactions evolves over the time.     
Having examined the responses to monetary and fiscal policy shocks a number of features 
emerge. First, a US contractionary monetary policy shock in a Constant-Parameter FAVAR model 
reduces output growth as expected. This is irrespective of whether the fiscal stance is included or 
not. However, while inflation falls in response to a monetary contraction within the simple model, 
it increases in the fiscal-augmented model. Our finding from the fiscal-augmented FAVAR model 
show that this monetary contraction induces consumption to increase. The increase in 
consumption and inflation may suggest that the policy generates a positive wealth effect. As is 
discussed in Bernanke et al. (2004), a large and prolonged government debt in conjunction with 
monetary contraction can cause prices to increase. In particular, if the interest share of government 
debt is considerable. In this case, a contractionary monetary policy can increase disposable 
income and generate a positive wealth effect leading to an increase in private expenditure and 
prices.  
Second, comparing the IRFs results from the fiscal-augmented TVP-FAVAR with those 
from the simple model, our finding from the fiscal-augmented model confirms that a monetary 
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contraction may cause an increase in the price levels when monetary policy is passive and fiscal 
policy is active. This finding suggests that price puzzle can be a normal response of prices to 
monetary contraction when fiscal policy is active which means the fiscal authority sets the 
government budget regardless of tax revenues. Thus, this monetary shock can generate a positive 
wealth effect. This can encourage private consumption and raise the price levels. This is the case 
during the 1970s that influenced the monetary transmission mechanism. 
The positive response of inflation and output growth to monetary contraction, which is more 
accentuated under active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy coordination, is consistent 
with the results presented in Favero and Monacelli (2003), Primiceri (2005), Chung et al. (2007), 
Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), Sims (2011), and Leeper and Walker (2012). Chung et al. (2007) 
argue that the price puzzle can be a natural outcome of periods when monetary policy fails to 
follow a Taylor Rule and taxes fail to respond to the state of debt. In addition, this result is 
consistent with Hansonˈs (2004) explanation of the price puzzle that it cannot be solved by the 
conventional method of adding extra information to the VAR models and it tends to be severe 
under an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy regime.  
Finally, the impulse responses within both the linear and TVP-FAVAR model show that 
fiscal policy has an inflationary impact on the economy. We find evidence to support the non-
Ricardian view on the fiscal policy from both model specifications. That is an expansionary fiscal 
policy stimulates demand and output. This finding is consistent with finding presented in Favero 
and Monacelli (2003), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), and Reade (2011).  
It is worth noting that our results are limited to the FAVAR models that only allow a limited 
scope of macroeconomic policy interactions to be traced. A number of limitations emerge from 
this study, which is left to future work. As concerns the results from the linear FAVAR model, 
it may be insightful to explore the experiment within the Block of Factors framework as in 
Korobilis (2013). In addition, our non-linear FAVAR model does not explicitly allows for 
monetary and fiscal policy Regime-Switching as in Davig and Leeper (2011). This implies that 
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the obtained results allow limited conclusion. Thus, replicating our analysis within a Markov-
Switching method may enhance our results that has also been left to future work. Finally, it may 
be useful to further investigate our research questions by adopting a Time-Varying Factor 
loadings as in Del Negro and Otrok (2008).  
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Appendix 3.A: Data series 
All the time series are taken from the St Louis Fed FRED database. Following Stock and Watson (2005), 
all variables are transformed to be approximately stationary using the appropriate transformation codes    
(T code) as follows: 1- No Transformation; 2- First Difference; 4- Logarithm; 5- First Difference of 
Logarithm. The slow code column indicates that variables respond to the policy either slowly or fast. 
Following Bernanke et al. (2005), the fast moving variables includes Housing Starts and Sales variables, 
Real Inventories and Orders Indices, Exchange Rates, Interest Rates, and Money and Credit Quantity 
Aggregates. The rest of variables include Real Output and Income, Employment and Hours, Consumption, 
Price Indexes, Average Hourly Earnings, and Fiscal Stance of the economy are the slow moving variables.       
 Mnemonic Description T code Slow Code 
 Real Output and Income   
1 NAPM ISM Manufacturing: PMI Composite Index 1 1 
2 EXPGSC96 Real Exports of Goods & Services 5 1 
3 IMPGSC96 Real Imports of Goods & Services, 3 Decimal 5 1 
4 DIVIDEND Corporate Profits after tax with IVA and CCAdj: Net Dividens 5 1 
5 RENTIN Rental Income of Persons with Capital Consumption Adjustment (CCAdj) 5 1 
6 ULCNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Labour Cost 5 1 
7 GDP Gross Domestic Product 5 1 
8 FSDP Final Sales to Domestic Purchasers 5 1 
9 FINSAL Final Sales of Domestic Product 5 1 
10 FPI Fixed Private Investment 5 1 
11 IPFINAL Industrial Production: Final Products (Market Group) 5 1 
12 IPCONGD Industrial Production: Consumer Goods 5 1 
13 INDPRO Industrial Production Index 5 1 
14 IPDCONGD Industrial Production: Durable Consumer Goods 5 1 
15 IPNCONGD Industrial Production: Nondurable Consumer Goods 5 1 
16 FINSLC96 Real Final Sales of Domestic Product 5 1 
17 PRFI Private Residential Fixed Investment 5 1 
18 GDPCTPI Gross Domestic Product: Chain-type Price Index 5 1 
19 GDPC96 Real Gross Domestic Product 5 1 
20 GSAVE Gross Saving 5 1 
21 NANIPI01USQ189 Personal Income in Constant Prices for the United States 5 1 
22 ALSGVAQ027S All sectors; gross value added (IMA) 5 1 
23 GDI Gross Domestic Income 5 1 
24 BOPBCA Balance on Current Account 1 1 
25 CP Corporate Profits After Tax (without IVA and CCAdj) 5 1 
26 ULCBS Business Sector: Unit Labour Cost 5 1 
 Employment and Hours   
27 UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate 1 1 
28 NAPMEI ISM Manufacturing: Employment Index 1 1 
29 EMRATIO Civilian Employment-Population Ratio 1 1 
30 UEMPLT5 Civilians Unemployed - Less Than 5 Weeks 5 1 
31 UEMP15OV Civilians Unemployed - 15 Weeks & Over 5 1 
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 Mnemonic Description T code Slow Code 
32 UEMP5TO14 Civilians Unemployed for 5-14 Weeks 5 1 
33 UEMP15T26 Civilians Unemployed for 15-26 Weeks 5 1 
34 UEMP27OV Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks and Over 5 1 
35 NDMANEMP All Employees: Nondurable goods 5 1 
36 MANEMP All Employees: Manufacturing 5 1 
37 SRVPRD All Employees: Service-Providing Industries 5 1 
38 USTPU All Employees: Trade, Transportation & Utilities 5 1 
39 USWTRADE All Employees: Wholesale Trade 5 1 
40 USTRADE All Employees: Retail Trade 5 1 
41 USFIRE All Employees: Financial Activities 5 1 
42 USEHS All Employees: Education & Health Services 5 1 
43 USPBS All Employees: Professional & Business Services 5 1 
44 USINFO All Employees: Information Services 5 1 
45 USSERV All Employees: Other Services 5 1 
46 USPRIV All Employees: Total Private Industries 5 1 
47 USGOVT All Employees: Government 5 1 
48 USLAH All Employees: Leisure & Hospitality 5 1 
 Consumption   
49 PCEC Personal Consumption Expenditures 5 1 
50 
51 
PCDG 
PCND 
 
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods  
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods 
 
5 
5 
1 
1 
 Housing Starts and Sales   
52 HOUSTNE Housing Starts in Northeast Census Region 4 0 
53 HOUSTMW Housing Starts in Midwest Census Region 4 0 
54 HOUSTS Housing Starts in South Census Region 4 0 
55 HOUSTW Housing Starts in West Census Region 4 0 
56 HOUST1F Privately Owned Housing Starts: 1-Unit Structures 4 0 
57 HOUST Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started 4 0 
58 PERMIT New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits 4 0 
 Real Inventories and Orders Indices   
59 NAPMSDI ISM Manufacturing: Supplier Deliveries Index 1 0 
60 NAPMNOI ISM Manufacturing: New Orders Index 1 0 
61 NAPMII ISM Manufacturing: Inventories Index 1 0 
62 CIVA Corporate Inventory Valuation Adjustment 1 0 
63 CBI Change in Private Inventories 1 0 
 Exchange Rates   
64 EXSZUS Switzerland / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate 5 0 
65 EXJPUS Japan / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate 5 0 
 Interest Rates   
66 FEDFUNDS Effective Federal Funds Rate 1 0 
67 AAA Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield 1 0 
68 BAA Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield 1 0 
69 MPRIME Bank Prime Loan Rate 1 0 
70 TB3MS 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate 1 0 
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 Mnemonic Description T code Slow Code 
71 TB6MS 6-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate 1 0 
72 GS1 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1 0 
73 GS3 3-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1 0 
74 GS5 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1 0 
75 GS10 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 1 0 
76 INTGSBUSM19N Interest Rates- Government Bonds for United States 1 0 
77 IRLTLT01USQ1N Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year: Main (Including Benchmark)  1 0 
 Money and Credit Quantity Aggregates   
78 REQRESNS Required Reserves of Depository Institutions 5 0 
79 RESBALNS Total Reserve Balances Maintained with Federal Reserve Banks 5 0 
80 BORROW Total Borrowings of Depository Institutions from the Federal Reserve 5 0 
81 TVCKSSL Travellers Checks Outstanding 5 0 
82 M2SL M2 Money Stock 5 0 
83 M2OWN M2 Own Rate 5 0 
84 SVSTCBSL Savings and Small Time Deposits at Commercial Banks 5 0 
85 SVSTSL Savings and Small Time Deposits - Total 5 0 
86 SVGCBSL Savings Deposits at Commercial Banks 5 0 
87 SVGTI Savings Deposits at Thrift Institutions 5 0 
88 SAVINGSL Savings Deposits - Total 5 0 
89 STDCBSL Small Time Deposits at Commercial Banks 5 0 
90 STDTI Small Time Deposits at Thrift Institutions 5 0 
91 STDSL Small Time Deposits - Total 5 0 
92 M2MSL M2 Less Small Time Deposits 5 0 
93 M2MOWN M2 Minus Own Rate 5 0 
94 MZMSL MZM Money Stock 5 0 
95 DDDFCBNS Demand Deposits Due to Foreign Commercial Banks 5 0 
96 DDDFOINS Demand Deposits Due to Foreign Official Institutions 5 0 
97 USGVDDNS U.S. Government Demand Deposits and Note Balances - Total 5 0 
98 USGDCB U.S. Government Demand Deposits at Commercial Banks 5 0 
99 CURRCIR Currency in Circulation 5 0 
100 INVEST Total Investment-Securities in Bank Credit at All Commercial Banks 5 0 
101 CNCF Corporate Net Cash Flow with IVA 5 0 
102 M1 M1 Money Stock 5 0 
103 CURRSL Currency Component of M1 5 0 
104 CURRDD Currency Component of M1 Plus Demand Deposits 5 0 
105 DEMDEPSL Demand Deposits at Commercial Banks 5 0 
106 TCDSL Total Checkable Deposits 5 0 
107 AMBSL St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base 5 0 
108 MABMM301657S M3 for the United States 5 0 
109 MABMBM01657S Broad Money 5 0 
110 LOANS Loans and Leases in Bank Credit 5 0 
111 LOANINV Loans and Investment in Bank Credit 5 0 
112 TCMAH All Sectors; Credit Market Instruments; Asset 5 0 
113 TCMDO All Sectors; Credit Market Instruments; Liability 5 0 
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 Mnemonic Description T code Slow Code 
114 USGSEC US Government Treasury and Securities at All Commercial Banks 5 0 
115 OTHSEC Other Securities at All Commercial Banks 5 0 
116 TOTALSL Total Consumer Credit Owned and Securitized, Outstanding 5 0 
117 BUSLOANS Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial Banks 5 0 
118 CONSUMER Consumer Loans at All Commercial Banks 5 0 
119 BOGAMBSL Board of Governors Monetary Base, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve  5 0 
120 TRARR Board of Governors Total Reserves, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve   5 0 
121 BOGNONBR Non-Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions  5 0 
122 NFORBRES Net Free or Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions  1 0 
123 CMDEBT Households and Non-profit Organizations; Credit Market Instruments; Liability 5 0 
124 REALLN Real Estate Loans at All Commercial Banks 5 0 
125 FBTALDQ027S Financial business; total assets (does not include land) 5 0 
126 FBLIEQQ027S Financial business; total liabilities and equity 5 0 
127 FBTMASQ027S Financial business; total mortgages; asset 5 0 
128 FBTSAAQ027S Financial business; Treasury securities; asset 5 0 
129 BOPIO Foreign Official Assets in the U.S.: Net 1 0 
130 HHMSDODNS Households and Non-profit Organizations; Home Mortgages; Liability 5 0 
 Price Indexes   
131 CPALTT01USQ66 Consumer Price Index: Total All Items for the United States 5 1 
132 USACPIFODQIN Consumer Price Index: Food for the United States 5 1 
133 CPIENGSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Energy 5 1 
134 CPITRNSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Transportation 5 1 
135 CUSR0000SAS Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Services 5 1 
136 CUSR0000SAC Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Commodities 5 1 
137 CUSR0000SAD Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Durables 5 1 
138 CPIMEDSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Medical Care 5 1 
139 CPIAPPSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Apparel 5 1 
140 MCOILWTICO Crude Oil Prices: West Texas Intermediate (WTI) - Cushing 5 1 
141 PPIACO Producer Price Index: All Commodities 5 1 
142 PPIFGS Producer Price Index: Finished Goods 5 1 
143 PPIFCG Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods 5 1 
144 PPIITM Producer Price Index: Intermediate Materials: Supplies & Components 5 1 
145 PPICRM Producer Price Index: Crude Materials for Further Processing 5 1 
146 PPIFCF Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Foods 5 1 
147 PPICPE Producer Price Index: Finished Goods: Capital Equipment 5 1 
148 PPIENG Producer Price Index: Fuels & Related Products & Power 5 1 
149 PPIIDC Producer Price Index: Industrial Commodities 5 1 
150 NAPMPRI ISM Manufacturing: Prices Index 1 1 
151 CPIHOSSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Housing 5 1 
 Average Hourly Earnings   
152 HCOMPBS Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour 5 1 
153 HOABS Business Sector: Hours of All Persons 5 1 
154 RCPHBS Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour 5 1 
155 COMPNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour 5 1 
156 HOANBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons 5 1 
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 Mnemonic Description T code Slow Code 
157 COMPRNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour 5 1 
158 ALWASPQ027S All sectors; wages and salaries paid (IMA) 5 1 
159 AHECONS Average Hourly Earnings Of Production: Construction 5 1 
160 AHEMAN Average Hourly Earnings Of Production: Manufacturing 5 1 
161 AHETPI Average Hourly Earnings of Production: Total Private 5 1 
162 AWOTMAN Average Weekly Overtime Hours of Production: Manufacturing 5 1 
163 AWHMAN Average Weekly Hours of Production : Manufacturing 5 1 
164 RCPHBS Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour 5 1 
 Fiscal Stance   
165 TGDEF Net Government Saving 1 1 
166 SLINV State & Local Government Gross Investment 5 1 
167 SLEXPND State & Local Government Current Expenditures 5 1 
168 GGSAVE Gross Government Saving 5 1 
169 DGI Federal Government: Real National Defence Gross Investment 1 1 
170 NDGI Federal Nondefense Gross Investment 5 1 
171 FGSL Federal government current transfer payments 5 1 
172 FGCE Federal Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment 5 1 
173 ASTIWPQ027S All sectors; current taxes on income, wealth, etc. received (IMA) 5 1 
174 A823RS2Q224EA Government - consumption expenditures and gross investment: Federal 1 1 
175 A824RS2Q224EA Government-consumption expenditures and gross investment: National defence 1 1 
176 A991RS2Q224EA Government-consumption expenditures State and local 1 1 
177 FGEXPND Federal Government: Current Expenditures 5 1 
178 A091RC1Q027EA Federal government current expenditures: Interest payments 5 1 
179 W068RCQ027SA Government total expenditures 5 1 
180 W070RC1Q027EA State and local government current tax receipts 5 1 
181 W077RC1Q027EA State and local government total receipts 5 1 
182 A997RC1Q027EA Government consumption expenditures: Federal: National defence 5 1 
183 A542RC1Q027EA Government consumption expenditures: Federal: Nondefense 5 1 
184 W101RC1Q027EA Government consumption expenditures: Gross output of general government 5 1 
185 GRECPT Government Current Receipts 5 1 
186 GEXPND Government Current Expenditures 5 1 
187 W054RC1Q027EA Government current tax receipts 5 1 
188 A084RC1Q027EA Government current transfer payments 5 1 
189 W060RC1Q027EA Government current transfer receipts 5 1 
190 B223RC1 Government unemployment insurance benefits 5 1 
191 
192 
193 
194 
 
GFDEGDQ188S 
W019RCQ027SBEA 
W018RC1Q027SBEA 
GDFICITS 
 
Federal Debt: Total Public Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product 
Federal government total expenditures 
Federal government total receipts 
Deficit based on total receipts and expenditures 
 
1 
5 
5 
5 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Miscellaneous 
HHSNTN 
 
University. OF MICH. INDEX OF CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS(BCD-83) 
 
1 
 
1 
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Appendix 3.B: Figures 
 
Figure 3.B.1. US Macroeconomic Policy Regimes Probabilities  
 
Note: This Figure illustrates different macroeconomic policy regimes estimated within a Markov-
Switching model. The Figure is adopted from Davig and Leeper (2011). 
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Figure 3.B.2. Posterior Mean of the SD of Residuals of the Factors in the TVP-FAVAR  
 
Note: Figure presents the Time-Varying Standard Deviations (SD) of errors within the TVP-FAVAR model with 
three unobserved factors over the sample 1959Q1-2013Q2. The FAVAR part of the model is estimated using the 
Two-Step Principal Components method based on Bernanke et al. (2005) identification approach.   
 
 
Figure 3.B.3. Posterior Mean of the SD of Residuals of the Observable Variables within the 
TVP-FAVAR  
 
Note: Figure presents the Time-Varying Standard Deviations (SD) of errors within the TVP-FAVAR model with 
three unobserved factors for the observable variables over the sample 1959Q1-2013Q2. The FAVAR part of the 
model is estimated using the Two-Step Principal Components method based on Bernanke et al. (2005) identification 
approach.   
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Chapter 4 
The International Transmission of Monetary Policy in 
Presence of Government Debt: a GVAR Approach 
 
Abstract  
This chapter aims to contribute to the empirical literature on the international spillovers of US 
monetary policy, whilst accounting for fiscal policy. The main motivation of this chapter is to 
identify the way in which fiscal policy is able to influence the monetary transmission mechanism 
and generate international spillovers. Here we model fiscal policy using government debt levels. 
Moreover, the study addresses the extent to which an increase in US government debt can 
stimulate the real economy and generate spillovers to the other economies. When modelling 
fiscal policy in open economy context we account for potential import leakages by employing a 
Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) methodology, which captures trade linkages across 
countries. Thus, it more fully models fiscal policy implemented in a global context and accounts 
for policy spillovers. The Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRF) indicates that 
accounting for fiscal policy influences the impact of a monetary contraction. Given the high level 
of US government debt, this finding seems to be reasonable, as any changes in interest rates can 
change the interest expenses share of government expenditure significantly. Furthermore, the 
response to an expansionary fiscal policy supports the non-Ricardian view on fiscal policy within 
US economy that is it increases both inflation and output. This fiscal policy shock also appears 
to generate expansionary spillover effects on other economies. Moreover, according to the 
estimated Likelihood Ratio (LR) to examine the potential contribution of US government debt 
to long-run macroeconomic relations within the GVAR, evidence suggests that the unrestricted 
Fisher equation, the Term Premium, and the Uncovered Interest rate Parities (UIP) condition can 
be maintained for the US and other economies. Finally, the results of Persistence Profiles (PP) 
proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1996) suggest that government debt induces a decrease in the 
convergence rate to equilibrium following the policy shocks compared with alternative model 
specifications.  
Key Words: Monetary and Fiscal Policy, International Spillovers, Government Debt, Global 
VAR, Generalized Impulse Response Functions, Long-Run Macroeconomic Relations  
JEL classification Code: E470, H690, C510, C520, C530  
Acknowledgment: I would like to thank Alessandro Galesi, M. Hashem Pesaran, and L. Vanessa 
Smith for making available their GVAR Matlab code. I am also grateful to Professor Hassan 
Molana and participant at the 2011 SGPE Conference for their helpful comments on the 
preliminary draft of this Chapter.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Over the three past decades, monetary policy has received much attention as the key 
macroeconomic instrument. This is partly due to the small lags between its announcement, 
implementation, and feedback, but also due to as monetary policy focuses upon nominal 
variables like inflation, see Walsh (2011) and Romer (2011). In contrast, fiscal policy, which 
takes some time to reach its policy goal, has been deemed less efficient to affect aggregate 
demand. Much research has argued that fiscal policy tends to be less effective in an open 
economy context given import leakages. However, the prolonged and widespread recent 
financial crisis shows the limitation of monetary policy and a reconsideration of fiscal policy as 
an effective policy instrument.  
The 2008 financial crisis triggered a sharp global contraction in real economic activity due 
partly to cross-country linkages. Many advanced economies have undertaken a range of 
monetary policy interventions and fiscal stimulus to counter the crisis, see Fawley and Neely 
(2013). The impact of these policy interventions varied among countries necessitating the 
reconsideration of the effectiveness of fiscal policy especially in the presence of cross-country 
linkages, see Blanchard et al. (2010), and Bussiere et al. (2013).  
Most macroeconomists agree that a rise in the short-term interest rates induces a fall in 
inflation and output. While there is a widespread agreement on the effect of monetary policy, 
there are both theoretical and empirical-motivated disputes on the implications of fiscal policy. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the Ricardian interpretation of fiscal policy suggests that a fiscal 
expansion is impotent to stimulate aggregate demand because it indicates higher expected taxes. 
In contrast, the non-Ricardian view implies that this shock would increase both prices and output 
due to its impact on private expenditure, see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) for a detailed 
discussion. There is empirical evidence that supports both these arguments depending on the 
identification of fiscal policy shocks implemented and the degree of macroeconomic policy 
coordination. For example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and Fatas and Mihov (2006) find 
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evidence to support that a positive shock to government spending induces real wages to increase 
which encourages private expenditure. This, in turns, would lead to an increase in aggregate 
demand, prices, and output. In the opposite side, Romer and Romer (1989) find evidence for a 
Ricardian view: a fall in the real wages and private consumption following an increase in defence 
expenditure in the US economy. These discrepancies mainly arises because of the different 
assumption on the response of taxation to the incurred government expenditure, see Canzoneri 
et al. (2011).1  
Another challenge is that the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) constraint makes Conventional 
Monetary Policy (CMP) less effective. The standard Keynesian resolution at the ZLB is to use 
fiscal policy to increase government expenditure or cut taxes in order to stimulate the economy. 
This policy approach can be powerful in a liquidity trap. Yet, the outcome depends on the 
expectation formation and most importantly, the magnitude of the policy-generated expansionary 
effect, see Correia et al. (2013).  
Note that, the implication of liquidity trap for monetary policy may account for the role of 
policy commitment by the monetary authority such as keeping the interest rate near to zero for a 
specific period, see Krugman (1998), Enggertsson and Woodford (2004), Auerbach and Obstfeld 
(2005), and Farhi and Werning (2012). This policy commitment is expected to increase output 
and inflation in both the present and the future. However, if the real interest rates ought to be 
negative to stimulate the economy, the only way to attain this policy target is to generate 
inflation. This can be achieved by a joint and flexible fiscal and monetary policy that mitigates 
the ZLB constraint on nominal interest rates, see Eggertsson (2010), Christiano and Ikeda (2011), 
Woodford (2011), and Correia et al. (2013).  
Given the important role of fiscal policy at the ZLB, however, in an open economy 
framework with trade linkages, it can be argued that domestic fiscal policy would create 
                                                     
1 Note that as Perotti (2007) explains, fiscal policy outcome also depends upon whether government expenses 
include defence expenditure or not.  
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international spillovers and reduces the impact at home, see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2013). This accounts for conducting the empirical investigation of policy impact in a global 
framework to capture both domestic and foreign outcomes rather than solely relying on domestic 
implication. A global perspective can take account of global co-movements among variables and 
the potential connections between domestic variables and their foreign counterparts, see 
Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010), and Hartmann and Roestel (2013). 
We identify a gap in the literature on the potential contribution of fiscal policy on the 
monetary transmission mechanism, in both the domestic and international levels. Thus, this 
Chapter aims to investigate the implication of US government debt for the monetary transmission 
mechanism at both the national and international level. It also attempts to address the extent to 
which a fiscal expansion can stimulate the economy and its ability to generate expansionary 
spillovers to other economies. Having considered our motivation, the construction of our 
benchmark model consists both domestic and cross-country relations. For this reason, this 
Chapter employs the Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) method. As Chapter 2 notes, this 
modelling framework is structured to facilitate cross-country analysis and explain the potential 
global co-movement among macro and finance variables, see Pesaran et al. (2004), Dees et al. 
(2007), and di Mauro and Pesaran (2013). Our motivation is to address the potential international 
spillovers of monetary and fiscal policy. In particular, our central contribution in this chapter is 
to examine the way in which the monetary transmission mechanism is influenced by a countryˈs 
fiscal stance in a global framework. The GVAR methodology is ideally suited to conduct our 
research as it allows policy analysis, testing for long-run macro and finance relationships, and 
investigating the spillover effect of policy shocks. For example see, Dees et al. (2007), Bagliano 
and Morana, (2009), Dees and Saint-Guilhem (2007), Poirson and Weber (2011), and Nickel and 
Vansteenkiste (2013).2 
                                                     
2 For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the GVAR methodology and application see di Mauro and Pesaran 
(2013).   
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For this purpose, two GVAR models have been constructed, namely the simple and the 
fiscal-augmented GVAR model specifications. Whilst the fiscal-augmented GVAR model 
includes the government debt to capture the potential impact of fiscal policy on the monetary 
transmission mechanism, the simple model excludes fiscal policy. We argue that although the 
short-term interest rate is a key policy transmission channel for both fiscal and monetary policy, 
however, our results suggests that an increase in government debt can counteract the policy 
targets. Furthermore, impulse responses indicate fiscal policy is the non-Ricardian: an increase 
in the government debt-to-GDP ratio can significantly stimulate the economy. This contrasts 
with Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). Fiscal policy also generates international spillovers to other 
economies. Finally, government debt appears to induce long-run macroeconomic relations to 
converge to equilibrium slowly. 
To our knowledge, there exists limited empirical literature on the international spillovers 
of monetary and fiscal policy interactions.3 We contribute to the related empirical literature in a 
number of ways. First, we find that real output and long-run interest rates are highly correlated 
across economies, whilst taking into account the government debt does not change the 
correlation. Second, we show that both prices and output increases in response to a monetary 
contraction within both the simple and the fiscal-augmented models. However, US government 
debt can influence the duration of responses to monetary policy shock. Given the high level of 
US public debt, this finding seems to be plausible as any changes in interest rates can 
significantly change the interest expenses share of government expenditure.  Third, the impulse 
responses of an expansionary fiscal policy support the non-Ricardian view within the US 
economy. Fourth, we find that there is significant international spillovers generated by monetary 
and fiscal policy. Fifth, the results of Persistence Profiles (PP) test suggest that government debt 
                                                     
3 As an instance, Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2013) employ the GVAR method to study the international spillovers 
of fiscal shocks on the both macro and financial variables including real GDP, inflation, equity prices, government 
and corporate bonds.   
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reduces the convergence rate to equilibrium following the policy shocks compared with ignoring 
the impact of fiscal policy.  
The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review of the related 
literature. Methodology issues are discussed in section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents model 
specification and empirical results. Dynamic analysis of the model is discussed in section 4.5. 
Long-run macroeconomic relations together with their Persistence Profiles results are examined 
in section 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes the study.  
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Table 4.1. Key Literature on the Domestic and International Spillovers of Macroeconomic policy  
Study Methodology Motivation Main Contribution 
Dees, di Mauro, 
Pesaran, and Smith 
(2007) 
GVAR 
Developing the 
GVAR methodology 
for the analysis of 
global 
interdependencies 
Equity and bond markets are more 
synchronous as compared to real output 
and inflation. In addition, a US monetary 
contractionary policy has limited and 
statistically insignificant spillover 
effects.  
Mountford and 
Uhlig (2009) 
Sign restrictions 
on the VAR 
Model 
Quantifying the effect 
of a tax cut policy on 
the economy and 
whether itˈs source of 
finance matter   
Comparing the IRFs from three different 
policy scenarios of deficit spending, 
deficit-financed tax cuts, and a balanced 
budget spending expansion, it appears 
that deficit-financed tax-cuts is more 
effective to stimulate the economy.         
Ramey (2011) 
the VAR and 
Ramey–Shapiro 
narrative 
approach 
Investigating the 
differences between 
anticipated and 
unanticipated tax 
changes 
The narrative approach shocks capture 
the timing of the news about future fiscal 
expansion better than VAR methods. In 
addition, given that the VAR approach 
captures the shocks too late, it misses the 
initial decline in consumption and real 
wages that occurs as soon as the news is 
learned. The results show that delaying 
the timing on the Ramey–Shapiro dates 
replicates the VAR results. 
Corsetti and Muller 
(2012) 
the VAR and 
standard 
Business Cycle 
model 
Revising the potential 
rule of fiscal by 
providing new 
evidence on the cross-
border effects of 
discretionary fiscal 
measures 
Significant cross border macroeconomic 
effects of US fiscal policy on economic 
activity in the UK and the Euro Area.  
Nickel and 
Vansteenkiste 
(2013) 
GVAR 
Examining the 
international 
spillovers of fiscal 
policy on the financial 
variables within the 
Euro Area 
There is a strong financial market inter-
linkages between corporate and the 
government sectors. In addition, the fiscal 
policy of the large risk-free government 
bonds issuing countries matters not only 
for the countries themselves but also at 
international level.   
Dees, Holly, 
Pesaran, and Smith 
(2007) 
Long-run 
macroeconomic 
relations within the 
GVAR model 
Testing for the 
validity and 
reasonableness of the 
long-run 
macroeconomic 
relations  
While the UIP conditions and the Fisher 
equation cannot be rejected, evidence has 
not been found to validate absolute 
purchasing power parity.      
Note: This Table summarizes the related literature that the chapter is constructed upon it. GVAR stands for Global 
VAR.    
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4.2 Review of Literature  
Over the three past decades, the main stream in monetary policy studies has not considered the 
effect of fiscal policy. Some studies provided evidence that fiscal policy is not as competent as 
monetary policy to stimulate the economy, see Barro (1983), Evans (1985,1987), and Plosser 
(1987). However, the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates led to a reconsideration of 
fiscal and monetary policy, as clearly monetary policy is constrained.4 While nominal interest 
rates are close to zero, the main question here is how- if at all- policy can increase aggregate 
demand. Among various ways to stimulate the economy, one practical solution is to implement 
an expansionary fiscal policy to raise the level of current inflation and hence decrease the real 
interest rate, see Bodenstein et al. (2009), Devereux (2010), Eggertsson (2010), Ramey (2011), 
Romer (2011), Woodford (2011), and Coresetti and Muller (2012).   
While there exists a consensus in the literature on the impact of monetary policy, the 
existing literature on the impact of fiscal policy is controversial. As discussed in Mountford and 
Uhlig (2009), the discrepancies among the results may depend upon different methodologies, the 
identification approach, and the sample period. Building up on the ZLB circumstances, some 
recent studies find evidence in favour of constraining monetary policy, in the form of policy 
commitment such as a Taylor Rule or inflation targeting, coordinated with an expansionary fiscal 
policy to stimulate the economy, see Woodford (2011), and Romer and Romer (2013).  
In a seminal paper on monetary and fiscal policy interactions, Leeper (1991) explains how 
the macroeconomic impact of monetary and fiscal policy can differ depending on the assumption 
of which policy is constrained, or passive, while the other policy can actively respond to the 
shocks. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are three possible combinations of macroeconomic 
policy. The conventional policy outcome is achieved from an active monetary policy and a 
passive fiscal policy. This is referred to in the literature as the Ricardian view. In contrast, there 
                                                     
4 As Cogan et al. (2010), and Woodford (2011) discuss a higher inflation expectation is required in such a 
circumstances to improve aggregate demand and output as in a liquidity trap insufficient demand is the major 
problem.       
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is the non-Ricardian argument, or the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), that holds the 
combination of a passive monetary policy and an active fiscal policy can produce counter 
intuitive results, i.e. the price puzzle. The third possible combination can be a unified monetary 
and fiscal policy in the form of either passive or active that generate unstable equilibrium, see 
Leeper (1991).   
Canzoneri et al. (2002), Monacelli and Perotti (2007), Jeanne and Svensson (2007), Claeys 
(2008), and Eggertsson (2010) find that a debt-financed fiscal expansion coupled with a Taylor-
type Rule monetary policy can lead to an increase in the interest rates.5 It can be explained as a 
higher expected inflation and output gap may account for a higher interest rate. This in turns can 
stimulate the economy. As discussed in Eggertsson (2010), and Jeanne and Svensson (2007) 
when the Central Bank commit to a higher future prices by a currency depreciation, this can 
cause a negative capital level at the Central Bankˈs balance sheet that may requires borrowing 
from government. To avoid or control the amount of borrowing, the Central Bank would not 
allow its capital to fall below a certain amount. This minimum capital level provide a lower 
bound on the future exchange rate. To reach this minimum capital level, consistent with the 
desired higher future prices, the Central Bank may commit itself to a depreciation of the 
exchange rate.   
However, there is the possibility that even an expansionary fiscal policy satisfies Ricardian 
equivalence and fails to change private expenditure and aggregate demand, see Barro (1979), 
Evans (1985-1987), Plosser (1987), and Canzoneri et al. (2011).6 As discussed in Chapter 2, 
while the Keynesian view,  argues that fiscal policy is an effective tool in influencing the real 
economy, the Ricardian view focuses on the limitation of fiscal policy, see Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2000), Wickens (2008), and Romer (2011).  
                                                     
5 By constraining a fiscal expansion with a monetary commitment in the form of Taylor-Rule, the interest rate is 
determined based on inflation and output gap, see Taylor (1993).     
6 Bernheim (1987) provides a critical survey of the empirical literature supporting the Ricardian view on fiscal 
policy. 
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We also explain in Chapter 2 that the interest rate is the key policy transmission channel to 
achieve both fiscal and monetary policy goals. While standard macro theories suggest 
government spending and interest rates are positively correlated, in practice their relationship 
depends on the extent to which a change in fiscal policy would affect inflation, wealth, and 
private consumption, see Barro (1983), and Plosser (1987). Thus, if government spending could 
produce a long-lived inflation, then private consumption, interest rates, and output would 
increase. Otherwise, their path would remain unchanged or even would be negatively affected, 
see Evans (1985), Favero and Giavazzi (2007), Corsetti and Kuester (2011), and Farhi and 
Werning (2012).  
Evans (1985,1987) concludes that the correlation between the interest rate and US 
government deficits is not statistically significant, providing empirical support for Ricardian 
equivalence.7 According to his study, a number of factors can clarify these finding such as the 
Federal Reserve stabilization policy, the small size of the deficit over the sample, determination 
of both the deficit and the stock of money as exogenous variables, a low level of inflation 
expectations, capital inflows from abroad, and the existing political conflict.8 More specifically, 
Evans (1985) explains that during the Second World War the Federal Reserve pegged interest 
rates to the Treasury securities to ensure low and stable interest rates. Thus, interest rate were 
unable to change in response to an increase in the government budget deficit. Similar studies for 
the US economy in the 1980s find little or no connection between government deficit and the 
interest rates, see Barro (1983), Feldstein (1985), Plosser (1987), and Ramey and Shapiro (1999) 
among others.  
From an opposite perspective, there is empirical evidence suggesting that an expansionary 
fiscal policy may induce the interest rates to increase dependent upon the treatment of debt 
                                                     
7 Evans (1985) estimates both restricted and unrestricted reduced forms for the interest rate in the US and five large 
industrial economies. He applied a standard IS-LM framework including government expenditure, the expected 
inflation rate, and the real money supply variables to determine the nominal interest rate. 
8 As Wickens (2008) discusses, within an IS-LM framework, the amount of governmentˈs deficits and its financing 
source are the two key factors which affect the interest rate.   
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policy, see Reinhart and Sack (2000), Canzoneri et al. (2002), Laubach and Williams (2003), 
Dai and Philippon (2005), and Mountford and Uhlig (2009). For example, Dai and Philippon 
(2005) find evidence that a positive shock to the deficit-to-GDP ratio by one percent leads to 40-
50 basis points increase in the long-term interest rates. In addition, their finding suggests that the 
fiscal shock, identified by a Cholesky approach, affects long-rates through expectations of future 
spot rates as well as risk premia.  
Note that the impact of a given fiscal shock on interest rates would differ in the presence 
of public debt compared to otherwise, as including debt feedback in the model is associated with 
a larger response of interest rates, inflation, and output, see Favero and Giavazzi (2007). They 
argue that a rise in the stock of debt would increase future monetization or, in the extreme case, 
a debt default.  
In addition to the potential role of public debt in changing the outcome of fiscal policy, 
fiscal policy can also be potent during a liquidity trap. For example, Farhi and Werning (2012), 
within a currency union, show that government expenditure multiplier for output is greater than 
one. The mechanism for their result is that government spending can stimulate inflation. With 
fixed nominal interest rates, this reduces real interest rates, which encourages current spending. 
The increase in consumption in turn leads to more inflation, creating a feedback loop. Their 
results suggest that the fiscal multipliers increase as the degree of price flexibility increases, 
which is intuitive given that the mechanism relies on the response of inflation. 
In another study, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) within a sign restrictions on VAR model 
show that a monetary contraction can produce a counter-intuitive responses as GDP and 
consumption both increase, in response to a rise in short-term interest rates. To explain the 
outcome of fiscal policy, they present IRFs evidence from three different policy scenarios of 
deficit spending, deficit-financed tax cuts, and a balanced budget spending expansion. Their 
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results suggest that a deficit-financed tax-cut succeeded more among the other alternatives to 
stimulate the economy through an increase in output.9   
So far, we researched the literature on the different impact of fiscal policy on the economy, 
and the way that it can be influenced by the public debt. Now turning our focus from the domestic 
impact of fiscal policy to its potential international spillovers, it is worth investigating how fiscal 
and monetary policy interactions may influence the real economy in a global framework. Before 
globalization of the world economy, it was widely believed that fiscal expansion would increase 
the nominal interest rate and crowd out the effects of increased government expenditure. 
However, in an open economy, the Treasury has access to both domestic and foreign financial 
markets to finance its expenditures. Thus, with a perfect capital flows assumption, the traditional 
Keynesian crowding-out effect of a fiscal expansion is hard to maintain for two reasons.10 First, 
perfect capital flows can decrease the crowding out effect of an expansionary fiscal policy. 
Second, given that the interest rates are determined at the global level, it does not seem certain 
that a fiscal expansion will lead to an increase in the interest rates, see Claeys et al. (2008). 
Under a high degree of capital mobility, and when the fiscal deficit of a country is small 
relative to the world saving rate and to a mobile stock of capital, then an expansionary fiscal 
policy would not increase the interest rates. However, if the fiscal deficit were large by global 
standards, then an increase in the real interest rate would be necessary to induce the capital 
inflow. Conversely, rising interest rates abroad might push interest rates up, regardless of the 
domestic fiscal position, see Brook (2003).11  
                                                     
9 They applied their VAR model to US quarterly data from 1955 to 2000. Their VAR constructed on 10 variables 
includes GDP, private consumption, total government revenue, real wages, private non-residential investment, 
interest rate, adjusted reserves, the producer price index, and the GDP deflator together with the fiscal policy 
instrument.   
10 Note that there may be an exchange rate effect which crowds out the export sector as an increase in government 
spending would lead to incipient pressure upwards upon yields and capital inflow.  
11 As noted in Brook (2003) the most important factors that contribute to a fall in interest rates include business 
cycles, the amount of capital stock in the country, the degree of capital market integration, domestic saving and 
consumption rate, expectations concerning future of the economy, and the possibility of a continuing fall in the short-
term rates by Central Banks. 
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The literature on fiscal policy multipliers in an open economy context suggests that they 
can be negatively correlated with the degree of openness of the economy due to import leakages 
as fiscal multipliers for more open and trade-dependent economies appears to be smaller, see 
Beetsma et al. (2006), and Cuaresma et al. (2011).  
In addition to the potential role of openness on the degree by which a fiscal policy may 
change the interest rates, public debt also account for the magnitude of policyˈs international 
spillovers. For example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Canzoneri et al. (2002), Caldara and 
Kamps (2008), Favaro et al. (2011), and Lagana and Sgro (2011) find evidence that US 
government expenditure shocks generates significant international spillovers during last four 
decades. Corsetti and Muller (2012) within a VAR model examine the domestic effects of US 
government spending shock and its international spillovers to the Euro Area and the UK. They 
focus on the cross-border effects of a US spending expansion on economic activity in the Euro 
Area and UK, as well as on the US bilateral trade with these economies.12 Their results suggest 
that unexpected fiscal expansions have a large impact on economic activity in the UK and Euro 
Area.  
In another study for the Euro Area, Chin and Frankel (2003) show that the regional public 
debt in the Euro Area has a negative effect on the interest rate while for a country basis in the 
area this relations turns to be positive. Cuaresma et al. (2011) report that a fiscal policy shock 
implemented in Germany generate spillovers within the Euro Area.13 Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2013) also provide evidence that fiscal policy impacts not only the domestic 
economy but also generates international spillovers through the trade channel.14  
                                                     
12 Corsetti and Muller (2012) estimate a VAR model on quarterly time series for the period 1980:Q1–2007:Q4, 
which do not consider the crisis period. Their VAR model includes four US time-series: government spending and 
output, long-term real interest rates, and public debt.  
13 Their analysis covers the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
14 In a study for OECD countries, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) find evidence of fiscal spillovers on output. 
Their approach for linking economies is similar to ours as policy shocks transmitted through the trade between 
countries. Their finding suggests that the spillover effects vary over the business cycles which have been observed 
to be high in recessions and modest in expansions. Also, the magnitude of spillovers highly depends on (i) the size 
and the state of both the source of fiscal shocks and the recipient countries, and (ii) the number of trade partners 
which reversely affects the spillovers.        
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Further to international macroeconomic spillovers, fiscal policy shocks may also be 
transmitted through financial variables. For example, Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2013) within a 
GVAR model show that fiscal shocks have significant international spillovers on financial 
variables.15 Particularly, they report that a shock to government consumption results in an 
increase in equity prices and government bonds yield domestically and internationally. They also 
find that a shock to government bond yields originated in a large country can produce spillovers 
to the domestic and international corporate bond markets.  
Finally, as regards the international macroeconomic impact of monetary policy, the 
literature suggests that the outcome of a monetary contraction can be counterintuitive. For 
example, Dees et al. (2007), within a GVAR model constructed upon monetary variables, study 
the international spillovers of a US monetary contraction and find that output and inflation 
increase in response to the policy shock, which is a counter-intuitive result.16 Their results also 
show that the effect of a change in US monetary policy to the Euro Area is limited and statistically 
insignificant.         
So far, we discuss the literature on the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy. Our 
discussion concerns the non-Ricardian view on fiscal policy and the literature on both the 
domestic and international impact of fiscal policy. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, 
it is useful to overview US macroeconomic policy indicators as is described in the next section.            
Stylised Facts 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates key policy indicators of the US economy. As can be seen, the nominal 
short-term interest rate has significantly declined over the sample while the government debt ratio 
has been almost doubled. At the same time, we can see a rise in real equity prices while US 
current account as a share of GDP falls suggesting that during this period, imports exceeded 
                                                     
15 They estimate a GVAR model on quarterly time series for the period 1980:Q1–2008:Q4 for eight countries 
including France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US. Their constructed GVAR model 
includes six variables: fiscal spending, real GDP, inflation, equity prices, government bond yield, and the corporate 
bond yield.  
16 Their GVAR model is estimated for 26 countries over the period 1979-2003 consists of seven variables: real 
output, inflation, real exchange rate, real equity prices, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, and the price 
of oil.  
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exports. The observation suggests that there may be a positive correlation between the 
government debt and the current account as an increase in the public debt has been led to a higher 
current account deficit. This is consistent with the twin-deficit hypothesis that suggests wider 
fiscal deficits should usually be accompanied by wider current account deficits provided that the 
relationship between fiscal deficits and private consumption is positive, see Nickel and 
Vansteenkiste (2008).17   
Figure 4.1. US Macroeconomic Policy Indicators 
 
Notes: This Figure demonstrates the dynamic of short-term interest rate, real equity prices, current account balance 
as a share of GDP, and government debt-to-GDP ratio, using quarterly time series for the period 1979:Q2-
2013:Q1 for the US. See Appendix 4.B for a detailed description of the data series.  
 
As Chapter 2 notes, the relationship between the current account and fiscal policy changes 
depends upon whether consumers make their expenditure decisions in a Ricardian or non-
Ricardian manner. If the debt ratio is high and the fiscal situation becomes increasingly 
unsustainable, then agents anticipate a tax increase. Given this expectation, consumers have an 
incentive to save more. In this case, a fiscal stimulus can be offset by higher private savings. 
Thus, under the Ricardian case, a high debt level would be associated with a stable or even 
                                                     
17 This is also in line with the Keynesian view that higher fiscal deficits can encourage private consumption. 
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negative relationship between the fiscal deficit and the current account deficit. However, under a 
sustainable public debt ratio, consumers would react in a non-Ricardian manner, thus, the 
relationship between the current account deficit and the fiscal deficit should be positive.18 Note 
that a debt-financed fiscal expansion requires an increase in either saving or the current account 
deficit to satisfy the equilibrium condition, see Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).19,20  
4.3 Structure of the Global VAR Model 
The Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) framework is a useful econometric tool in modelling 
global connections. It is particularly suited to the analysis of the transmission of the shocks 
among the world economies. As noted in Chapter 2, the GVAR model links core domestic 
variables to their foreign counterparts together with globally observed variables. As detailed in 
Pesaran et al. (2004), and Dees et al. (2007), the construction of a GVAR model consists of the 
following four stages.  
1. Estimating individual country/region-specific VARX models,  
2. Constructing a weighting matrix to link domestic variables with their foreign counterparts 
that also allows for the international transmission of policy innovations,  
3. Linking all the estimated VARX through the computed weighting matrix, 
4. Solving the GVAR system simultaneously. 
Where )1,1(VARX  is denoted by ittiiititiiit uXXXX  
*
1,1
*
01, . 
                                                     
18 Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) report three thresholds for the government debt-to-GDP ratio: low debt and 
medium debt countries, with a debt level of 44% of GDP, the relationship is positive, i.e. an increase in the fiscal 
deficit leads to a higher current account deficit, in line with the non-Ricardian view. In medium-to-high debt 
countries, with debt ratios between 44% and 90% of GDP, the relationship is still positive but much less so. In the 
very high debt countries, with debt ratios of above 90% of GDP, the relationship is negative and insignificant, 
suggesting that a rise in the fiscal deficit does not result in a rise in the current account deficit. Implicitly this result 
suggests that private consumers have become Ricardian offsetting the increase in the fiscal deficit by a fall in private 
consumption. 
19 The effect of government debt can be explained more clear through National Account identities. We know that at 
equilibrium the sum of private and public saving must be equal to the sum of investment and net exports as follows: 
S+(T-G)=I+NX . Now under a debt-financed fiscal expansion, the left side of the equation represent a budget deficit 
and a decrease in public saving. The equilibrium can be satisfied in three ways: (i) private saving may rise, (ii) 
domestic investment may fall, or (iii) net export may decline. The conventional view holds that this policy would 
induced private saving to increase. In contrast, the non-Ricardian view states that this policy would cause a fall in 
net exports that constitutes an increase in the trade deficit as the policy would encourage private expenditure rather 
than private saving, see Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).       
20 One example for the positive connection between the budget deficit and the trade deficit is the Twin Deficit in the 
US during the 1980s. 
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Given the specified procedure, to estimate the VARX model, suppose that there are 1N
countries/regions in the global economy; each one is indexed by Ni ,,2,1,0   where 0i
represents the reference country.21 Let itX  be a 1iK  country-specific vector of domestic 
variables/factors and *
itX  be a 1
* iK  vector of foreign variables specific to country i , where iK  
and 
*
iK  denote the number of domestic and foreign variables for country i  respectively. In the 
GVAR literature, the main assumption is the weak exogeneity of foreign variables. By definition, 
the foreign variable,
*
itX , is weakly exogenous to the domestic variable, itX , if there is no long-
run feedback from 
*
itX  to itX , see Pesaran et al. (2004), and Dees et al. (2007). This property 
allows that foreign variables in VARX models to stand as global factors.22 
Thus, each individual )1,1(VARX  is written in the form of Equation (4.1) as follows. 
ittiiititiitiiit XXXaaX  
*
1,1
*
01,10  (4.1) 
Where Tt ,,2,1,0  , Ni ,,2,1,0   , 0ia  and tia 1 are the coefficients of the deterministic, 
iii KK   is a matrix of lagged coefficients, 0i and 1i   are a
*
ii KK   matrix of coefficients 
associated with the foreign specific variables, 1 iit K is a vector of idiosyncratic country-
specific shocks in which all shocks are assumed to be normally distributed as ),0(~
2 iidit . It is 
worth noting that we do not require all VARX models to include the same variables for all 
countries. It is possible to consider zero weights for any missing variables in the country
thi  
within the VARX model, see Pesaran et al. (2004).23 
The next step is the construction of a weighting matrix to relate domestic and foreign 
variables together and identify potential spillovers across countries. The selection of the 
weighting matrix is an important matter. Given the integrated financial markets, one choice for 
                                                     
21 The Numeraire country is the country whose currency is set as the reference currency. 
22 Note that all the country-specific variables/observed factors are treated endogenously, while their foreign 
counterparts are treated as weakly exogenous. A detailed discussion can be found in Dees et al. (2007).   
23 As concerns our study, there are no datasets available for long-term interest rates and real equity prices variables 
for China. Thus, as in Dees et al. (2007) these two variables have been excluded from Chinaˈs model.   
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linking countries together can be finance variables such as the interest rates, the exchange rates, 
and the equity prices to perform as the transmission channels for policy intervention. 
Alternatively, bilateral trade between countries can account for international spillovers since in 
an open economy framework, both the interest rates and the exchange rate, per se, are influenced 
by the trade stance, see Chudik and Fratzscher (2011). 
The existing literature on the cross-countries linking channels identifies the bilateral trade 
between countries as one of the most significant determinants of cross-countries linkages, see 
Forbes and Chinn (2004), Pesaran et al. (2004), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2006), and Dees et al. 
(2007). Moreover, some studies find evidence of a direct link between bilateral trade and the 
business cycles co-movements in the way that a stronger trade relationship is associated with 
more similar business cycle patterns, see Pesaran et al. (2004), Dees et al. (2007), and Kappler 
(2009). We follow Pesaran et al. (2004), and Dees et al. (2007) to adopt bilateral trade as the 
international transmission channel for policy shocks. 
Given bilateral trade as the weighting approach, accordingly, all domestic and foreign 
variables are connected via the constructed bilateral trade matrix, which allows for the world-
interdependencies across countries. Let ijw denotes the trade matrix between countries ji, .  For 
each VARX, the vector 
*
itX , which includes foreign-specific variables, can be written as follows.      
10,
00
* 

N
j
jtijii
N
j
jtijit XWandwxwX  (4.2) 
We also follow Pesaran et al. (2004), and Dees et al. (2007) approach to employ a fixed trade 
weights matrix, ijw . We compute the average trade flows over a three-year basis that is 
constructed using the current and past two years of the cross-country flows data. As has been 
discussed in Dees et al. (2007) the choice of using the fixed-weights is on the basis that changes 
in trade weights tend to be rather gradual. Thus, the foreign-specific variables computed using 
both the fixed and variable trade weights are often very close.  
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For each country, the co-integrating relations can be written as a conditional Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) for both the endogenous and weakly exogenous variables as Equation 
(4.3) shows. 
  itjtiitiititiitiiiiit uzdXdtcX   ,11*001,0 )1(  (4.3) 
Where






 
 *, ititit XXz , ),( 11,1,   ttiti dz , the matrix  22 , iii   captures the lagged 
coefficients of domestic and foreign variables for country i , id  is a vector of observed global 
factors, and itu  is residuals. In addition, i  is a )( ii rK   matrix of rank ir , i  is a iii rKK  )(
*  
matrix of rank ir  ,and ir  is the number of co-integrating relations in the system. Furthermore, 
following Pesaran and Smith (2006) the coefficients of the linear trend in the error correction 
form ),,( iii  is restricted to avoid the possibility of the quadratic trend in itX . It is possible 
to decompose i  as ),,( * idiXiXi    and ),,(
*  tititit dXX . Thus, rewriting the VECM 
yields Equation (4.4). 
tdXX itiditiXitiXititi )()(
*
*    (4.4) 
As can be seen in Equation (4.4), it is possible to estimate co-integrating relations both 
within itX , and between itX  and 
*
itX , as well as, across itX  and jtX  for any ji  , see Dees et al. 
(2007). The number of co-integrating relations can be consistently estimated for each country 
model by treating td  and 
*
itX  as weakly exogenous I (1).
24  
After estimating all country-specific VARX models, we can proceed to solving all the 
 
N
i
ik
0  endogenous variables of the global economy collected in the 1k  vector 
),,,( 10  Ntttt XXXX  simultaneously using the trade-weighted matrix for linking countries 
                                                     
24 Note that the weak exogeneity assumption in the co-integration literature implies there is no long-run feedback 
from domestic variables to foreign-specific variables without ignoring lagged short-run feedback between domestic 
and their foreign counterparts, see Pesaran et al. (2004), and Dees et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion.   
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relative to each country specific weights. Thus, we need to rewrite the vector ),(
*  ititit XXZ  in 
the form of Equation (4.5) provided that 

N
j
jtijit xwX
0
*
. 
NiXWZ tiit ,,2,1,0,   (4.5) 
Note that iW  is a kkk ii  )(
*
 matrix that is determined by the country-specific weights, see 
Dees et al. (2007). Let ),...,,,,...,,(max 1010 NN qqqpppp  , and L  be the lag-operator, the 
GVAR (P) can be formulated as Equation (4.6): 
ttXPLG ),(  (4.6) 
Where 
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 (4.7) 
And )],(),,([),,( iiiiitiii qLpLzqpLA   , ittiitiiit udqLYaa  ),(10 . 
In order to estimate the GVAR (P), Equation (4.6) must be solved recursively. This 
Equation is the framework of the point estimation and Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
(GIRF) analysis.25  Having introduced our methodology we now proceed to set out our empirical 
results.   
4.4 Model Specification  
Given this chapter objective that is to study the international spillovers of macroeconomic policy 
interventions in the presence of government debt, this section presents the results of constructed 
GVAR. In the next section, we discuss the dynamic properties of the model. As noted earlier, to 
construct a GVAR model two sets of variables must be specified: domestic, itX , and their foreign 
counterparts, 
*
itX . We estimate two core models: a simple GVAR model, which excludes fiscal 
                                                     
25A detailed procedure of constructing a GVAR model and corresponding formal proof can be found in Pesaran et 
al. (2004), Pesaran and Smith (2006), and Dees et al. (2007).      
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policy variable, and a fiscal-augmented GVAR model, which includes the government debt-to-
GDP ratio to examine the way that fiscal policy may influence monetary policy in a global 
setting. The domestic variables consists of macro and finance variables in the form of 
itX = [real 
output, ity , CPI inflation, it , real exchange rate, itep , real equity price, iteq , short-term interest 
rate, itsr , long-term interest rate, itlr , government debt-to-GDP ratio, itgdr , oil price,
oil
tp , raw 
material price,
mat
tp , and metal price,
metal
tp  ]. Inflation is estimated based on 1,  tiitit PP  while 
CPI index is used to estimate the real values.26 The foreign variables are presented with similar 
notation distinguished by an asterisk,*, as follows.  
                                             ],,,,,,,,[
******* metal
t
mat
t
oil
tititititititit pppgdrlrsreqyX   
  
Our choice of variables is based on the standard VAR literature on the monetary policy 
studies, augmented with government debt to proxy fiscal variable. We decide to focus upon 
government debt-to-GDP ratio in our study to show the potential influence of the fiscal stance, 
as the debt ratio may present government expenditure dynamic over the time. There are a number 
of reasons that rationalize our choice. First, government debt level reduces the problem related 
to separating taxes and the government expenditure effects in government budget. It also can 
help to avoid the co-linearity problems that are highly likely to occur when both the revenue and 
expenditure sides of the government budget are included in the model. Most importantly, as 
noted in Favero and Giavazzi (2007), and Farhi and Werning (2012) by adopting the government 
debt ratio, it is possible to depict the dynamics of the fiscal stance rather than mapping the current 
budget circumstances.  
Our GVAR model involves six major industrial countries: Australia, Canada, China, Japan, 
the UK, the US, and the Euro Area, which contribute approximately to 80 percent of the worldˈs, 
                                                     
26 As noted before, it is not required that all the country-specific VARX models include the same number of variables 
where data is not available. In our model, due to the data limitation for long-term interest rate and the equity price 
in China, these two variables have been excluded from the Chinaˈs model. 
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output.27 Given the importance of the scale of the US economy in the world, the US is set as the 
reference economy with the US dollar as the reference currency. The model is estimated over the 
period 1979:Q2- 2013:Q1. Our main sources for the data are International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the OECD Statistics, and Bloomberg database as detailed in Appendix 4.B.   
Before proceeding to the empirical results, it is worth noting that the GVAR results are 
valid only if two conditions satisfied: (i) the parameters of the individual models are stable over 
time, and (ii) the country-specific foreign variables are weakly exogenous, see Dees et al. (2007). 
The obtained results for weak exogenity and parameter stability tests imply these two conditions 
are satisfied for our model.    
4.4.1 Trade Weights Matrix 
Our approach to construct the weighting matrix is to use bilateral trade across countries. There 
are a number of ways to estimate the trade shares among countries.28 We follow Dees et al. 
(2007) to compute bilateral trade between countries and employ Equation (4.8) for country i  as 
follows. 
      
i
jiji
ji
TT
MX
TW
,,
,

  (4.8) 
Note jiTW ,  represents bilateral trade between country i  and country j , jiX ,  and jiM , represents 
export and import between these two countries, and iTT  represents the total value of foreign 
trade in the country i  with all trade partners including country j . 
Table 4.2 presents the trade shares for each country. The neighbouring effects can be traced 
for the bilateral trade among countries. The US, the Euro Area, and Japan are the main trade 
partners of China, in order. The Euro Area shares bilateral trade of around 34 percent with the 
UK, around 30 percent with the US, and 20 percent with China. The Euro Area is the main trade 
                                                     
27 The Euro Area countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, and Spain. The 
rationale for excluding some countries from the Euro Area is similar to that of Dees et al. (2007) justifying that 
building up a model as a benchmark for policy analysis required the omission of those countries facing instability or 
which are small in terms of economic scale.  
28 See Kappler (2009) for a detailed explanation of the alternative approaches.  
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partner for the UK at 68 percent, while the share of the US economy in UK foreign trade is 
substantially less, at 16 percent, and less than one percent for China. Canada shares of around 
one-third of the US foreign trade, while the Euro Area with shares of 24 percent and China with 
21 percent accounting as the other major trade collaborates for the US.  
As discussed in Cook and Devereux (2013), economies with a greater trade linkage may 
respond to policy shocks more similar. Thus, we can expect that a policy shock to any of the 
involved countries would generate spillovers to its trade partners. We explore this idea later in 
dynamic analysis of the GVAR model.    
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Table 4.2. Trade Weights Matrix 
Country Australia Canada China Euro Area Japan UK US 
Australia 0.000 0.005 0.046 0.028 0.072 0.018 0.018 
Canada 0.020 0.000 0.039 0.037 0.034 0.030 0.338 
China 0.265 0.055 0.000 0.201 0.356 0.066 0.209 
Euro Area 0.190 0.064 0.276 0.000 0.178 0.684 0.241 
Japan 0.280 0.033 0.241 0.090 0.000 0.035 0.129 
UK 0.067 0.028 0.043 0.340 0.034 0.000 0.065 
US 0.178 0.814 0.354 0.303 0.324 0.167 0.000 
Note: Trade weights are calculated based on dividing the share of bilateral trade between countries i and j, over the 
total amount of foreign trade of country i, using the IMF databases for Direction of Trade Statistics. 
 
Having estimated the matrix of trade weights, it is also possible to estimate the trade-
weighted macro variables within the GVAR model. Table 4.3 presents the weight of each 
countryˈs macroeconomic variables based on its share of trade. As can be seen, macroeconomic 
variables in the US have the greatest weight to influence the world economies through bilateral 
trade channel. Thus, it is not surprising that the US economy plays a dominant role to generate 
international spillovers to other economies.  
It can also be observed that the US long-term interest rates and real equity prices have a 
greater weight to generate international spillovers. Thus, these two variables can be considered 
as two potential channels for the transmission of policy shocks. Furthermore, the US short-term 
interest rates, government debt, inflation, and output seem to have equal weight to generate 
international spillovers across countries.   
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Table 4.3. Trade-Weighted Macro-Variable  
Country 
Real 
output 
Inflation 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
Real 
Equity 
Price 
Long-
Term 
Interest 
Rate 
Short-
Term 
Interest 
Rate 
Government 
Debt-to-GDP 
Australia 0.020 0.020 0.032 0.025 0.025 0.020 0.020 
Canada 0.033 0.033 0.050 0.040 0.040 0.033 0.033 
China 0.182 0.182 0.281 NA NA 0.182 0.182 
Euro Area 0.247 0.247 0.382 0.302 0.302 0.247 0.247 
Japan 0.110 0.110 0.170 0.134 0.134 0.110 0.110 
UK 0.055 0.055 0.085 0.067 0.067 0.055 0.055 
US 0.353 0.353 NA 0.431 0.431 0.353 0.353 
Note: This Table presents Country-Specific variablesˈ weights based on the constructed trade-weighted matrix. Due 
to data limitation, equity prices and long-term interest rate for China were not obtained and are denoted by NA. The 
NA cell for US exchange rate is due to denominating all countriesˈ currencies to the US dollar. 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Estimation of the Country-Specific Models 
In order to validate the obtained results, the stationary properties of our GVAR variables must 
be verified. The results of unit root test is presented in Appendix 4.A. The results suggest that all 
domestic and foreign variables are non-stationary in level and turn to be stationery in their first 
difference. Given that all variables are I(1), it allows us to estimate the standard co-integrating 
relations. Table 4.4 presents the lag order of ),( ii qpVARX and the number of co-integrating 
relations among countries.29 The lag order of domestic variables is determined by the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC). For foreign variables, due to the data limitation, the lag order is set 
to unity, while given the GVAR model structure it is not allowed to determine more than two 
lags for both domestic and foreign variables, see Dees et al. (2007).  
  
                                                     
29 According to Dees et al. (2007), it is not required that the lag order of domestic variables, pi, and foreign variables, 
qi, be identical in the individual VARX models. 
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Table 4.4. Lag Order and Number of Co-Integrating Relations for VARX Models 
Country 
VARX Order of Individual Models 
   i
p
                               i
q
 
Co-integrating Relations 
Australia 2 1 3 
Canada 2 1 3 
China 2 1 1 
Euro Area 2 1 3 
Japan 1 1 3 
UK 2 1 3 
US 2 1 2 
Note: This Table presents the lag order of domestic, pi, and foreign, qi, variables, in order. The rank of the co-
integrating relations is estimated using Johansenˈs trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics for models with weakly 
exogenous regressors, in the case where unrestricted constant and restricted trend coefficients are included in the 
country-specific Error Correction Models (ECM). The co-integration results are based on the trace statistic and 
significant at 95% critical value level.  
 
As regards co-integrating relations, let the 
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Now suppose that the rank obtained is 1ir . Then the corresponding co-integrating relations for 
the 
thi economy can be written as follows:  
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4.4.3 Weak Exogeneity Test 
As noted previously, estimating a valid country-specific VARX model in the GVAR framework 
required foreign variables be weakly exogenous to their domestic counterpart, see Dees et al. 
(2007). Table 4.5 presents the results of weak exogenity tests.  
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Table 4.5. Weak Exogeneity Test  
Country F test 
C 
Value 
*
ity  
*
it  
*
iteq  
*
itlr  
*
itsr  
*
itgdr  
oil
tp  
mat
tp  
metal
tp  
Australia F(3,92) 3.10 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.30 2.12 0.89 1.62 1.13 0.62 
Canada F(3,98) 2.46 2.80* 3.01* 2.25 1.54 2.28 2.39 2.14 0.50 0.88 
China F(1,101) 3.09 0.74 1.47 1.97 1.01 1.61 1.53 1.07 0.28 0.55 
Euro Area F(3,92) 3.10 0.29 0.56 0.46 0.02 1.09 0.63 0.12 0.03 2.70 
Japan F(3,92) 3.10 0.50 0.34 0.13 2.40 1.53 0.34 1.51 2.05 1.53 
UK F(3,99) 3.09 2.70 0.15 1.42 0.19 0.83 1.49 0.62 2.40 2.29 
US F(2,97) 3.09 1.29 0.93 2.63 1.93 1.98 NA 0.65 2.48 1.25 
Note: This Table contains evidence of foreign variable weak exogeneity for each country. The null hypothesis is weak 
exogeneity; hence, failing to reject of the null implies that weak exogeneity holds. The results are presented at 95% 
confidence interval. An asterisk ,*, indicates that weak exogeneity assumption is rejected for those variables of that 
particular country. NA indicates the variables that is not involved in the VARX model as weakly exogenous. 
 
According to the results, the null hypothesis of weak exogenity is rejected for output and 
inflation in Canada. All other variables can be considered as weakly exogenous within the 
country-specific VARX models. As has been discussed in Dees et al. (2007) rejection of the weak 
exogeneity assumption would have been problematic in the case of the US given its significant 
impact in the global model as the reference economy. Furthermore, as foreign government debt-
to-GDP ratio is not expected to affect the US economy, thus, has not been set as weakly 
exogenous to the US model.    
4.4.4 Pair-Wise Cross-Section Correlations 
One of the unique advantages of the GVAR methodology is its ability to test for Common Global 
Factors across countries. As stated earlier, all country-specific VARX models are estimated 
conditional upon weak exogeneity of foreign variables. This fundamental assumption is ensured 
when the idiosyncratic shocks of the country-specific models are cross-sectionally weakly 
correlated, as 0),(cov * itit uX , with N . By conditioning the country-specific models on 
weakly exogenous foreign variables, which can be considered as proxies for the Common Global 
Factors, one can expect that the degree of correlation of the remaining shocks across 
countries/regions will be modest. As Dees et al. (2007) discuss, these residual interdependencies 
could represent policy and trade spillover effects. 
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Table 4.6. Average Pair-Wise Cross-Sectional Correlations 
Country Real Output  Inflation 
 Levels First Differences VARX 
Residuals 
 Levels First Differences VARX Residuals 
Australia 0.98 0.26 0.03  0.43 0.20 -0.01 
Canada 0.98 0.34 -0.03  0.55 0.23 0.00 
China 0.98 0.14 -0.07  0.11 0.16 -0.10 
Euro Area 0.98 0.34 -0.06  0.57 0.33 -0.03 
Japan 0.93 0.23 -0.06  0.47 0.18 -0.01 
UK 0.98 0.37 0.00  0.55 0.20 0.00 
US 0.99 0.39 -0.06  0.55 0.34 -0.09 
Average 0.97 
 
0.30 
 
-0.04 
 
 0.46 
 
          0.23 
  
 
-0.03 
 
 
Country Long-term Interest Rate  Short-term Interest Rate 
 Levels First Differences VARX Residuals  Levels First Differences VARX Residuals 
Australia 0.92 0.47 -0.02  0.73 0.27 0.03 
Canada 0.96 0.58 0.02  0.82 0.27 0.04 
China NA NA NA  0.50 0.13 0.01 
Euro Area 0.95 0.54 -0.06  0.79 0.23 -0.03 
Japan 0.93 0.41 0.00  0.78 0.04 0.04 
UK 0.95 0.50 -0.04  0.81 0.27 0.03 
US 0.93 0.58 0.01  0.72 0.23 0.03 
Average 0.94 
 
0.51 
 
-0.02 
 
 0.74 
 
0.21 
  
 
0.02 
 
 
Country Real Exchange Rate  Government Debt-to-GDP 
 Levels  First Differences VARX Residuals  Levels  First Differences VARX Residuals 
Australia 0.78 0.37 0.11  0.17 0.32 0.09 
Canada 0.76 0.32 0.06  0.40 0.38 0.12 
China 0.19 0.10 -0.12  0.37 0.00 -0.24 
Euro Area 0.77 0.41 -0.04  0.59 0.50 0.12 
Japan 0.63 0.16 -0.07  0.38 0.13 0.18 
UK 0.78 0.41 -0.05  0.18 0.45 0.07 
US NA NA NA  0.47 0.44 0.18 
Average 0.65 
 
0.30 
 
-0.02 
 
 0.37 
 
      0.32 
  
 
0.07 
 
Note: The results present average correlation between domestic and their corresponding foreign variables among 
countries of interest. The VARX residuals are computed based on country-specific models included the foreign-
specified variables. NA cells for the exchange rate in the US is due to denominating all countriesˈ currencies to the 
US dollar, and for long-term interest rate in China is due to data limitation.  
 
Average pair-wise cross-section correlations show the extent to which the country-specific 
foreign variables are effective in reducing the cross-section correlation of the variables in the 
GVAR model. Table 4.6 presents the result of this test reported in levels and first differences for 
the endogenous variables, also those of the VARX residuals. Typically, the average cross-section 
correlations are high in the level of the endogenous variables and low in their first differences, 
see Dees et al. (2007).  
As can be seen in Table 4.6, real output levels have the highest degree of cross-section 
correlations at around of 97 percent on average. Long-term interest rate levels also shares 
common trends and are highly correlated across countries at around 94 percent on average. Yet, 
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short-term interest rates show a smaller but still high degree of correlation of around 74 percent 
on average. Similar to short-term interest rate, we can observe a more modest degree of 
correlation among the real exchange rate levels across countries of about 65 percent on average. 
Except for China, inflation shows a degree of correlation of around 43-57 percent across 
countries, which are relatively smaller than the other variables. Finally, the result of cross-
sectional correlation for government debt presents a low degree of co-movements across 
countries around of 37 percent on average.  
The cross-sectional correlation of the variables in their first difference, however, is quite 
small compared with the level of variables, indicating that there is a limited cross-correlation 
between variables in their first differences. For example, the average correlations of output fall 
from 93-99 percent in levels to 14-39 percent in differences. In general, our results are similar to 
those of Dees et al. (2007), verifying our constructed GVAR specification.  
Our evidence suggests that there is significant cross-country correlation for the variables in 
the estimated GVAR model, although its extent varies among variables.30 Turning to the cross-
section correlation of the residuals from the VARX models, including both domestic and foreign 
variables, we can observe that their correlations are very small. This indicates that the model has 
succeeded in capturing the common trends and trade spillover effects among variables and across 
countries, sees Dees et al. (2007).     
4.4.5 Contemporaneous Effects of Foreign Variables  
The contemporaneous effects of foreign variables on their domestic counterparts can be 
interpreted as the impact elasticity between domestic and foreign variables, see Dees et al. 
(2007). These effects can represent the international linkages between domestic and foreign 
variables. Table 4.7 presents results of the foreign variables impact on the domestic variables. 
  
                                                     
30 Note that the pair-wise cross-section is not a formal statistical test for validating the estimates of global movement 
among variable cross-countries. However, it can be taken as an indication of such an effect, see Dees et al. (2007).    
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Table 4.7. Contemporaneous Effects of Foreign Variables on their Domestic Counterparts 
Country Real output Inflation 
Real 
Equity 
Price 
Long-
Term 
Interest 
Rate 
Short-
Term 
Interest 
Rate 
Government 
Debt-to-
GDP 
Australia 0.27* 0.53* 0.85* 0.93* 1.04* 0.21* 
  (2.18) (3.54) (6.78) (4.50) (4.97) 
(2.87) 
 
Canada 0.48* 0.65* 0.95* 0.98* 0.86* 0.26* 
  (4.39) (7.04) (18.1) (17.57) (7.04) 
(3.95) 
 
China 0.25* 0.62* NA NA 0.13 0.09  
  (3.71) (2.66) NA NA (1.06)  (0.07) 
Euro Area 0.31* 0.30* 1.04* 0.56* 0.37* 0.21* 
  (3.6) (5.70) (8.46) (6.61) (3.57) 
(2.70) 
 
Japan 0.34* -0.01 0.70* 0.52* 0.17* 0.24* 
  (2.18) (-0.18) (6.08) (4.84) (2.11) 
(2.95) 
 
UK 0.54* 0.72* 0.81* 0.66* 0.76* 0.30* 
  (4.11) (5.50) (15.12) (4.55) (3.16) 
(3.39) 
 
US 0.52* 0.83* NA NA NA  NA 
 (4.39) (6.77) NA NA  NA  NA 
Note: The robust t-ratio values are presented in parentheses computed using Whiteˈs heteroscedasticity-consistent 
variance estimator. The null hypothesis here is the existence of correlation between domestic and foreign variables. 
The Whiteˈs Adjusted Standard Errors criteria is based on the Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and 
allows heteroscedastic residuals. An asterisk,*, indicates that the result is statistically significant. The blank cells 
for the US indicate variables that are not involved in the VARX model as weakly exogenous. For China, blank cells 
are due to data limitation for long-term interest rate and equity prices.   
 
Asterisks indicate that we typically cannot reject the null hypothesis of correlation at the 
95% significance level. It can be therefore seen from the Table that with the exception of short-
term interest rates and government debt in China and inflation in Japan, the other domestic 
specified variables are positively linked with their foreign counterparts.  
The results suggests that one percent changes in foreign real output can lead to an increase 
of 0.5 percent on real output in the US and the UK, while the Euro Area and China real output 
would be less affected. In addition, CPI inflation in the US, the UK, and China are significantly 
affected by foreign inflation. More importantly, the results suggest that the contemporaneous 
elasticity of real equity price is high and above one in the case of the Euro Area. This finding has 
been also reported in Dees et al. (2007). They interpret this finding as an indication of the Euro 
Area stock markets slightly overreacting to foreign stock price changes.  
Moreover, we can observe a relatively strong elasticity between long-term interest rate in 
both the Euro Area and the UK and foreign bond markets while the elasticity is rather less for 
short-term interest rates in the Euro Area. This can indicates that the Euro Area bond market is 
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more responsive than its monetary policy reactions. In contrast, we find rather weak linkages for 
government debt ratio across focused countries, around of 0.25 percent, see Table 4.7. To 
summarize our results from this section we find that long-term interest rate and the real equity 
prices are highly correlated across the countries covered in our analysis. Thus, any policy-
induced changes in foreign long-term interest rate and equity prices would influence the linked 
economies.                        
4.4.6 Parameter Stability Test 
One of the fundamental problems facing VAR models is stability of the estimated parameters, 
see Bagliano and Favero (1997). It is possible that our GVAR results have been affected by this 
problem. As Dees et al. (2007) indicate, this problem is more pronounced for emerging 
economies, which are subject to significant changes. However, our constructed GVAR model 
includes only China in which it has gone through substantial structural changes. Nevertheless, to 
ensure the stability of parameters we perform the parameter stability test proposed by Nyblom 
(1989). The Nyblom test considers a simple linear regression model with K  variables, as 
Equation (4.9) shows compared to the Time-Varying Parameter (TVP) alternative model, as 
presented in Equation (4.10). 
ntxy ttt ,...,1,    (4.9) 
ki
itttt
,...,1),,0(~, 21     (4.10) 
The objective is to test the following null and alternative hypotheses: 
:0H    is constant ⇔ 0
2 
i
 for all i   
:1H   0
2 
i
  for some i   
Nyblom (1989) derives a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics written as below.31 



n
t
tt SVS
n
LM
1
1
2ˆ
1

, where 


t
j
tt fS
1
 = cumulative sums, ttt xf ˆ , and XXnV  1 . 
 
                                                     
31 Further details of the estimation of the LM statistics can be found in Nyblom (1989). 
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Table 4.8. Nyblom Parameter Stability Tests 
LM Statistic 
Real 
output 
Inflation 
Short-
Term 
Interest 
Rate 
Real 
Exchange 
rate 
Real 
Equity 
Price 
Long-Term 
Interest Rate 
Government 
Debt-to-
GDP 
Nyblom -US 
2.57* 2.64* 5.70 NA 2.56* 3.79 1.76* 
(2.96) (2.90) (2.99) NA (2.84) (2.86) (2.78) 
Robust Nyblom -US 
3.08* 2.58* 3.28* NA 2.54* 3.09* 2.31* 
(3.36) (3.32) (3. 59) NA (3.12) (3.19) (3.22) 
Nyblom -China 
2.53* 3.02 1.60* 1.62* NA NA 2.34* 
(2.61) (2.88) (2.88) (3.00) NA NA (2.86) 
Robust Nyblom -China 
2.73* 3.43 1.68* 3.06* NA NA 3.51* 
(3.13) (3.37) (3.23) (3.37) NA NA (3.60) 
Nyblom - Euro Area 
2.84* 2.20* 3.39 4.30 3.40* 3.46 2.39* 
(3.53) (3.30) (3.17) (3.58) (3.65) (3.33) (3.65) 
Robust Nyblom- Euro Area 
3.66* 2.80* 3.46* 4.09 3.96* 3.24* 3.58* 
(3.79) (3.90) (3.55) (3.95) (4.11) (3.87) (4.11) 
Nyblom-UK 
3.11* 2.17* 3.43 4.21 2.80* 2.64* 2.95* 
(3.32) (3.12) (3.38) (3.47) (3.19) (3.41) (3.63) 
Robust Nyblom-UK 
3.29* 2.95* 4.08 3.67* 3.37* 3.38* 2.80* 
(3.73) (3.77) (3.68) (4.09) (3.94) (4.02) (3.99) 
Note: The null hypothesis is parameter stability; hence, failing to reject of the null implies parameter stability over the 
sample. An asterisk ,*, indicates parameter stability. Critical Values (CV) at the 5% significance level are presented in 
the parentheses. NA are either due to setting as reference country, i.e. the US, or data limitation, i.e. China. The robust 
Nyblom denotes the heteroskedasticity-robust version of the test. LM statistics abbreviates the Lagrange Multiplier 
statistic.  
  
 
The estimated LM statistics provides a decision criteria for the rejection of the null 
hypothesis
0H .  If 05.0CVLM   , it suggests that at 95% confidence level parameters are instable. 
Table 4.8 presents the results for the computed Nyblom parameter stability test and its 
heteroskedasiticy-robust version for the variables. The critical values of the tests are calculated 
based on the sieve bootstrap samples obtained from the solution of the GVAR(P) model.32 The 
results vary across countries and variables. 
According to Table 4.8, both the Nyblom test and its robust results suggest that the 
parameters of real output for all the countries is stable over the sample. Similar results validate 
parameter stability of inflation among the countries with China being the only exception. As 
regards the short-term interest rates, there is evidence for parameter instability for UK short-term 
interest rates while for the rest of countries this parameter seems to be stable over the sample. In 
the case of long-term rates, the robust Nyblom test results suggest parameter stability across 
                                                     
32 For the technical details see Dees et al. (2007).    
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countries. Furthermore, as can be seen from the robust test results, parameters of government 
debt, real equity prices, and the exchange rate seem to be constant cross-countries over the 
sample except for the Euro Area real exchange rate.  
Overall, according to results, there are only a few variables with unstable parameters. 
Given the linear GVAR modelling framework, it is not possible to completely rule out parameter 
instability impact from our results. However, as the test outcome changes for the robust version, 
except for UKˈs short-term interest rate, Euro Area real exchange rate, and Chinaˈs inflation, it 
seems that these instabilities are mainly related to error variances and not the parameter 
coefficients. Thus, as addressed in Dees et al. (2007), a reasonable approach to deal with this 
problem is to use robust standard errors when examining the impact effect of foreign variables, 
and to use both the bootstrap means and confidence bounds along point estimates result as a 
foundation for the dynamic analysis.33 Furthermore, although there is evidence of parameter 
changes in dynamic analysis of policy shocks, our study is concerned with past parameter 
variation and implicitly assumes that the policy intervention has no independent effects on 
parameter values, see Pesaran and Smith (2012).      
4.5 Dynamic Analysis: Generalized Impulse Response Functions  
The GVAR approach provides a coherent framework for modelling global interactions. The 
standard way of examining economic interactions in both domestic and global dimensions is 
through Impulse Response Function (IRF) analysis mapping the possible responses of a system 
to a shock imposed to the model at various future periods. In a GVAR model with 1N
countries/regions and 
iK  endogenous variables for each country/region, up to  1
0


i
N
i
i KK
 
restrictions are required for shocks to be exactly identified. In practice, however, it is very 
difficult to find and impose such a large number of theory-based restrictions.  
                                                     
33 According to our results, there is only a small amount of evidence indicating parameter instability and is not the 
only one in the GVAR literature. For example, a large number of parameter instability has been reported in Dees et 
al. (2007) due to involving a large number of emerging economies in the GVAR model.       
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Given the identification problems, one possible approach is to use the Generalized Impulse 
Response Functions (GIRF) proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and developed by Pesaran and Shin 
(1998). This approach is an alternative to the Orthogonal Impulse Responses (OIR) proposed by 
Sims (1980). The concepts of orthogonality in impulse responses guarantees that various 
imposed shocks to the system are uncorrelated, implying that their corresponding covariance 
matrix is zero.  Thus, it is possible to examine the impact of different simultaneous shocks to the 
model of interest. In contrast to OIR, the GIRF approach imposes shocks to individual errors and 
filters out the effect of other shocks using the observed distribution of all shocks.  
The GIRFs depicts how changes in one variable affect other variables in the GVAR model 
and over time, regardless of the source of the shock. In other words, it describes the way that 
other variables are affected by a shock through tracing the changes to the error terms of the 
conditional model, itu , see Equation (4.3) . Moreover, since the GVAR model is conditional upon 
the weak exogeneity assumption, the shock correlation is not an issue here. Thus, in contrast to 
IRFs in structural models, GIRFs do not require that shocks to be identified. They can present 
dynamics in a time series model by mapping out the reaction to a one standard deviation shock 
to the residual in the corresponding equation, see Dees et al. (2007). Furthermore, the GIRFs are 
invariant to the ordering of the variables and countries in the GVAR model, which clearly is an 
advantage even if we had a theory-driven ordering of the variables, see Pesaran and Smith (2006), 
and Dees et al. (2007). These two unique properties of the GIRFs seems to overcome the 
identification problems concerning VAR modelling approaches.            
Within the GIRFs approach, the information underlying a common global factor 
}),,{( 1 ttt XXG in time 1t  is employed to predict the value of X  at time nt  . Then, by 
assuming that t  has a multivariate normal distribution, the effect of one standard error shock 
to the thj  Equation is tested, corresponding to the 
thl  variable in the 
thi  country, in time t, see 
Pesaran et al. (2004). The objective is to predict tX  over the period nTTTt  ,,2,1  , 
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where n is the forecast horizon, provided that tX  is observed in the period Tt ,,2,1  . 
Equation (4.11) shows the way that nTX   is formulated for the forecasting purposes as follows.
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Consequently, the exogenous global variables can be obtained from Equation (4.12): 
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Equation (4.12) shows that the point forecast of the endogenous variables, nTX  , is conditional 
on the initial state of the system, TX  , and the exogenous global variables, 
n
Td
1


 . Formulating 
the future expected values for nTX  and 
*
nTX  enables us to calculate the GIRFs as presented in 
Equation (4.13). 
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 (4.13) 
Given that ),,( 1  tt XX . 
Having considered the properties of GIRFs and given the motivation of the study, now we 
proceed to the dynamic analysis of the macro-finance responses to policy shocks. In doing so, 
we estimate two GVAR models: a simple GVAR and a fiscal-augmented GVAR model to 
address the potential impact of US fiscal policy on monetary policy and its international 
spillovers. Then we continue to examining both the domestic and international spillovers of US 
fiscal policy.    
                                                     
34 A detailed explanation of formulating 
nTX  , and formal proof can be found in Pesaran et al. (2004).     
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4.5.1 The Simple GVAR Model Results to Monetary Shock  
This section presents the GIRFs estimated within the simple GVAR model, which excludes 
government debt, to one standard error increase in the nominal short-term interest rates. Figure 
4.2 plots the responses. As set out in Chapter 2, it is expected that an increase in short-term 
interest rates induce a fall in prices and output through the interest rates, the exchange rate, and 
equity prices channels. 
As presented in Figure 4.2, this contractionary monetary policy shock induces US output 
growth to increase by 0.2 percent at peak. However, output rapidly falls and the effect is 
statistically significant. The same responses can be observed by inflation: a short-lived rise in 
inflation followed by a sharp fall up to zero. These results are counterintuitive, though they 
become statistically insignificant after one quarter. The same results are found in Dees et al. 
(2007).   
This counterintuitive finding is reported in a number of studies using VAR models as 
reported in Hanson (2004) that is referred in the literature as the price puzzle. One popular 
explanation for the price puzzle relates it with the lack of information to capture the response of 
prices to the policy shock. The proposed solution has been the addition of extra information, 
most importantly commodity price indices to the model. For this reason, our model consists two 
commodity price indices to our model, namely metal price, and raw material price as explained 
in the model specification section. However, adding this extra information does not correct the 
response of prices. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this counterintuitive responses might be 
better explained by taking into account different monetary and fiscal policy regimes in terms of 
which policy dominates the another one, see Chung et al. (2007). We explore this idea further in 
the next section. 
As regards the long-term interest rates, the policy shock induces an increase of around 0.1 
percent, which remains significant over the period. Finally, US equity prices fall in response to 
policy shocks, though statistically is insignificant.     
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Figure 4.2. The GIRFs to a Monetary Contraction within the Simple GVAR 
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Notes: These impulses responses are based upon a contractionary US monetary policy shock. The Figure provides 
quarterly GIRFs of the GVAR specified-variables after imposing a one standard error shock to US short-term 
interest rate without involving government debt-to-GDP variable in the model over the sample 1979:Q2-2013:Q1. 
The solid lines present bootstrap mean estimates with the dashed lines presenting 90% bootstrap error bands. The 
scale on the horizontal axis measures the number of quarters after the initial shock.   
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Now we turn our focus on the international spillovers induced by a US contractionary 
monetary policy shock. As can be seen from Figure 4.2, in the Euro Area output increase in 
response, though the responses are statistically insignificant at all horizons. UK real output, 
however, does not react to the policy shock and the associated GIRFs are not statistically 
significant. The policy also causes real output in China to fall, which stays significant over the 
period.  
As regards the international spillovers of the policy shock on inflation for the economies 
of interest, as the GIRFs suggest Chinaˈs inflation does not respond to the policy shock, while 
those of the Euro Area and UK shows an increase which then return back to zero. Note that all 
the responses remain statistically insignificant.  
As regards the international impact of policy on short-term interest rates, the GIRFs 
presented in Figure 4.2 shows a positive and statistically significant effect for the Euro Area, and 
UK. This reflects a strong interdependence of short-term rate among the US, Euro Area, and UK. 
The effect of shock on long-term interest rates for both the Euro Area and UK tends to be positive 
and statistically significant; again reflecting the interdependence of the long-term rates.          
Focusing upon the international effects of US monetary contraction, the policy shock is 
not succeeded to significantly influence the exchange rate and equity prices in none of the 
economies of interest. In general, our GIRFs to this policy shock is consistent with those reported 
in Dees et al. (2007). Likewise, our impulse responses, suggest that a US monetary contraction 
has a limited international spillovers. In the next section, we consider to examine the impact of 
fiscal policy on the international transmission of policy shock.  
4.5.2 The Fiscal-GVAR Model Results to Monetary Shock  
Given the increasing use of fiscal policy and the rise in US government debt, it is important to 
re-consider the GVAR evidence while accounting for these changes. Figure 4.3 presents the 
macroeconomic impact of US monetary contraction within the fiscal GVAR model. This model 
includes fiscal policy proxied by the government debt ratio. As presented in the graph, including 
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the government debt-to-GDP in the model changes the GIRF results compared with the simple 
model. As can be seen in Figure 4.3, a monetary contraction causes US output to increase and 
after two quarters returns to zero, though the response is statistically significant only for a quarter. 
Comparing Figures 4.2 and 4.3, we can see that including government debt increase the duration 
of responses.  
As regards the response of inflation, a price puzzle can be observed. The distinguished 
feature compared with the simple model is it takes longer for inflation to return to equilibrium. 
This implies that including government debt makes the price puzzle persist longer. This finding 
is in line with the results reported in Chapter 3 suggesting that the fiscal stance may contribute 
to the appearance of the price puzzle or its persistent. As discussed earlier, taking into account 
fiscal policy, a monetary contraction may lead to an increase in output and inflation. This 
observation can be interpreted by US unprecedented government debt level as any changes in 
interest rates can significantly change interest expenses components of government spending, 
see Favero and Giavazzi (2007), and Sims (2013). 
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Figure 4.3. The GIRFs to a Monetary Contraction within the Fiscal-Augmented GVAR 
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Notes: These impulses responses are based upon a contractionary US monetary policy shock. This Figure provides 
quarterly GIRFs of the GVAR specified-variables after imposing a one standard error shock to US short-term 
interest rate while includes government debt-to-GDP variable in the model over sample 1979:Q2-2013:Q1. The 
solid lines present bootstrap mean estimates with the dashed lines presenting 90% bootstrap error bands. The scale 
on the horizontal axis measures the number of quarters after the initial shock.    
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Chung et al. (2007) explains that the price puzzle can be interpreted as a normal responses 
of prices rather than a puzzle. The mechanism can be explained as follows. A rise in interest rates 
increases the interest share of government debt. To finance the payment, new government debt 
is required to be issued. This may generate a positive wealth effect to bond holders through either 
higher interest earnings or new government bond. This, in turn, can encourage private 
expenditure leading to an increase in output and inflation, see Chung et al. (2007), and Leeper 
and Walker (2012).      
Likewise in the simple model, we can see from Figure 4.3 that US long-term interest rates 
increase by around of 0.1 percent. This effect is statistically significant for the whole period. US 
real equity prices also falls in response to an increase in interest rates, although this appears to 
be insignificant. Furthermore, government debt increases in response to a contractionary 
monetary policy shock, but this is statistically insignificant.  
Focusing on the international transmission of a US monetary contraction, the responses 
appear to be relatively similar to the simple model. This policy shock increases output and prices 
in both the Euro Area and UK, although the responses are not statistically significant. However, 
a few differences can be observed in terms of magnitude and duration of the responses. For 
example, while the exchange rate in the Euro Area and UK increase within the simple model, the 
exchange rate does not respond in the debt-augmented model. The increase in foreign currencies 
is counterintuitive as it is expected that US contractionary monetary policy shock induce an 
appreciation of US dollar and depreciation of other currencies.  
It can be explained as US monetary contraction has generated spillovers to both the Euro 
Area, and UKˈ interest rates. As both the short and long-term rates has been increased in these 
economies, the potential capital outflows has been ruled out. Thus, it can be due to this effect 
that real exchange rate has not changed. Moreover, this policy shock induces short-term interest 
rates in the Euro Area and UK to increase with both model specifications, though their response 
tends to be statistically significant within government debt-augmented model.  
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Finally, as GIRFs suggest, government debt for the countries of interest has increased in 
response to the policy shock, though, their responses tends to be statistically insignificant. It 
might be due to an increase in the interest component of the government debt caused by US 
contractionary monetary policy as both short and long-term interest rates are increased in the 
Euro Area and UK in response to the policy.                
In summary, our results confirm cross-countries co-movements between short and long-
term interest rates. This co-movement is not affected by US government debt. In addition, 
comparing the GIRFs from the simple model with those of the fiscal GVAR, it appears that US 
government debt influences the duration of responses to a monetary policy shock. Given that the 
responses of output and inflation are counterintuitive, our results are in line with those of Dees 
et al. (2007), although our study differs in a number of ways.35 Having considered the high level 
of US government debt, this finding seems to be reasonable, as any changes in interest rates 
would significantly change the interest expenses share of government expenditure. Thus, US 
fiscal stance would affect the impact of monetary policy. This finding is consistent with the 
literature on the importance of debt dynamics for the real activity measures and its influence on 
the monetary transmission mechanism, see Chung et al. (2007), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), 
and Favero and Giavazzi (2007).  
4.5.3 The GVAR Model Results to Fiscal Shock  
Having discussed the domestic and global impact of monetary policy shock, we now consider 
investigating a US fiscal policy shock. As noted earlier, there are two strands in the literature on 
the outcome of fiscal expansion. While the non-Ricardian find fiscal policy effective to stimulate 
the economy, the Ricardian view suggests the otherwise. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that 
at some circumstances such as the ZLB fiscal expansion may stimulate the economy. To examine 
                                                     
35 Our study employs a larger sample to include the 2008 financial crisis while those of Dees et al. (2007) ends in 
2003. The application of the constructed GVAR model in our study is also different in terms of using the model as 
framework to study the potential contribution of government debt on monetary policy. Moreover, our choice of the 
involved economies is more limited in terms of focusing on more homogenous economies, while those of Dees et 
al. (2007) includes both advanced and emerging economies. 
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the effectiveness of US fiscal policy and its international spillovers, this section presents the 
impulse responses to a US expansionary fiscal policy shock. To maintain the consistency among 
the Chapters, as noted in Chapter 3, we choose government debt-to-GDP as the fiscal policy 
instrument. Figure 4.4 presents the GIRFs to a one standard error positive shock to US 
government debt-to-GDP ratio. This may be expected to impact positively upon output and 
inflation through a demand channel and possibly to positively impact other countries through 
spillover effects.   
As can be seen from Figure 4.4, this fiscal policy shock has a significant and positive 
impact on US real output. This amounts to an increase in output of 0.5 percent. This fiscal 
expansion shock, also, increases US inflation by around 0.1 percent at peak, although the effect 
is short-lived and statistically insignificant. As regards US interest rates, both short and long-
term rates, it appears that a rise in government debt induces nominal interest rates to increase: 
while the response of the long-term rates is insignificant, short-term rates turns to be significant 
for a while. This feedback by short-term interest rate appears to be permanent, which amounts 
of around 0.05 percent. Interest rates may respond due to crowding out of borrowing and/or a 
Taylor Rule response of interest rates to increased output and inflation. Furthermore, this policy 
shock has a positive impact on US real equity prices around of two percent, which remains 
significant for a while.  
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Figure 4.4. The GIRFs to a Fiscal Expansion within the GVAR 
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Notes: These impulses responses are based upon an expansionary US fiscal policy shock. This Figure provides 
quarterly GIRFs of the GVAR specified-variables after imposing a one standard error shock to US government debt-
to-GDP variable over sample 1979:Q2-2013:Q1. The solid lines present bootstrap mean estimates with the dashed 
lines presenting 90% bootstrap error bands. The scale on the horizontal axis measures the number of quarters after 
the initial shock.   
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Turning to the international transmission of the shock, as displayed in Figure 4.4, real 
output in the Euro Area and UK increase in response to the fiscal shock, then gradually returns 
to equilibrium. The response is statistically significant. The policy, however, cannot impact 
Chinaˈs output significantly. As regards the impact of policy on inflation, as Figure 4.4 shows, 
US fiscal expansion increases inflation within the economies of interest. However, the responses 
are statistically insignificant.  
In addition, while the fiscal shock induces China, the Euro Area, and UK short-term 
interest rates to increase, the response is insignificant. This policy shock also increases both the 
Euro Area and UK long-term rates, but insignificantly. Furthermore, both the Euro Area and UK 
equity prices increase in response to this policy and remain significant for the whole period. The 
impact on equity prices in the Euro Area is greater, around four percent. It can be seen in the 
graph that the real exchange rate for the Euro Area has increased in response to the shock, though 
again the responses are insignificant.36 For China and the UK, overall, the real exchange rate 
does not respond to the fiscal expansion.  
Finally, government debt in China, the Euro Area, and UK increase following the increase 
in US debt, which all gradually return to equilibrium. However, as Figure 4.4 shows, the 
responses are not statistically significant except the UK. One potential explanation is the increase 
in their short and long-term interest rates induced by US fiscal expansion. This in turns can 
increase the interest component of the government debt leading to an increase in government 
debt in the economies of interest.   
Overall, the results of the US fiscal expansion suggests this policy is effective to increase 
real output. The increase in the interest rates, both short and long term, however, may crowd out 
this fiscal expansion. Furthermore, as US real equity prices increase following the increase in 
                                                     
36 Given the appreciation of real exchange rates in the focused economies following the policy shock, this may 
account for the import leakages for US fiscal expansionary policy, see Baldassarri et al. (1993), and Cuaresma et al. 
(2011). 
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US government debt, it can generate a positive wealth effect, which in turn would improve 
aggregate demand and output by encouraging private consumption.  
Thus, the impulse response results with a fiscal shock support the non-Ricardian view on 
fiscal policy for the US economy. From this perspective our results is consistent with those of 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009). They find that a deficit-financed fiscal expansion can stimulate the 
US economy. Furthermore, the generated expansionary effects on the economies of interest 
suggest that there is potential spillovers through integrated financial markets and potentially trade 
channel in the case of the Euro Area, i.e. import leakages, although some of the effect of the 
fiscal shock stays in the US.37  
Up to now, we construct two GVAR models to examine the extent to which US fiscal 
policy may influence the monetary transmission mechanism in a global framework. Then we 
investigate the impact of a US fiscal expansion that is found to be effective in stimulating the 
economy and generating international spillovers. Having discussed the results, a number of 
features emerge. First, we find evidence of the appearance of the price puzzle in response to a 
contractionary monetary policy shock within a simple GVAR model. Second, the GIRFs 
obtained from the debt-augmented GVAR model suggest that the price puzzle tends to be more 
persistent in presence of government debt. The economic justification for this result can be the 
potential role of higher interest earnings together with the issuance of new government bonds on 
encouraging private expenditure and aggregate demand. Third, within the GVAR model, we find 
evidence for the non-Ricardian view on US fiscal policy together with significant international 
spillovers to the Euro Area and UK, stimulating their economies. Fourth, both short-term and 
long-term interest rates appear to be correlated across US and the other economies and US 
government debt does not change the correlation. 
The next section attempts to investigate the contribution of fiscal policy to the performance 
of the long-run macroeconomic relations.  
                                                     
37 Beetsma et al. (2006) examine fiscal policy spillovers within major economies in the Euro Area. They find 
evidence for import leakage in the Euro Area following a fiscal expansion.    
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4.6 Long-Run Macroeconomic Relations  
This section examines the way in which government debt can influence the performance of long-
run macroeconomic relations within the global economy. In particular, we investigate the way 
that long-run relations can be influenced by the US government debt. These long-run 
macroeconomic relations concerns the impact of policy shocks on the interest rates, inflation, 
and the exchange rates in the long-term.         
As addressed in Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007), the theory-based long-run 
relations for country-specific models can be obtained from two sources: (i) deriving the relations 
from inter-temporal optimization conditions as in Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) models, or (ii) deriving the relations from arbitrage conditions. Following Dees, Holly, 
Pesaran, and Smith (2007), we consider a number of plausible long-run relations namely the 
Fisher equation, the Uncovered Interest Parities (UIP), and the Term Premium conditions 
between short and long-term interest rates. These hypotheses have been tested in the literature, 
however, they come either from single countries framework or in the case of multi-country 
framework, the potential role of fiscal policy has been ignored. Our choice of these long-run 
relations accounts for inflation and interest rates connections in the both domestic and global 
economies.38      
We consider the same GVAR model specification as has been described earlier that is 
consistent with the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).39 Recalling the co-integrating relation, 
the corresponding relations for the 
thi economy can be written as below.  
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38 A detailed discussion of the literature on the determination of various long-run relations can be found in Dees, 
Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007).   
39 The BIC criteria suggests to choose between VARX (2,1) and VARX (2,2) given the data limitation that does not 
allow the lag orders of domestic and foreign variables exceeded more than two, see Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith 
(2007).  
194 
 
Where r represents the number of estimated co-integrating vectors for the given country. Note 
that, since just one long-run economic relation can be imposed for each co-integrating vector, 
the number of theory-based relations must be equal to the countryˈs rank of the co-integrating 
relations, see Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007). 
We follow Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007) in adopting the long-run relations, 
which is derived from a small open economy framework as in Gali and Monacelli (2005). Thus, 
for the thi  economy these following long-run relationships have been considered as possible 
candidates to capture the long-run relations between the variables of interest.40   
)0(~,33 Iasr tiiitit    (4.14) 
)0(~)( ,66
*
,1,
* IaeEsrsr tiitititit    (4.15) 
)0(~,44 Ialrsr tiiitit   (4.16) 
Where )(
*
1,  tit eE is the expected rate of depreciation of country 
thi  currency between time t  and
1t . Note that Equation (4.14) represents the Fisher equation and suggests that the real interest 
rate is stationary. Equations (4.15) and (4.16) represent the UIP condition and the Term Premium, 
respectively. Based on the empirical result for the selected countries, )(
*
1,  tit eE  is I(0), 
therefore, the UIP condition reduces to: 
)0(* Isrsr itit   (4.17) 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
40 Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007) present the results of testing six long-run relations to capture output 
growth, inflation, the interest rates, and the exchange rate. However, based on the stability and Persistent Profile 
tests results of the estimated GVAR, only three over-identification restrictions have been chosen in their study which 
have been adopted here, too.  
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Having considered the determined co-integrating relations across countries as presented in 
Table 4.4 and the specified long-run macroeconomic relationships, now we can proceed to 
testing these over-identification restrictions. Given our co-integrating vectors, we can impose a 
maximum numbers of three ir  vectors as over-identification restrictions representing Equations 
(4.14), (4.15), and (4.16) as follows.41   
                      00000000000001101 i  
                     00000010000001002 i  
                     00000000001001003 i   
                                                     
41 As Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007) explain, the choice of the possible long-term restrictions has been 
made upon the satisfactory performance of the GVAR model in terms of stability, persistence profiles, and IRFs. If 
the persistence profiles for any combination of co-integrating relations do not converge to zero as the horizon 
increase, then they must be disregarded as valid relations.           
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Table 4.9. Over-Identified Long-Run Relations-Restricted Fisher Equation  
Country r Fisher Equation Term Premium UIP Conditions LR (df) 99% CV 
Australia 3 ititsr   itit lrsr   
*
itit srsr   132.24 (36)* 151.17 
Canada 3 ititsr   itit lrsr   
*
itit srsr   142.1 (36) * 158.60 
China 1 ititsr      NA    NA 43.97 (12) * 53.65 
Japan 3 ititsr   itit lrsr   
*
itit srsr   159.50 (36) 152.30 
Euro Area 3 ititsr   itit lrsr   
*
itit srsr   144.55 (36) * 146.06 
UK 3 ititsr   itit lrsr   
*
itit srsr   157.11 (36) 142.03 
US  2 ititsr   itit lrsr      NA 90.9 (18) 76. 50 
Note: This Table reports the over-identification test results of the focused countries. r is the number of co-integration 
vectors. LR is the log-likelihood ratio statistic for testing the long-run restrictions, with the number of over-identifying 
restrictions provided in brackets. The bootstrapped upper one percent critical value of the LR statistic is provided in the 
last column. An Asterisk ,*, in LR results indicates that the over-identified restriction cannot be rejected by the data 
over the 1979:Q2-2013:Q1 sample.      
Table 4.9 reports the result of testing these long-run relations within our GVAR model for 
the selected countries based on the log-Likelihood Ratio, LR statistic. The results are obtained 
based on restricting the inflation coefficient in the Fisher equation to unity. As can be seen in 
Table 4.9, the Fisher equation, Term Premium, and the UIP condition cannot be rejected for the 
Euro Area. In addition, based on LR statistic, the Fisher equation cannot be rejected in China 
implying that there is long-run relationship between short-term interest rates and inflation. 
However, in the case of the US and the UK, long-run relations are rejected. 
As noted in Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007), the value of the inflation coefficient 
may represent its amount in the Central Bank policy rule. Thus, fixing the coefficient in the 
Fisher equation to unity can lead to inaccurate results. In fact, as the Taylor principal suggests, 
the coefficient of inflation should be greater than unity to ensure an accurate path for the real 
interest rates and output, consequently. Thus, alternative to the restricted Fisher equation, the 
coefficient of inflation can be allowed to be unrestricted and be estimated outside the GVAR 
model. Table 4.10 presents the results for the unrestricted Fisher Equation. For this purpose, we 
estimate 
1i  for each country model as follows. 
 000000000000010 12,1 ii    
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Table 4.10. Over-Identified Long-Run Relations-Unrestricted Fisher Equation  
Country r Fisher Equation Term Premium UIP Conditions LR (df) 99% CV 
Australia 3 ititsr 09.1  itit lrsr   
*
itit srsr   132.24 (35)* 151.17 
Canada 3 ititsr 13.1  itit lrsr   
*
itit srsr   142.1 (35) * 158.60 
China 1 ititsr 67.0      NA    NA 43.97 (13) * 53.65 
Japan 3 ititsr 03.2  itit lrsr   
*
itit srsr   152.64 (35) 148.32 
Euro Area 3 ititsr 11.1  itit lrsr   
*
itit srsr   134.25 (35) * 136.16 
UK 3 ititsr 67.1  itit lrsr   
*
itit srsr   143.18 (35) 139.43 
US  2 ititsr 96.1  itit lrsr       NA 64.9 (17) * 66. 50 
Note: This Table reports the over-identification test results of the focused countries. r is the number of co-integration 
vectors. LR is the log-likelihood ratio statistic for testing the long-run restrictions, with the number of over-identifying 
restrictions provided in brackets. The bootstrapped upper one percent critical value of the LR statistic is provided in the 
last column. An Asterisk,*, in LR results indicates that the over-identified restriction cannot be rejected by the data over 
the 1979:Q2-2013:Q1 sample.      
 
The results of unrestricted Fisher equation suggests that as the LR statistics in the UK and 
Japan are greater than their critical values, therefore, the specified long-run relations can be 
rejected for these two countries while for the rest of countries these relations are validated.                 
Given the results, while the restricted Fisher hypothesis is rejected in the US, UK, and 
Japan it can be supported for the other economies. In the case of the unrestricted Fisher relation 
that seems to be more in line with economic intuition, the results provides support that expect 
for Japan, and the UK, the Fisher relation holds. Likewise, based on the LR test results presented 
in Table 4.10, both the Term Premium and the UIP relations can be held for the economies of 
interest with the exception of the UK and Japan. Furthermore, even in the case of Japan and the 
UK with having LR statistic above their critical values, their Persistence Profiles, as presented 
in Figure 4.6, shows that these relations converge to zero over the time. We proceed to discussing 
Persistence Profiles of the long-run relations for both the simple and the fiscal-augmented GVAR 
models in the next section. 
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4.6.1 Persistence Profiles 
Once a system of long-run co-integration relations is shocked, the speed in which the 
relationships return to their equilibrium is very important. As Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith 
(2007) discuss,  Persistence Profiles (PP) test, proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1996), shows the 
time profiles of the effects of variable-specific shocks on the co-integrating relations while the 
GIRFs refer to the time profile of the effects of variable-specific shocks on all the variables in 
the model. In other words, Persistence Profiles shows how fast the long-run relationships 
converge to the equilibrium following an imposed shock to the co-integrating relations within 
the GVAR model. 
To understand the way that US government debt may influence the speed of adjustment 
for the long-run relationship, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 present the Persistence Profile test results 
corresponding to the simple and fiscal-augmented GVAR models include the long-run over-
identification relations. As explained in Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007), the value of the 
PP is unity on impact, which must return back to zero as n . It can be seen from Figure 4.6 
that the Fisher relationship is less persistence compared with the Term Premium and the UIP 
conditions. For the Fisher equation, any shock is corrected in between 4 and 6 years while the 
fastest convergence occurs for the Euro Area, and the UK is the slowest. 
The convergence time for the UIP conditions is almost 5 years following a shock.  This is 
consistent with the existing empirical literature as the UIP relation can diverge from equilibrium 
for a longer period due to the slow adjustment of expectations to any actual changes in monetary 
policy, see Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007). The Term Premium relations displays rather 
faster Persistence Profiles as less than four years time is required to return back to steady-state 
after a shock. Overall, the reasonableness of Persistence Profiles suggest that these theory-based 
relations appear to be valid and cannot be rejected even in the presence of government debt.  
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Figure 4.5. The Simple GVAR Model Persistence Profiles of the Long-Run Relations 
 Note: This Figure presents Persistence Profile for the US, China, the Euro Area, and the UK demonstrating co-
integration relations and speed of convergence to equilibrium. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Fiscal-Augmented GVAR Model Persistence Profiles of the Long-Run Relations  
 
Note: This Figure presents Persistence Profile for the US, China, the Euro Area, and the UK demonstrating co-
integration relations and speed of convergence to equilibrium. 
 
 
Comparing the results within the simple model with those obtained from the fiscal-
augmented, it appears that government debt contributes to slowing the process of correction the 
imposed shocks to the system for the Fisher and Term Premium relations.42 It implies that any 
                                                     
42 As is presented in Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith (2007), within a monetary-focused GVAR model, the Fisher 
equation and the Term Premium almost take two years to return to equilibrium while the time required for the UIP 
condition is considerably greater nearly after six years.     
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policy shocks would require rather longer time to return back to equilibrium when these relations 
are held and in presence of government debt. It can be due to the impact of fiscal policy on 
inflation and its persistence. As noted, we find evidence that fiscal policy may contribute to the 
persistence of the price puzzle. The government debt can also induce a reduction in the speed of 
adjustment to the equilibrium in the long-run. 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter explores the implication of government debt for the monetary policy transmission 
at both the domestic and international level. The study focuses on three main objectives. First, to 
examine the way in which the outcome of US contractionary monetary policy shock may differ 
in the presence of government debt. It also aims to investigate the international transmission of 
US monetary contraction on the economies of interest while it accounts for US government debt. 
Second, we examine the impact of US fiscal expansionary policy and its potential international 
spillovers. Third, we investigate the contribution of government debt to long-run macroeconomic 
relations.  
Having discussed both the Ricardian and non-Ricardian arguments on the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy to stimulate the economy, we estimate two GVAR model specifications: a simple 
and a government debt-augmented GVAR model. Our overall results from the estimated GVAR 
model suggest that real output and long-term interest rates are highly correlated across countries, 
while real exchange rates, short-term interest rates and inflation show a modest correlation. As 
regards the contemporaneous effects of foreign variables, empirical evidence suggests that Euro 
Area bond market is more responsive than its monetary policy reactions. This finding is also 
reported in Dees et al. (2007).  
The impulse responses from the estimated GVAR models also suggest a number of features. 
First, we can observe that both prices and output increase in response to monetary contraction 
within both the simple and fiscal-augmented model. However, US government debt influences 
the duration of responses to a monetary contraction. Given the high level of US government debt, 
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this finding seems to be reasonable, as any changes in interest rates would significantly change 
the interest expenses share of government expenditure. Second, we find empirical support for 
the non-Ricardian view on fiscal policy within the US economy. It is shown that fiscal shocks 
tend to have significant domestic and international spillovers on real and financial variables. In 
particular, the results suggest that US expansionary fiscal policy shock influences real output and 
the bond markets in the Euro Area and UK. Third, according to the estimated LR test to examine 
the potential contribution of US government debt to long-run macroeconomic relations within 
the GVAR, we find that the unrestricted Fisher equation, the Term Premium, and the UIP 
condition hold for the US and the other economies. Finally, the results of Persistence Profiles 
test suggest that government debt reduces the speed of adjustment to equilibrium following 
policy shock. This may be due to the impact of fiscal policy on inflation and its persistence.   
Given that the presented results are limited to our GVAR model, a few dimensions is 
emerged for further research as follows. As our results come from a linear GVAR model with 
constant parameters, a non-linear version of the GVAR as those of Favero (2013) that taking into 
account potential monetary and fiscal regime changes may capture the potential impact of the 
fiscal stance on the monetary transmission mechanism more accurately. It may also be insightful 
to construct a Time-Varying Parameter (TVP) version of the GVAR to capture the potential 
macroeconomic regime changes. Exploring the topic with alternative approaches for the 
identification of monetary and fiscal policy shocks is also left to future work.         
  
   
 
  
202 
 
Appendix 4.A-Unit Root Test 
Table 4.A.1. Unit Root Test for Domestic-Specific Variables  
Variable 
WS 
Statistic 
Australia Canada China Euro Area Japan UK US 
ity  (trend) -3.24 -2.82 -2.34 -1.96 -1.60 -0.98 -2.86 -2.24 
ity  (de-trended) -2.55 1.59 0.67 0.38 0.49 0.63 -0.74 0.28 
ity  -2.55 -6.29* -4.99* -3.32* -4.69* -3.94* -2.87* -4.56* 
it  (trend) -3.24 -3.07 -2.77 -3.07 -0.90 -2.47 -3.18 -1.53 
it  (de-trended) -2.55 -2.36 -1.54 -2.01 0.79 -0.71 -0.10 -0.09 
it  -2.55 -9.68* -8.51* -6.79* -6.69* -8.48* -7.51* -8.37* 
itep  (trend) -3.24 -2.60 -1.82 -1.05 -2.22 -1.86 -2.66 NA 
itep  (de-trended) -2.55 0.12 1.02 -1.05 -0.41 0.02 -0.53 NA 
itep  -2.55 -7.78* -7.40* -7.02* -6.85* -4.93* -7.96* NA 
iteq  (trend) -3.24 -2.91 -2.60 NA -2.43 -1.80 -1.53 -1.71 
iteq  (de-trended) -2.55 -1.13 -0.93 NA -0.92 -1.65 -0.31 -0.48 
iteq  -2.55 -6.99* -7.02* NA -6.71* -5.01* -7.28* -6.14* 
itlr  (trend) -3.24 -2.01 -2.62 NA -3.06 -1.90 -3.10 -3.16 
itlr  (de-trended) -2.55 -1.24 -0.49 NA -0.60 0.01 0.24 -0.41 
itlr  -2.55 -5.63* -7.37* NA -5.52* -5.63* -7.90* -6.99* 
itsr  (trend) -3.24 -2.42 -3.02 -1.61 -3.02 -2.64 -2.96 -2.62 
itsr  (de-trended) -2.55 -1.95 -0.61 -1.42 -0.77 -1.03 -0.38 -0.07 
itsr  -2.55 -7.27* -6.20* -6.05* -5.79* -5.21* -6.87* -4.11* 
itgdr  (trend) -3.24 -3.02 -1.77 -2.34 -3.12 -1.51 -2.50 -2.42 
itgdr  (de-trended) -2.55 -2.05 -1.31 0.75 -0.40 0.20 -2.22 -1.36 
itgdr  -2.55 -3.29* -2.99* -2.81* -3.38* -3.28* -3.09* -2.80* 
Note: Unit Root t-statistics is reported based on Weighted Symmetric estimation of ADF (WS) type regressions due to its superior 
performance compared to the standard ADF test as it exploits the time reversibility of stationary autoregressive processes. The lag 
length employed in the WS unit root tests is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). An asterisk,*, indicates the rejection 
of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 95% significance level. The blank spaces are either due to setting as reference country, i.e. 
the US, or data limitation, i.e. China. All the statistics are computed over the sample 1979:Q2-2013:Q2. 
 
 
Table 4.A.2. Unit Root Tests for Global Variable 
Global Variable WS Statistic t-Statistic 
oil
tp  (trend) -3.24 -1.12 
oil
tp  (de-trended) -2.55 -0.91 
oil
tp  -2.55 -6.46* 
mat
tp  (trend) -3.24 -2.43 
mat
tp  (de-trended) -2.55 -1.28 
mat
tp  -2.55 -5.67* 
metal
tp  (trend) -3.24 -2.27 
metal
tp  (de-trended) -2.55 -0.95 
metal
tp  -2.55 -5.16* 
Note: Unit Root t-statistics is reported based on Weighted Symmetric estimation of ADF (WS) type regressions due to its 
superior performance compared to the standard ADF test as it exploits the time reversibility of stationary autoregressive 
processes. The lag length employed in the WS unit root tests is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). An asterisk 
,*, indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 95% significance level. All the statistics are computed over 
the sample 1979:Q2-2013:Q2.  
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Table 4.A.3. Unit Root Tests for Foreign-Specific Variables  
Variable 
WS 
Statistic 
Australia Canada China Euro Area   Japan     UK     US 
*
ity  (trend) -3.24 -2.18 -2.40 -1.60 -3.08 -3.59 -1.76 -2.95 
*
ity  (de-trended) -2.55 1.28 0.33 0.48 0.67 -0.05 0.62 0.99 
*
ity  -2.55 -5.37* -4.54* -4.61* -4.29* -3.48* -4.74* -5.23* 
*
it  (trend) -3.24 -3.07 -1.69 -0.76 -2.41 -3.05 -1.24 -3.06 
*
it  (de-trended) -2.55 -1.72 -0.05 1.20 -0.89 -2.30 0.67 -1.28 
*
it  -2.55 -7.18* -8.38* -7.74* -8.08* -7.06* -7.44* -7.35* 
*
iteq  (trend) -3.24 -1.96 -1.76 -2.11 -1.84 -2.16 -2.34 -3.01 
*
iteq  (de-trended) -2.55 -0.85 -0.49 -0.74 -0.48 -0.62 -0.81 -0.99 
*
iteq  -2.55 -6.81* -6.24* -6.69* -6.74* -6.50* -6.65* -6.99* 
*
itlr  (trend) -3.24 -2.54 -2.08 -2.77 -3.02 -3.00 -2.76 -3.10 
*
itlr  (de-trended) -2.55 -0.05 -0.28 -0.12 0.19 -0.25 -0.34 -0.22 
*
itlr  -2.55 -5.65* -6.95* -6.02* -6.81* -6.59* -5.97* -6.25* 
*
itsr  (trend) -3.24 -3.07 -2.89 -3.14 -2.26 -2.93 -2.41 -2.89 
*
itsr  (de-trended) -2.55 -0.60 0.06 -0.06 -0.68 -0.57 -0.43 -0.55 
*
itsr  -2.55 -4.31* -4.13* -3.88* -5.13* -5.05* -5.21* -4.89* 
*
itgdr  (trend) -3.24 -1.35 -2.39 -3.00 -2.19 -1.91 -3.04 -2.96 
*
itgdr  (de-trended) -2.55 1.20 -0.64 0.93 0.79 0.37 0.13 0.55 
*
itgdr  -2.55 -2.69* -2.70* -2.93* -3.27* -3.02* -3.13* -2.73* 
Note: Unit Root t-statistics is reported based on Weighted Symmetric estimation of ADF (WS) type regressions due to its 
superior performance compared to the standard ADF test as it exploits the time reversibility of stationary autoregressive 
processes. The lag length employed in the WS unit root tests is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). An asterisk 
,*, indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 95% significance level. All the statistics are computed over 
the sample 1979:Q2-2013:Q2.  
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Appendix 4.B-Data series 
1. Real GDP 
The IFS 99BVRZF series (GDP VOL) has been used for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States. For Austria, Belgium, Finland the IFS 99BVPZF 
series (GDP VOL) has been used. For China, as there is no quarterly real GDP index published, it is derived 
from a nominal GDP series released by National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and adjusted by CPI. All these 
series has been seasonally adjusted using the quarterly growth rate of the adjusted IFS series from 2004Q1 
to 2009Q4.43      
2. Consumer Price Index 
The IFS CPI 64zf series has been used to build the consumer price index for all selected countries excluding 
China in which data source is National Bureau of Statistics from Datastream data.   
3. Short-term Interest Rate 
The IFS is the main source of data for short-term interest rates. For China, the IFS Deposit Rate                 
(60Lzf series) has been used. The IFS Treasury Bill Rate (60Czf series) was used for Canada, UK and US. 
The IFS Money Market Rate (60Bzf series) was used for Australia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
Spain. For Austria, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands no data was available for any of these series from 
1999Q1 when the euro was introduced. The country specific IFS Money Market Rate (60Bzf series) was 
used from 1979Q1 to 1998Q4 and completed to 2009Q4 using the corresponding series (60Bzf series) for 
Germany as the representative euro interest rate. 
4. Long-term Interest Rate 
The IFS Government Bond Yield (61zf series) has been used as a measure of long-run interest rates.  
5. Exchange Rates 
Exchange rates series are from Bloomberg. A quarterly average of the nominal bilateral exchange rate         
vis-à-vis the US dollar has been computed for each country based on the closing value of the last Wednesday 
of each month.   
6. Equity Price Index 
Equity price index series are from Bloomberg using a quarterly average of the MSCI country index based on 
the closing value of the last Wednesday of each month. 44  
7. Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio 
The IMF Government Financial Statistics is the source of data for government primary net lending/borrowing 
as a Percent of GDP (Code: GGXONLB_NGDP). 
8. Broad Money 
The broad money is downloaded from the OECD data series. 
9. Trade Matrix 
The IFS DOT statistics has been used to build the trade matrix choosing the c.i.f. for both exports and imports 
available at the annual frequency. 
10. Oil Price Index 
The price of oil is based on a Brent series from Bloomberg (Series: Current pipeline export quality Brent 
blends) using quarterly averaged of daily closing prices for all trading days. 
11. Other commodities Indices 
The agricultural raw material and metals price indices were both taken from the IMF’s Primary Commodity 
Prices monthly data. Because the IMF data starts in 1980, the series were extrapolated backwards to 1979 
using the growth rate of the monthly price indices (2010 = 100) from the World Bank. Monthly averages of 
the indices were taken for each quarter.45 
12. PPP-GDP Data 
The main source for construction of the country specific PPP-GDP weights is the World Development 
Indicator database of the World Bank.The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms is used to construct the PPP-
GDP weights obtained from the World Development Indicator database of the World Bank in current 
international dollars (Ticker: NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD). 
                                                     
43 A detailed procedure of seasonal adjustment and interpolation methods can be found in Dees et al. (2007).  
44 A detailed procedure of seasonal adjustment and interpolation methods can be found in Dees et al. (2007). 
45 See Dees et al. (2007), for further details. 
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Chapter 5 
Domestic and International Macroeconomic Impact of US 
Unconventional Monetary Policy  
 
Abstract  
This chapter explores both the domestic and international macroeconomic impact of 
Unconventional Monetary Policy (UMP) in the US. The empirical evidence concerning the 
domestic effectiveness of UMP is obtained from a Factor-Augmented VAR (FAVAR) model 
comprises 195 US monthly time series spanning the 2007:M06-2013:M06 period. The Impulse 
Responses Functions (IRF) suggest that an increase in broad money can lead to an increase in 
economic activity and prices. A policy-induced fall in the bond yields spread within the FAVAR 
model also increases economic activity and prices. These findings turn out to be qualitatively 
similar to the literature on the effects of UMP. Taking into account the potential leakages from 
implementation of UMP through trade across countries, this chapter also examines the 
international spillovers of policy within a Global VAR (GVAR) model. The unique structure of 
GVAR methodology allows us to capture the international transmission of policy shocks through 
a trade-weighted matrix among the economies of interest. The results within the GVAR model 
suggests that both output and equity prices are highly correlated across countries. In addition, a 
fall in the US spread induces a fall in Euro Area and UK bond yield spreads as well. This implies 
that bond yield spreads are linked globally that is consistent with the literature as has been 
reported in Dees et al. (2007). Furthermore, Impulse Responses suggest that UMP, in the form 
of a fall in the yield spreads and increase in broad money, can significantly increase US output 
and generate international spillovers to the Euro Area and UK. However, changes in the bond 
yield spread is more effective to generate international spillovers within the Euro Area and UK, 
while an increase in broad money is more effective to improve the US economy. Finally, we find 
that there is a negative correlation between the spread and the equity prices that suggests UMP 
shocks are transmitted through the portfolio balance channel. Portfolio balance channel refers to 
lowering long-term interest rates through Open Market Operations leading to changes in 
portfolios.   
JEL classification Code: C33, C52, E52, E58, E61 
Key Words: Unconventional Monetary Policy, Portfolio Balance Channel, International 
Spillovers, Government Debt, Factor-Augmented VAR, Global VAR   
Acknowledgement: I am grateful to Professor Charles Nolan and participant at the 2013 PhD 
workshop at the University of Glasgow for their helpful comments on the preliminary draft of 
this Chapter.  
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on the macroeconomic impact of US 
Unconventional Monetary Policy (UMP) domestically and internationally. We also consider the 
potential role of government debt in the monetary transmission mechanism. In the face of the 
recent financial crisis, Conventional Monetary Policy (CMP) was confronted with the Zero 
Lower Bound (ZLB) of interests. Major Central Banks, with interest rates constrained at the 
ZLB, considered alternative monetary policy tools, namely UMP. However, the question 
regarding the effectiveness of the non-standard policy measures remains highly controversial, 
see Bauer and Neely (2013). 
As explained in Chapter 2, UMP mainly takes one of these following forms: (i) forward 
guidance for future policy rates, (ii) Credit Easing (CE), and (iii) Quantitative Easing (QE), see 
Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2011), and Kapetanios et al. (2012). However, the core idea 
of UMP appears to focus on Central Banksˈ balance sheet policy by targeting either a change in 
the composition of the balance sheet, i.e. quantitative easing or an expansion in the size of the 
balance sheet, i.e. credit easing. The balance sheet policy in the form of QE has three main 
elements: (i) an explicit target for bank reserve, (ii) a conditional commitment to maintain high 
reserve levels in the future, and (iii) increased purchases of government bonds to facilitate the 
achievement of the target on bank reserves, see Borio and Disyatat (2010). Hence, QE as a 
combination of bank reserve policy and quasi-debt management policy, that is purchases of 
government bonds, may refer to any Central Bankˈs operation that results in a rise in the reserves, 
see Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005), Taylor and Williams (2010). The most obvious advantage of 
QE is to inject an excess of reserves to the market that can evade short-term interest rate volatility 
and keep the interest rate constant around zero, see Bowdler and Radia (2012).  
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The target of the proposed UMP is to lower long-term interest rates and provide more 
liquidity in order to stimulate the economy.1 There are two channels for the transmission of UMP, 
namely the portfolio balance and signalling. Portfolio balance channel refers to lowering long-
term interest rates through Open Market Operations. Within the portfolio balance channel, the 
LSAP increase is assumed to the price of purchased assets and their close substitutes, and to 
include a fall in their returns. The objective is that ultimately to stimulate aggregate demand due 
to a positive wealth effect. In addition, the policy-induced increase in money supply tends to 
depreciate the domestic currency and improve the current account, see Joyce et al. (2011), and 
Kapetanios et al. (2012). The announcements of LSAP will also influence government bond 
yields through the signalling channel. Signalling channel refers to generating expectations of 
lowering the future short-term interest rates. The signalling channel implies that investors 
consider the LSAP announcement as an indication of a lower path for future short-term interest 
rates. This would also affect the expectations component of long-term interest rates, see Bauer 
and Neely (2013).2   
The literature on the transmission channels of UMP and the persistence of the impact 
suggests that Central Banks asset purchases program mainly affect bond yields and other asset 
prices due to a reduction in term premia through portfolio balance channel, see DˈAmico and 
King (2013), Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2011), and Pesaran and Smith (2012). For 
example, Gagnon et al. (2011) find that the $300 billion of US bond purchases, which amount to 
approximately 2 percent of GDP, lowered US 10-year Treasury yields by around of 90 basis 
points.3 Furthermore, the existing evidence suggests that the Federal Reserveˈs purchases of US 
Treasuries have affected yields through both the portfolio balance and signalling channels, see 
                                                     
1 The Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) program has been executed by purchasing bonds or assets from financial 
institutions financed by Central Bankˈs money to stimulate the economy through boosting nominal expenditure and 
thereby increasing domestic inflation, see Joyce et al. (2011). 
2 Note that as discussed in Woodford (2012), the announcement includes both explicit and implicit signals for the 
future short-term path. 
3 There are disparities among studies regards measuring the impact of US-UMP on the governmentˈs bond yields. 
For example, Hamilton and Wu (2012) report 13 basis points reduction following the policy, DˈAmico and King 
(2013) report US bond yields being 45 basis points lower after UMP, while those of Fawley and Neely (2013) shows 
around of 107 basis points reduction in the yields. 
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Bauer and Neely (2013), and DˈAmico and King (2013).4 In addition, Curdia and Woodford 
(2011) discuss that the effectiveness of UMP depends upon the degree of substitution of the 
assets. For example, if Central Banks purchases assets with identical characteristic to bank 
reserves, agents may not consider to rebalance their portfolio, thus, the impact tends to be 
insignificant.5  
Given that the signalling and portfolio balance are the main transmission channels for UMP, 
the existing literature on the effectiveness of UMP is controversial.6 For example, while 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argued that the Great Recession would have been more moderate 
if the Federal Reserve had injected more reserves into the markets, some argue that injecting 
more free money should not per se affect the decisions of rational agents, see Curdia and 
Woodford (2009) for a detailed discussion. Recently, Woodford (2012) explains that the 
discrepancy between results on the effectiveness of UMP depends upon the way that agents 
perceive the policy intervention. For example, under an UMP in the form of policy commitment 
that the Central Bank commits to keep the nominal interest rate near to ZLB until achieving a 
certain target, say a specific level for nominal GDP, the policy impact tends to be substantial. In 
contrast, if UMP aims to persist until the Central Bank achieved its usual targets and then return 
to its usual path, the policy outcome tends to be lower. In practice, however, policy often relies 
on a combination of commitment to a clear target as guidance for future interest rate policy, with 
immediate policy actions to stimulate spending.    
Having noted the literature on the impact of US-UMP in order to stimulate the economy 
and prevent deflation, however, the existing studies mainly concern the domestic outcome of the 
                                                     
4 Christensen et al. (2009) report that the Federal Reserveˈs QE program mainly worked through the signaling channel. 
However, their results suggest that the portfolio balance channel has been more effective to decline the yields of UK 
bonds yields in response to UK-UMP. Their model allows for decomposing the fall in yields into changes in the 
expected future policy rates and changes in term premia. 
5 As discussed in Brunner and Meltzer (1972), Central Banks can influence the pattern of yields on different assets 
by altering the supply of assets with different durations and liquidity, given that assets are imperfect substitutes. This 
implies that an important component of the portfolio balance channel is the heterogeneity across agents, as some 
people would consider holding different portfolios with different duration and liquidity. 
6 For a concise review of the literature on the effects of LSAP program, see Rosa (2012). 
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policy intervention.7 As concerns the international macroeconomic impact of US-UMP, we 
identify a gap in the literature. It is important that the assessment of UMP account for the 
potential international spillovers of the policy and the way that the fiscal stance may influence 
the policy outcome. Indeed, there is little literature on exploring the UMP and its transmission 
mechanism in a global framework.8 Our approach to examine the domestic macroeconomic 
impact of UMP is close to those of Baumeister and Benati (2013), Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce 
et al. (2011,2012), Kapetanios et al. (2012), Pesaran and Smith (2012), and Gambacorta et al. 
(2014) as is outlined in Table 5.1. We follow this literature and focus on the portfolio balance as 
the main transmission channel for US-UMP. 
In doing so and given the motivation of this Chapter, we employ the Factor-Augmented 
VAR (FAVAR), and the Global VAR (GVAR) methodologies to examine the domestic and 
international impact of US-UMP, respectively. By previewing the results, it is shown that UMP 
implemented in the US influenced the real economy within not only the US, but also China, the 
Euro Area, and UK. We find that US-UMP leads to a significant but temporary rise in output 
and prices in the US economy. This result turns out to be robust to both the FAVAR and GVAR 
model specifications. The output effects are qualitatively similar to the ones typically found in 
the literature on the effectiveness of the UMP as Table 5.1 outlines. The impact on the price 
level, on the other hand, seems to be less persistent and weaker. Furthermore, based on the pair-
wise cross-sectional test results, we find evidence that output and equity prices are significantly 
correlated across countries, while the global correlation is smaller for inflation, bond yield 
spread, and the exchange rate. Finally, the results of the Nyblom parameter stability test provide 
evidence that our results are robust to potential parameter instability.  
                                                     
7 See Strobebel and Taylor (2009), Fuster and willen (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2011), Peersman 
(2011), Swanson (2011), Kapetanios et al. (2012), Pesaran and Smith (2012), Baumeister and Benati (2013), and 
DˈAmico and King (2013) among others. 
8 We can referred to Pesaran and Smith (2012), and Gambacorta et al. (2014) as a few exceptions which is described 
in the literature review section. 
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This Chapter contributes to the empirical literature on the both domestic and international 
spillovers of UMP within the models that account for public debt together with macro and finance 
variables. Our contribution to the empirical literature on the UMP is as follows. First, within a 
FAVAR framework we show that US-UMP can significantly increase output and inflation. Our 
finding is consistent with those presented in Baumeister and Benati (2013), Gambacorta et al. 
(2014), and Wu and Xia (2014).  Second, the impulse response results within the estimated 
GVAR model suggest that US-UMP has generated international spillovers stimulating the Euro 
Area and UK economies. Third, the portfolio balance seems to be the most likely transmission 
channel of the policy implemented. We find that there is a negative correlation between the 
spread and the equity prices that suggests the policy potentially is transmitted through the 
portfolio balance channel.  
The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 provides a brief review of the 
related literature. Models specification and empirical results are presented in section 5.3 and 
section 5.4 concludes the study.  
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Table 5. 1. Key Literature on the Macroeconomic Impact of UMP 
Study         Methodology           Size of the Shock           Main Contribution 
Baumeister and Benati 
(2013) 
TVP-SVAR 
100 bps negative shock to 
the 10-year Treasury bond 
yield spread  
US-GDP growth 
increased by 2.4% 
together with an 
increase in inflation 
by 1.6 %.   
Gagnon et al. (2011) 
Event-Study and 
Times Series 
Regression 
NA 
US-long-term 
interest rates is 
reduced by 90-110 
bp.   
Kapetanios et al. (2012) 
BVAR,  
Markov-Switching 
SVAR, and  
TVP-FAVAR 
100 bps negative shock to 
the 10-year Treasury bond 
yield spread 
UK-GDP growth 
increased by 1.5 % 
together with an 
increase in inflation 
by 1.25 % at peak. 
Joyce et al. (2011) 
VAR and  
GARCH-M Models NA 
UK-long-term 
interest rates is 
reduced by 100 bp.       
Pesaran and Smith (2012) 
Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) 
Counterfactual 
100 bps negative shock to 
the UK spread  
UK-GDP growth 
increased by 0.75-1 
% depending on 
whether foreign 
output is included 
or excluded, 
respectively.     
Gambacorta et al. (2014)  
Mean Group Panel 
VAR 
An increase in the balance 
sheet around of 3% 
US-output 
increased by 0.06 % 
together with an 
increase in inflation 
by 0.025 %.        
Note: This Table summarizes the related literature that the chapter is constructed upon it. bp abbreviates basis points. 
SVAR stands for Structural VAR. BVAR stands for Bayesian VAR. TVP-FAVAR stands for Time-Varying Parameter 
Factor-Augmented VAR. GARCH stands for Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity.          
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5.2 Review of the Literature on Unconventional Monetary Policy   
There exist a growing literature argues that Central Banks can influence the economy at the ZLB 
by implementing non-standard monetary policy measures. So far, this argument has been 
empirically tested twice. Once, in the early 2000s in Japan, and then after the 2008 financial 
crisis, a number of advanced economies pursued UMP to stimulate economic growth, see Okina 
and Shiratsuka (2004), Girardin and Moussa (2011), and Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013).9  
Although UMP initially aimed to reduce financial market distress, they also targeted to 
stimulate the real economy. UMP measures are expected to increase the supply of money by 
either direct lending to commercial banks and private sector or involving purchases of long-term 
assets that are intended to reduce long-term interest rates, see Fawley and Neely (2013). 
Early work on the impact of UMP has begun following Operation Twist in the United States 
in 1961. This operation involved Federal Reserve purchases of long-term bonds financed by sales 
of short-term Treasury Bills. The objective was to lower long-term interest rates.10 Then in early 
2000s, the Bank of Japan adopts UMP in the form of large-scale asset purchases with the 
objective of facilitating direct lending to banks. This policy has changed both the components 
and the size of the Bank of Japanˈs balance sheet. Although UMP implemented in Japan has 
prevented further recession and deflation, it has not increased output and inflation sufficiently, 
see Okina and Shiratsuka (2004), Girardin and Moussa (2011), and Schenkelberg and Watzka 
(2013).  
The empirical literature on the Japan-UMP suggests that the policy impacts market 
expectations through signalling channel, see Ugai (2007). In addition, although there is evidence 
confirming that UMP caused the interest rates to remain low for some time, but the effect of 
UMP operations on bond yields or risk premia is mixed. For example, Bernanke et al. (2004), 
                                                     
9 The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have expanded their supply of money by purchasing a large number 
of targeted assets.  However, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan chose to ease their monetary policy 
stance by increasing direct lending to banks and supply of loans. 
10 Note that as discussed in Chapter 2, the Operation Twist differs from the recent conduct of UMP in the sense that 
UMP has been financed by the creation of base money. 
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within a yield curve model, find that Japanese yields were roughly 50 basis points lower than 
expected after the conduct of UMP. In addition they report Japan-UMP is transmitted through 
the signalling channel, when the market learned of future declines in the net supply of longer-
term Treasury securities.     
As regards the transmission channels of US-UMP, in contrast to Japan, the empirical 
literature suggests that the policy has lowered US long-term interest rates through both signalling 
and portfolio balance channels, see for example Christensen et al. (2009). In another study, Bauer 
and Neely (2013) find evidence supporting that US-UMP has affected long-term yields through 
signalling channel. On the other hand, a number of  studies do not allow for the signalling channel 
by construction and only estimate the relationship between quantities of outstanding government 
debt and risk premia, see for example Gagnon et al. (2011), DˈAmico and King (2013), and 
Hamilton and Wu (2012). They find that asset purchases lowered bond yields by reducing risk 
premia in the US. They conclude that UMP is mainly transmitted through the portfolio balance 
channel.  
 The literature on the impact of UMP on the long-term interest rate, using event study 
method, suggests that unconventional policy measures mainly lower long-term yields due to a 
fall in risk premium and the announcement that short-term interest rates would remain low for an 
extended horizon, see Gagnon et al. (2011), and Fawley and Neely (2013).11 The same results, 
using a cross-section analysis approach, have been reported in DˈAmico and King (2013). They 
find that the bond yields of the purchased securities have been lowered more compared to the 
other assets. They conclude that the program substantially reduced US long-term Treasury yields 
which appears to be persistent. Furthermore, Gagnon et al. (2011) employ both event-study and 
time-series approaches to analyse the impact of UMP on long-term yield spreads in the US.12 
Their results indicate that UMP has led to a long-lasting reductions in long-term interest rates on 
                                                     
11 Cecioni et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive survey of the evidence on the effectiveness of the various UMP 
measures adopted by the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank.       
12 The bond yield spread is defined as the difference between long and short-term interest rate, which is the 10-year 
government bond yield minus the 3-month Treasury bill. 
214 
 
a range of securities, including securities that were not included in the purchase programs. They 
show that the primary transmission mechanism is the portfolio balance channel by reducing the 
risk premium of the assets being purchased and their close substitutes. This would increase the 
price of assets and hence lower their yields, leading to portfolio rebalancing. This in turns will 
increase the wealth and reduce the cost of borrowing.13 
Having discussed the transmission mechanism of UMP, now we consider discussing the 
macroeconomic impact of the policy. A number of studies find evidence that US unconventional 
monetary strategy adverted significant risk of both deflation and output collapse. For example, 
Baumeister and Benati (2013) estimate a Time-Varying Parameter Structural VAR (TVP-SVAR) 
model to investigate the macroeconomic impact of US-UMP. They find that a reduction in the 
long-term yield spread increases both output growth and inflation. Their counterfactual 
simulations also indicate that UMP actions in the US prevents further reduction in output and 
prices. They use US quarterly data for 1954:Q3–2008:Q4 and find that in the absence of UMP, 
output growth would have fallen by 10 percent compared to an actual fall of 3 percent and that 
inflation would have been negative. Their simulation results under conventional monetary policy 
suggest that the real GDP in US would have been 0.9 percent lower and the inflation rate would 
have been reached as low as -1 percent in the absence of UMP.  
In another study on the effectiveness of US-UMP, Chung et al. (2012) find that this policy 
intervention raises the level of real GDP by around of 3 percent. They also report that the inflation 
is 1 percent lower than if the Federal Reserve had not implement UMP. This confirms the 
effectiveness of the policy to prevent deflation. Their simulations results come from a model that 
a 50 basis points reduction in long-term interest rates is transmitted through a portfolio balance 
channel. In addition, they find that the Federal Reserveˈs asset purchases have an effects 
equivalent to a cut in the federal funds rate of around 300 basis points from early 2009 to 2012.  
                                                     
13 The same findings have been reported in Swanson (2011), Hamilton and Wu (2012) suggesting that US-UMP has 
lowered the long-term interest rates.  
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As regards the impact of UK-UMP, and having examined the empirical literature, it appears 
that UK-UMP has been also effective to stimulate the economy and prevent deflation. For 
example, Baumeister and Benati (2013) examine UK quarterly data spans the 1955:Q1-2008:Q4. 
They find that in the absent of UK-UMP, in the form of a reduction in long-term interest rates, 
inflation and output growth would have fallen significantly. In addition, their counterfactual 
results suggests that the reduction in the long-term interest rate induced by UMP in the UK have 
prevented deflation and further reduction in output.  
In another study, Joyce et al. (2011) using event studies and portfolio balance models find 
that UK-UMP affects the real economy mainly through the portfolio balance channel and in two 
stages: an initial impact phases and an adjustment phase. First, asset purchases affect the 
composition of the portfolios by an increase in the holdings of broad money and a decline in 
proportion of assets. Then, provided that money and assets are imperfect substitutions, the policy 
shock causes a portfolio rebalancing leading to an upward pressure on current asset prices and 
hence a decline in asset returns.  
Kapetanios et al. (2012) also find evidence for the effectiveness of UK-UMP. They 
assumed that UK-UMP has lowered the 10-year government bond yield by 100 basis points. 
They employed three different approaches to investigate the UMP impact including Bayesian 
VAR (BVAR), Markov-Switching Structural VAR (MS-SVAR), and a Time-Varying Parameter 
VAR (TVP-VAR).14 Their results suggest that UK-UMP had a peak effect on the level of real 
GDP and inflation of around 1.5 and 1.25 percent respectively, while the reported results vary 
across the different model specifications. Furthermore, their counterfactual analysis suggests that 
                                                     
14 They estimate three VAR models in a way that each model incorporate structural change in different ways to 
produce counterfactual forecasts. They use a large BVAR, estimated over rolling windows, to allow for structural 
change; an MS-SVAR, where parameters are allowed to change at a particular time to capture regime changes; and 
a TVP-SVAR, which allows assessing general time variation in parameters. The policy shocks in these models are 
identified through restrictions on the impulse responses. They assume that UMP acted to reduce bonds spreads. They 
use monthly data from 1993 to 2011. The BVAR model comprises 43 variables, reflecting real activity, prices, and 
policy rates in the UK, US, and Euro Area. They employed MS-SVAR model in a switching VAR with four regimes. 
The VAR part of their model consists of six variables: output growth, inflation, M4 growth, the 3-month Treasury 
Bill rate, the spread between the 10-year bond rate and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate, and growth in the FTSE all 
share index.  
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without UMP the decline in output and inflation would have been larger during 2009. They 
conclude that unconventional policy implemented in the UK has prevented a deeper recession 
and deflation.  
Similar qualitative finding is reported in Pesaran and Smith (2012) indicating that UMP 
has been effective in the UK economy. Their results are based on a counterfactual analysis using 
the bivariate Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) method. Their model consists of UK 
domestic output growth, US and Euro Area output growth, and the spread between long and 
short-term interest rates. They follow the Bank of England assumption that UMP caused a 
permanent 100 basis points reduction in the UK spread. Their justification for taking the spread 
as a proxy of UMP is that when Central Banks purchase assets, which are mainly government 
bonds, it involves exchanging one governmental liability for another in the Central Bankˈs 
balance sheet. This change in the quantities of the two assets would cause a rise in the price of 
government bond and a decline in their yields. This in turns is expected to encourage aggregate 
demand by increasing wealth and reducing companies cost of borrowing. It also may increases 
banksˈ liquidity and may prompt more lending. Pesaran and Smith (2012) provide empirical 
support that this unconventional policy induced a temporary increase in UKˈs output growth by 
about one percent. Their findings also indicate that including foreign output growth in the model 
can lower the effect of the policy on UKˈs output.  
Finally, as regards the international macroeconomic impact of UMP, Gambacorta et al. 
(2014) present results from a panel VAR using monthly data from eight advanced economies.15 
They find that an exogenous increase in Central Bank balance sheets at the ZLB leads to a 
temporary rise in economic activity and consumer prices. The estimated output effects turn out 
to be qualitatively similar to the ones reported in the literature on the effects of conventional 
                                                     
15 The economies included in the panel analysis are Canada, the Euro Area, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The time-series sample spans January 2008 until June 2011. They do 
not allow for cross-country spillover effects of UMP measures because the sample period is too small to extend the 
empirical model in this direction. It implies that they focus on the domestic effects of UMP measures. An UMP 
shock is identified as an exogenous innovation to the Central Bank balance sheet in the form of a mixture of zero 
and sign restrictions.  
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monetary policy and hence indicates that UMP measures have been effective in stimulating the 
economy. However, the impact on the price level is weaker and less persistent. Their individual 
country results suggest that there are no major differences in the macroeconomic effects of UMP 
across countries, despite the heterogeneity of the measures that were taken. Furthermore, they 
estimate an extended model augmented with the outstanding debt of the central government. 
They report that public debt falls significantly in response to the Central Bank balance sheet 
policy. This probably reflects positive feedback effects of the shock-induced increase in output 
on public finances. 
Having reviewed the related literature, the next section proceeds to examining the impact 
of US Unconventional Monetary Policy within both FAVAR and GVAR frameworks.     
5.3 Empirical Results 
This section presents the empirical findings of the study. The objective is to examine the domestic 
and international effect of UMP in the US. We adopt the FAVAR and GVAR methodologies as 
our econometrics framework. Our choice of the applied methodology is rationalized given the 
unique properties of these two approaches. While within the FAVAR, the large dataset comprises 
macro and financial variables to capture the domestic impact of the conducted policy more 
accurately, the GVAR method enables us to investigate the potential international spillovers of 
the policy.  
As discussed, the empirical literature on UMP suggest that the conduct of unconventional 
policy has caused a permanent reduction in long-term yields.16 The policy also increased the size 
of Central Banksˈ balance sheet through increasing broad money. The policy potentially works 
through the portfolio balance and/or signalling channels. On this ground, we investigate 
macroeconomic impact of US unconventional policy through two policy experiments: (i) a fall 
in bond yield spread, and (ii) a rise in broad money.17 Following Kapetanios et al. (2012), and 
                                                     
16 See Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2011), Kapetanios et al. (2012), Pesaran and Smith (2012), Baumeister and 
Benati (2013), Fawley and Neely (2013), and Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013). 
17 Both bond yield spread and broad money have been employed in the literature to proxy the effect of UMP. For 
example, Kapetanious et al. (2012), and Pesaran and Smith (2012) adopt bond yield spread as UMP instrument 
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Pesaran and Smith, (2012), the bond yield spread is defined as the difference between long and 
short-term interest rate. That is the 10-year government bond yield minus the 3-month Treasury 
bill to capture the term structure of interest rates. In accord with the emprirical literature, we 
assume that US-UMP caused a 100 basis points reduction in the spread, see Gagnon et al. (2011), 
Joyce et al. (2011), Kapetanios et al. (2012), Pesaran and Smith (2012), Baumeister and Benati 
(2013), Fawley and Neely (2013), and Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013). For the second 
experiment, we examine the impact of one standard error increase in broad money while both 
interventions are assumed to be permanent.18  
In so doing, first we estimate a FAVAR model within a two-step Principal Component (PC) 
method to investigate the impact of a fall in bond yields spread together with an increase in the 
broad money shocks on the US economy. Second, we estimate a GVAR model to examine the 
potential international spillovers generated by these two policy shocks. In addition, both models 
investigate the transmission mechanism of policy shocks.             
5.3.1 Estimation of the FAVAR Model 
This section investigate the domestic impact of UMP within a FAVAR. We follow the same 
procedure as addressed in Chapter 3 to construct the FAVAR model. In so doing, following 
Bernanke et al. (2005), the Factor-Augmented VAR model takes the form as follows. 
  t
t
t
t
t
u
Y
F
L
Y
F














1
1  (5.1) 
Note that )(L  is a lag polynomial of finite order d , and iu  is error term vector with 
1)( MK  dimension that ),0(,..~ QNdiiut . However, this Equation cannot be estimated 
directly because the factors,
tF  , are unobservable. Given that these factors are representing forces 
                                                     
which is considered to capture the effect of asset purchases on lowering long-term interest rates. As regards adopting 
broad money as another UMP instrument, we follow Woodford (2012) who argues that changes in the size of balance 
sheet may reflect UMP. We assume that the liquidity provision policy of Central Banks will change the supply of 
money in the economy, captured by broad money. Note that Gambacota et al. (2014) adopt both an increase in the 
size of Central Bankˈs balance sheet and an increase in base money, as the two UMP instruments, and report the 
same results.           
18 As discussed in Pesaran and Smith (2012), and Woodford (2012) this assumption can be interpreted as a policy 
commitment, though, it allows limited conclusion.    
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that potentially affect many economic variables, it is possible to infer some information about the 
factors from observation of large number of economic time series as explained in Bernanke et al. 
(2005). Assuming that 
tX  represents the informational time series with the dimension of 1N , 
while NMK  , and are related to both the unobservable factors tF and the observed variables 
tY . Thus, the unobservable components summarized in tF  can be estimated as formulated in 
Equation (5.2). 
tt
y
it
f
iit eYFX   (5.2) 
Where f is an KN  matrix of factor loadings, y  is an MN   matrix of observable variables, 
and te  is the vector of error terms with 1N dimension, which are mean zero and assumed to 
be either normal and uncorrelated or weakly cross-correlated depending on the model estimation 
method.19 Furthermore, it is assumed that the error terms of Equations (5.1) and (5.2) are 
independent of each other. Thus, tX  measures the unobservable factors conditional on tY  , see 
Bernanke et al. (2005).   
Our FAVAR model is estimated using monthly data over 2007:M06-2013:M06 sample. The 
dataset consists of 195 US macroeconomic time series collected from the St Louis Fed FRED 
database.20 Following common practice in this literature, all variables are transformed to be 
stationary as described in Appendix 3.A.21 All the time series are seasonally adjusted were this is 
applicable.22 Consistent with the Factor Modelling literature, macroeconomic time series is 
selected to represent the following categories: Real Output and Income, Employment and Hours, 
Consumption, Housing Starts and Sales, Real Inventories and Orders Indices, Exchange Rates, 
                                                     
19 As is discussed in Bernanke et al. (2005) the Principal Components method allows for some cross-correlation in 
te  that disappears as N .       
20 A detailed description of database and the list of involved variables are provided in Appendix 3.A.  
21 We follow Bernanke et al. (2005), and Korobilis (2013) procedure to ensure stationary properties of the time 
series.   
22 The time series are seasonally adjusted using the Demetra+ package developed by Eurostat. To seasonally adjust 
the time series, the TRAMOSEATS method has been employed. This method can be divided into two main parts: a 
pre-adjustment step, which removes the deterministic component of the series by means of a regression model with 
Arima noises and the decomposition part itself. See Grudkowska (2013) for a detailed explanation.  
220 
 
Interest Rates, Money and Credit Quantity Aggregates, Price Indexes, Average Hourly Earnings, 
the Fiscal Stance, and Consumers Expectations.  
As regards determining the number of factors involved in the FAVAR model, we follow 
Bernanke et al. (2005) approach that is based on the sensitivity of the results to the alternative 
number of factors. As have been reported in Bernanke et al. (2005) and Korobilis (2013) the 
qualitative results are not altered when the number of factors increased from three to five factors. 
We estimate our specified FAVAR model with three and five factors. As the obtained results 
appear to be quite the same, the FAVAR model is constructed with three factors to maintain 
parsimony.23 
The lag length of the state Equation (5.2) is another important specification to be 
determined. The lag lengths are selected in the VAR literature based on statistical criterion such 
as AIC, BIC, or SIC. In the FAVAR literature, however, no specific criterion is used, to our 
knowledge. Bernanke et al. (2005) employ 13 lags in order to allow sufficient dynamics in their 
model. While Stock and Watson (2005) estimate a 2-lag model. We follow Bernanke et al. (2005) 
approach and construct our model using 13 lags.    
With reference to the observable variables required to be isolated in the VAR part, 
tY , our 
VAR includes inflation, Industrial Production growth, and the Bond Yield Spread.24 Thus, our 
FAVAR is a trivariate VAR augmented with three unobservable factors, tF  , which are extracted 
from the large set of time series macroeconomic variables as is addressed in Appendix 3.A. We 
use the PC approach to extract the factors. The use of PC method ensures identification of the 
model since it normalizes all factors to have zero mean and unit variance, see Korobilis (2013).  
Following Bernanke et al. (2005), the identification approach is a recursive method to 
identify unconventional monetary policy shock, see section 3.4.2 for more details. This approach 
                                                     
23 As discussed in Bernanke et al. (2005) increasing the number of factors does not appear to improve the results. 
24 We followed Bernanke et al. (2005) approach to put Industrial Production growth as observable variable in the 
VAR to proxy output. As Bernanke et al. (2005) explain: "Output in the theoretical model may correspond more 
closely to a latent measure of economic activity than to a specific data series such as real GDP". Thus, we include 
GDP as a time series in our information to extract the unobserved factors. We, then, present the IRFs of GDP to the 
policy shock within the FAVAR model.     
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assumes that the monetary authority reacts simultaneously to macroeconomic shocks. The 
recursive approach orders the policy instrument, tR , last and its innovations are treated as the 
policy shocks while the unobservable factors and macroeconomic variables respond to the policy 
shock with time lags. Thus, monetary policy actions influence inflation and Industrial Production 
growth with at least one period of lag, while the time lag for UMP tool is zero by ordering it last 
in the VAR part.25 Furthermore, it treats inflation as predetermined, which is consistent with the 
estimation of Taylor Rule that regress the nominal interest rate on inflation, see Bernanke et al. 
(2005), and Chung et al. (2007).   
As discussed in Bernanke et al. (2005) two blocks of information variables can be defined: 
(i) the slow-moving variables, and (ii) the fast-moving variables. The slow-moving block of 
variables are set to respond to monetary policy shocks with a month lag while the fast-moving 
block of variables reacts instantly to the policy shocks.26 
Having established model specification and the identification of monetary policy shock, the 
next section presents the impulse response analysis.  
5.3.2 IRFs Results of US Bond Yield Spread Shock 
This section presents the empirical results obtained from a FAVAR model estimated by the two-
step PC approach. The objective is to investigate the impact of an expansionary Unconventional 
Monetary Policy on the US economy. Furthermore, we consider examining the way in which US 
fiscal stance may influence the transmission of policy shock. 
Figure 5.1 presents the Impulse Response Functions to an expansionary UMP in the form 
of a fall in US bond yield spread.27 This means a decrease in the spread between long and short-
term interest rates.  
                                                     
25 As explained in Primiceri (2005), ordering monetary policy tool last in the VAR is not simply an ordering issue, 
but an identification condition that is essential for isolating monetary policy shock.   
26 The slow-moving block of variables includes Real Output and Income, Employment and Hours, Consumption, 
Price Indexes, Average Hourly Earnings, the Fiscal Stance, and Consumers Expectations. The fast-moving block of 
variables includes Housing Starts and Sales, Real Inventories and Orders Indices, Exchange Rates, Interest Rates, 
and Money and Credit Quantity Aggregates, see Appendix 3.A for more details. 
27 As noted, the bond yield spread is defined as the difference between long and short-term interest rate, which is the 
10-year government bond yield minus the 3-month Treasury bill. 
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Figure 5. 1.The IRFs to a Bond Yield Spread Shock  
 
Notes: This Figure illustrates the IRFs to an expansionary UMP shock within a FAVAR model. The VAR part of 
the model includes the bond yield spread, Industrial Production growth, and Inflation on top panel. The IRFs of other 
key variables in the monetary transmission mechanism is estimated based on three unobserved factors. The Impulse 
Responses together with their confidence intervals (10th, 50th, and 90th) are generated based on Bernanke et al. (2005) 
FAVAR model specification corresponds to a one standard deviation fall in the Bond Yield Spread. The FAVAR 
model is estimated using a Two-Step Principal Components approach over monthly data spans 2007:M06-2013:M06 
sample. 
 
The IRFs are generated within the FAVAR model consists of three unobserved factors and 
three observed variables in the VAR. The three observed variables in the VAR part of the model 
includes inflation, Industrial Production growth, and the bond yield spread. As can be seen, an 
expansionary UMP shock leads to a significant rise in Industrial Production growth and inflation. 
However, the expansionary effect on inflation is temporary, while the impact on Industrial 
Production growth persists for the whole period. This is consistent with the literature as a fall in 
the spread is expected to generate an expansionary effect on output, see Gagnon et al. (2011), 
Kapetanios et al. (2012), Pesaran and Smith (2012), Baumeister and Benati (2013), and Wu and 
Xia (2014). In particular, Wu and Xia (2014) within a FAVAR model, find similar qualitative 
responses for Industrial Production index, inflation, and unemployment.      
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As regards the other real activity measures, the IRFs show intuitive responses. It can be 
seen from Figure 5.1 that following UMP expansion, consumption, GDP, and new orders index 
increase, while unemployment declines. The responses are statistically significant.  
The responses of monetary aggregate measures such as broad money, the monetary base, 
and loans are consistent with the literature. As Figure 5.1 shows, monetary aggregate measures 
increase, although all the responses are statistically insignificant, except of loans. Finally, as the 
IRFs suggest, a fall in the spread seems to be unable to significantly influence the fiscal stance.    
In order to examine the robustness of our results to UMP shock, we consider replicating 
our analysis using a different quantitative policy instrument. That is an increase in broad money. 
The next section presents the impulse responses.           
5.3.3 IRFs Results of US Broad Money Shock 
Now we present the impulse responses to an increase in US broad money. Figure 5.2 shows the 
results generated within a FAVAR model consists of three unobserved factors and three observed 
variables. The VAR section of the model includes inflation, Industrial Production growth, and 
broad money.  
Overall, the IRFs results suggest the following common findings. An increase in broad 
money induces inflation and industrial production index to increase which statistically are 
significant. Other real activity measures such as consumption, GDP, and average hourly earnings 
also increase. This finding suggest that an increase in US broad money can succeed to stimulate 
the economy. As expected, the policy shock also is associated with a reduction in unemployment. 
New housing starts and new orders remain irresponsive following the shock. The increase in 
consumption, inflation, and GDP in response to this UMP shock may indicates that the policy 
shock generates a positive wealth effect encouraging private expenditure and aggregate demand.           
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Figure 5. 2.The IRFs to a Broad Money Shock  
 
Notes: This Figure illustrates the IRFs to an expansionary UMP shock within a FAVAR model. The VAR part of 
the model includes the broad money, Industrial Production growth, and Inflation on top panel. The IRFs of other 
key variables in the monetary transmission mechanism is estimated based on three unobserved factors. The Impulse 
Responses together with their confidence intervals (10th, 50th, and 90th) are generated based on Bernanke et al. (2005) 
FAVAR model specification corresponds to a 1 standard deviation increase in Broad Money. The FAVAR model is 
estimated using a Two-Step Principal Components approach from Bernanke et al. (2005) over monthly data spans 
2007:M06-2013:M06 sample. 
 
As regards the response of monetary aggregate, our results are consistent with the intuition.  
We can see that the policy shock increases the base money, borrowing, and loans, which are 
statistically significant. However, total reserve balance increased that is a counterintuitive 
response. Turning to interest rate response, we can see that an increase in US broad money caused 
both short and long-term interest rates to fall. This finding is consistent with the literature on the 
impact of UMP on lowering ling-term bond yields, see Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2012), 
Kapetanios et al. (2012), and Pesaran and Smith (2012). Finally, government debt and 
expenditure both increase in response to the shock. Although it is expected that an expansionary 
UMP increases economic activity and reduces debt, but our results can be justified as the interest 
share of public debt increase. This might be due to the conduct of UMP that can be associated 
with issuing new government bonds to finance the program.  
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Given that the policy-induced increase in broad money increases consumption and loans, 
it may indicate the portfolio balance as the policy transmission channel. This can support the 
view that the UMP program may generate positive wealth effect, which in turn would improve 
aggregate demand.  
Comparing the impulse responses obtained from these two expansionary UMP shocks, we 
can see that the both shocks significantly increase prices and real activity measures. Nevertheless, 
the IRFs of a fall in the spread seems to generate more expansionary effect rather increasing 
broad money. Having discussed the domestic impact of these policy shocks, the next section 
proceeds to examining their international spillovers.         
5.3.4 Estimation of the GVAR Model  
Here we employ the GVAR framework to examine the international spillovers of US-UMP. The 
same procedure as addressed in Chapter 4 is used to construct the GVAR model. Thus, the 
country-specific )1,1(VARX  model will take the general form as presented in Equation (5.3).28 
ittiiititiitiiit XXXaaX  
*
1,1
*
01,110  (5.3) 
Note that ioa  and tia 1 are the coefficients of the deterministic, iii KK   is a matrix of lagged 
coefficients, io  and 1i are 
*
ii KK  matrix of coefficients associated with the foreign specific 
variables, 1 iit K  is a vector of idiosyncratic country-specific shocks in which all shocks 
are assumed to be normally distributed as ),0(~
2 iidit . It is worth nothing that it is not 
necessary that all 
*VARX  be the same across all countries in terms of the included variables due 
to the fact that we consider zero weights for any missing variables in the country
thi within the
*VARX model, see Pesaran et al. (2004).29 
                                                     
28 Note that all the country-specific variables/observed factors are treated endogenously, while their foreign 
counterparts are treated as weakly exogenous. For a detailed discussion on this subject, see Dees et al. (2007).   
29 As concerns our study, there are no datasets available for long-term interest rates and real equity prices variables 
for China.  
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As has been explained in Chapter 4, we follow Pesaran et al. (2004), Pesaran and Smith 
(2006), and Dees et al. (2007) approach to construct the weighting matrix. We choose the 
bilateral trade as the international transmission channel of policy innovation.30 Thus, all foreign 
variables are linked through a bilateral trade matrix. Assuming that ijw  indicates the trade matrix 
between countries i and j, the corresponding foreign variables will influence country-specific 
VARX models as follows.     
                                    10,
00
* 
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N
j
jtijit xwandwxwX  
Likewise Chapter 4, we follow Pesaran et al. (2004), and Dees et al. (2007) to employ a 
fixed trade weights matrix by using the average trade flows computed over a three year basis.31 
The computed bilateral trade-weighted matrix is presented in Appendix 5.A.   
We use the same procedure as explained in Chapter 4 to estimate the GVAR(P) as 
formulated in Equation (5.4). 
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Where  )],(),,([),,( iiiiitiii qLpLzqpLA   , ittiitiiit udqLYaa  ),(10 .  
The next step is to estimate the GVAR (P) from Equation (5.4). This equation is our framework 
for the point estimation and Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRF) analysis.32   
                                                     
30 As discussed in Forbes and Chinn (2004), and Baxter and Kouparitsas (2006), bilateral trade between countries is 
one of the most important determinants of cross-countries linkages. 
31 As has been discussed in Dees et al. (2007) the choice of using fixed-weights is on the basis that changes in trade 
weights tend to be rather gradual. Thus, the foreign-specific variables computed using either fixed or variable trade 
weights are often very close.  
32A detailed procedure of constructing a GVAR model and formal proof can be found in Pesaran et al. (2004), 
Pesaran and Smith (2006), and Dees et al. (2007).      
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5.3.5 GVAR Model Specification 
This section explains the preliminary analysis required prior to estimating the model. Given this 
chapterˈs motivation, our GVAR model includes these variables: real output, ity , CPI inflation,
it , bond yield spread, itbys , real exchange rate, itep , real equity price, iteq , broad money, itM 2  
,government debt-to-GDP ratio, itgdr , price of oil,
oil
tp , raw material price,
mat
tp , and price of 
metal,
metal
tp , where data are available. Inflation is estimated using this definition:
1,  tiitit pp , where CPI index is used for estimating the real values.
33   
The foreign-specific variables are presented with similar notation, but are distinguished by 
an asterisk,*, as follows.  
],,,,,,,,,[ 2
metal
t
mat
t
oil
titititititititit pppgdrMbyseqepyX   
],,,,,,,,[ **2
***** metal
t
mat
t
oil
tititititititit pppgdrMbyseqyX   
Our GVAR model involves 14 economies, which contribute approximately to 80 percent 
of the worldˈs output.34 We estimate our model using monthly data covering the period 
2007:M06-2013:M06. The main sources for the data are International Finance Statistics (IFS), 
the OECD Statistics, and Bloomberg database as detailed in Appendices 3.A and 4.B. Given the 
importance to the scale of US economy in the world, the US is set as the reference economy with 
the US dollar as the reference currency.  
5.3.6 Model Testing 
Prior to proceed with the estimation of the specified GVAR, a number of tests must be performed 
to ensure the validity of the results. This section presents the results of weak exogenity, parameter 
                                                     
33 As noted before, it is not required that all the country-specific VARX models include the same number of variables 
where data is not available. In our model, due to the data limitation for long-term interest rate and equity price in 
China, these two variables have been excluded from the VARX model for China. 
34 The economies covered by our study include Australia, Canada, China, Japan, the UK, the US, and the Euro Area. 
The Euro Area economies include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, and Spain. The 
rationale for excluding some countries from the Euro Area is similar to that of Dees et al. (2007) justifying that 
building up a model as a benchmark for policy analysis required the omission of those countries facing instability or 
which are small in terms of economic scale. 
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stability, and unit root tests. We start by performing unit root tests to determine the order of 
integration of both the endogenous and exogenous variables. Tables 5.A.2 and 5.A.3 present the 
results of unit root tests using the weighted symmetric estimation of Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(WS-ADF) statistics for the levels and the first differences of variables. The results confirm that 
all domestic and foreign variables are stationary in their first difference. The results of unit root 
show that all variables are )1(I  across all countries allowing the use of standard co-integration 
and Error Correction Model (ECM) estimation. Thus, we use the level series for both endogenous 
and our weakly exogenous variables in the country-specific models.  
Next, we estimate country-specific co-integrating VAR models and determine the rank of 
the co-integrating relations. Table 5.A.4 presents the results. The lag order for the domestic 
variables are determined based on the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). For foreign variables, 
the lag order is set to unity due to the data limitation.35  
Finally, according to the literature on the GVAR modelling, the weak exogeneity of the 
country-specific foreign variables is a key assumption for estimating the individual VARX. Table 
5.2 presents the results of the weak exogenity tests. According to the results, with the exception 
of Australian inflation, all other variables are weakly exogenouce within the country-specific 
VARX models. Furthermore, the foreign bond yield spread,
*
itbys , foreign government debt 
ratio, 
*
itgdr , and foreign broad money,
*
2itM , are not expected to affect the US economy 
substantially. Thus, they are not considered as weakly exogenous within the US model.    
  
                                                     
35 Note that as Dees et al. (2007) explain, it is not possible to determine more than two lags for both the domestic 
and foreign variables.  
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Table 5. 2. Weak Exogeneity Test  
Country F test C 
Value 
*
ity  
*
it  
*
iteq  
*
itbys  
*
2itM  
*
itgdr  
oil
tp  
mat
tp  
metal
tp  
Australia F(2,98) 3.10 0.41 4.26* 0.38 0.51 0.88 1.08 1.62 1.13 0.62 
Canada F(3,104) 2.70 1.29 1.48 0.56 2.03 0.62 2.42 2.14 0.50 0.88 
China F(2,106) 3.10 0.21 1.42 0.80 1.73 0.69 0.69 1.07 0.28 0.55 
Euro Area F(2,98) 3.10 1.81 0.85 0.09 0.65 0.34 1.34 0.12 0.03 2.70 
Japan F(2,98) 3.10 1.03 0.03 0.55 0.48 0.76 0.96 1.51 2.05 1.53 
UK F(2,105) 3.10 2.72 0.54 1.30 0.92 0.38 1.38 0.62 2.40 2.29 
US F(2,102) 3.10 1.72 1.80 0.63 NA NA NA 0.65 2.48 1.25 
Note: The null hypothesis is weak exogeneity; hence, failing to reject of the null implies that weak exogeneity is 
held. The results are presented at 95% confidence level. An asterisk,*, indicates that weak exogeneity assumption 
cannot be held for those variables/country. NA indicates the variables that are not involved in the VARX model as 
weakly exogenous. 
 
Now we continue to perform another important test to validate the estimated GVAR model 
that is parameter stability. To ensure the estimated parameters within the GVAR model are 
stable, the same procedure as Chapter 4 details is followed to perform the parameter stability test 
of Nyblom (1989). Table 5.3 presents the results for the computed Nyblom parameter stability 
test. The critical values of the tests are calculated based on the sieve bootstrap samples obtained 
from the solution of the GVAR model.  
According to the Nyblom test results, all the parameters are stable in their robust version 
with the exception of UK bond yield spread. Note that there is a few number of parameter 
instability according to Nyblom statistics that includes Euro Area exchange rate and inflation, 
and US bond yield spread. It is worth noting that given the limitation of the GVAR methodology, 
we cannot completely rule out the potential parameter instability among the estimated variables.  
Taking into account some potential parameter changes associated with policy shocks, our 
study, however, is concerned with past parameter variations and implicitly assumes that the 
policy intervention has no independent effects on parameter values, see Pesaran and Smith 
(2012). Nevertheless, to take cautious, we follow Dees et al. (2007) to use both the bootstrap 
means and confidence bounds rather than point estimate results.   
230 
 
Table 5. 3. Nyblom Parameter Stability Tests 
LM Statistic 
Real 
Output 
Inflation 
Bond 
Yields 
Spread 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
Real 
Equity 
Prices 
Broad 
Money 
Government 
Debt-to-
GDP 
Nyblom -US 
3.56* 2.60* 5.33 NA 2.70* 3.34* 1.76* 
(3.70) (3.33) (3.52) NA (3.36) (3.38) (2.78) 
Robust Nyblom -US 
3.19* 2.50* 3.03* NA 2.86* 3.12* 2.31* 
(3.59) (3.18) (3.82) NA (3.74) (3.28) (3.22) 
Nyblom -China 
2.67* 2.20* NA 2.47* NA 2.34* 2.34* 
(3.58) (3.53) NA (3.82) NA (3.86) (2.86) 
Robust Nyblom -China 
2.94* 3.67* NA 4.20* NA 3.51* 3.51* 
(3.93) (4.11) NA (4.21) NA (4.60) (3.60) 
Nyblom - Euro Area 
2.96* 8.62 3.39* 2.63* 5.26 2.63* 2.39* 
(3.78) (3.49) (3.94) (3.72) (4.20) (4.08) (3.65) 
Robust Nyblom- Euro Area 
3.78* 3.83* 3.60* 3.48* 3.45* 4.29* 3.58* 
(4.18) (4.10) (4.24) (4.35) (4.33) (4.43) (4.11) 
Nyblom-UK 
3.16* 2.10* 2.93* 3.50* 2.66* 3.20* 2.95* 
(3.62) (4.25) (3.85) (3.83) (3.71) (3.41) (3.63) 
Robust Nyblom-UK 
3.50* 2.52* 4.69 3.26* 2.90* 3.73* 2.80* 
(4.62) (4.38) (4.43) (4.51) (4.37) (3.92) (3.99) 
Note: The null hypothesis is parameter stability; hence, failing to reject of the null implies parameter stability over the 
sample. An asterisk, *, indicates parameter stability for those variables/countries. Critical Values at the 95% significance 
level are presented in the parentheses. NA are either indicating variables for the reference country, i.e. the US, or due to 
data limitation, i.e. China. The robust Nyblom denotes the heteroskedasticity-robust version of the test. LM statistics 
abbreviates the Lagrange Multiplier.  
 
5.3.7 Average Pair-Wise Cross-Section Correlation 
This section investigates whether there is a Common Global Factor among countries within the 
estimated GVAR model. Having considered that all country-specific VARX models are estimated 
conditional upon the weak exogeneity of foreign variables, it implies that
 NwithuX itit ,0),cov(
*
. This allows the foreign variables to be considered as proxies of the 
common global factors, see Pesaran et al. (2004), and Dees et al. (2007). When the degree of 
correlation of the remaining shocks across countries is small, it suggests that there are 
interdependencies among the residuals. As Dees et al. (2007) explain it could be interpreted as a 
sign implying that the estimated model captures the effects of policy shocks.  
Table 5.4 presents the result of average pair-wise cross-sectional correlation of the 
variables. The results are reported for levels and the first differences of the endogenous variables 
together with those of the *VARX residuals.  
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Table 5. 4. Average Pair-Wise Cross-Section Correlations 
Country Real Output  Inflation 
 Levels First Difference VARX Residuals  Levels First Difference VARX Residuals 
Australia 0.98 0.25 0.02  0.70 0.39 -0.01 
Canada 0.98 0.33 -0.07  0.76 0.44 -0.02 
China 0.97 0.13 -0.1  0.38 0.30 -0.13 
Euro Area 0.98 0.33 -0.03  0.79 0.58 -0.07 
Japan 0.93 0.22 -0.05  0.77 0.47 -0.03 
UK 0.98 0.37 -0.01  0.77 0.43 -0.03 
US 0.98 0.37 -0.10  0.79 0.50 -0.11 
        
Country Bond yield Spread  Real Equity Price 
 
Levels First Difference VARX Residuals  Levels First Difference VARX Residuals 
Australia 0.79 0.67 -0.02   0.34 0.22 0.02 
Canada 0.74 0.73 -0.04   0.40 0.18 -0.01 
China NA NA NA  -0.19 -0.14 -0.09 
Euro Area 0.84 0.72 -0.22   0.26 0.25 0.00 
Japan 0.32 0.55 -0.17   0.18 0.12 0.00 
UK 0.82 0.74 -0.04   0.43 0.19 -0.09 
US 0.81 0.74 -0.16   0.28 0.22 0.03 
        
Country Real Exchange Rate   Broad Money 
 Levels First Difference VARX Residuals  Levels First Difference VARX Residuals 
Australia  0.40 0.38 0.06  -0.02 0.00 0.03 
Canada  0.45 0.35 0.05   0.08 0.06 0.01 
China -0.01 0.10 -0.14  -0.05 -0.03 0.03 
Euro Area  0.42 0.42 -0.03  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Japan -0.11 0.18 -0.07  -0.07 -0.09 -0.03 
UK  0.38 0.42 -0.06   0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
US  NA NA NA  -0.02 0.03 0.02 
Note: The results present average correlation between domestic and their corresponding foreign variables among 
countries of interest. The VARX residuals are computed based on country-specific models included the foreign-
specified variables. NA for the exchange rate in the US is due to denominating all countriesˈ currencies to the US 
dollar, and for long-term interest rate in China is due to data limitation.  
 
Typically, the average cross-section correlations are high in the level of the endogenous 
variables and low in their first differences, see Dees et al. (2007). According to the results, the 
real output shows the highest degree of cross correlation ranging between 93-98 percent for the 
countries of interest. This implies that any changes in output of each country may influence other 
countries output as well. As regards inflation, with China being the only exception, there is a 
moderate degree of correlation ranging between 70-79 percent. 
In addition, we can see a considerable degree of cross-correlation of around 74-84 percent 
for bond yield spread, with Japan being the exception. This indicates that a policy-induced 
changes in each countryˈs spread can impact bond yield spread within the other economies of 
interest. As regards the real equality price cross-correlation, the results suggest a low degree of 
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correlation across countries. A modest degree of cross-correlation, also, can be observed for the 
real exchange rate among the countries. Finally, for broad money, as Table 5.5 presents, we can 
see a very low degree of cross-correlation.  
The cross-section correlation of the variables in their first difference, however, is quiet 
small compared with level of the variables suggests a limited cross-correlation between variables 
in their first differences. For example, the average cross-section correlations of output fall from 
93-98 percent to13-37 percent by moving from level to the first differences. In general, our result 
is consistent with those of Dees et al. (2007) which can indicate that our constructed GVAR 
specification is accurate.   
It can be inferred from the results that there is a significant cross-correlation among the 
key policy indicator variables in our constructed GVAR model, although its extent varies among 
variables. Turning to the cross-section correlation of the residuals from the *VARX models, we 
can observe that the cross-correlations are very small due to the residual independencies. As 
Dees et al. (2007) explain this confirms that the model effectively can capture the global trends 
and spillover effects among variables and across countries.  
5.3.8 Contemporaneous Effects of Foreign Variables  
Having examined the cross-correlation among variables, now we continue to discuss the 
contemporaneous effect of the foreign variables on their counterparts. Table 5.5 presents the 
results together with their robust t-ratio values. These results indicate impact elasticity between 
the domestic and foreign variables.  
We can see that most of the values are significant with a positive sign. The exceptions are 
inflation for Japan, and broad money and government debt for China. These results are 
informative as regards the cross-countries linkages. For example, a one percent change in the 
other countriesˈ weighted output can increase US output around of half percent. We can see that 
Chinaˈs output has the least output elasticity among countries while those of the UK show the 
highest amount.  
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Table 5. 5. Contemporaneous Effects of Foreign Variables on their Domestic Counterparts 
Country Real output Inflation 
Real 
Equity 
Price 
Bond Yield 
Spread 
Broad 
Money 
Government 
Debt-to-
GDP 
Australia 0.53* 0.62* 0.83* 0.93* 0.24* 0.25* 
  (2.18) (3.54) (6.78) (4.50) (4.97) 
(2.87) 
 
Canada 0.61* 0.67* 0.95* 0.78* 0.36* 0.28* 
  (4.39) (7.04) (18.1) (17.57) (7.04) 
(3.95) 
 
China 0.33* 0.62* NA NA 0.13 0.15 
  (3.71) (2.66) NA NA (1.06)  (0.07) 
Euro Area 0.42* 0.65* 1.04* 0.76* 0.27* 0.22* 
  (3.6) (5.70) (8.46) (6.61) (3.57) 
(2.70) 
 
Japan 0.40* -0.01 0.73* 0.52* 0.17* 0.23* 
  (2.18) (-0.18) (6.08) (4.84) (2.11) 
(2.95) 
 
UK 0.74* 0.79* 0.85* 0.76* 0.26* 0.31* 
  (4.11) (5.50) (15.12) (4.55) (3.16) 
(3.39) 
 
US 0.54* 0.88* NA NA NA  NA 
 (4.39) (6.77) NA NA  NA  NA 
Note: The robust t-ratio values are presented in parentheses computed using Whiteˈs heteroscedasticity-consistent 
variance estimator. An asterisk, *, indicates that the result is statistically significant. NA for the US indicate variables 
that are not involved in the VARX model as weakly exogenous. For China, NA is due to data limitation for long-
term interest rate and equity prices.   
The highest elasticity can be observed for the real equity prices whereby the domestic 
counterpart variables react more than proportionally to the foreign variables that is above one in 
the case of the Euro Area. Our results are similar to those reported in Dees et al. (2007). They 
interpret this finding as an indication that the Euro Area stock markets is slightly overreacting to 
foreign stock price changes. We can also observe relatively strong elasticity between bond yields 
spread across counties while the elasticity is rather weak for broad money and government debt, 
see Table 5.5.  
Up to this point, we explain the construction of our GVAR model and perform the 
preliminary test to validate the model. In the next section, we proceed to the dynamic analysis of 
the model.   
5.3.9 The GIRF Results of US Bond Yield Spread Shock 
As noted in Chapter 2, the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRF) is an alternative to 
the Orthogonal Impulse Responses (OIR) to study the effects of different policy experiments. 
The concepts of orthogonality in impulse responses is discussed in Chapter 4. It must be 
emphasized that OIR guarantees that different shocks are uncorrelated implying that their 
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corresponding covariance matrix is zero.  Thus, it is possible to examine the impact of different 
shocks to the model, simultaneously. Furthermore, the OIR is sensitive to the ordering of the 
variables in the VAR. However, the GIRF approach imposes shocks to individual errors and 
filters out the effect of other shocks using the observed distribution of all shocks. It is also 
invariant to the ordering of the variables and countries in the GVAR model, which clearly is an 
advantage even if we had a theory-driven ordering of the variables, see Pesarn and Smith (2006), 
and Dees et al. (2007). These two unique properties of the GIRFs make it much suitable to deal 
with identification problems concerning VAR models. We follow the same procedure to estimate 
the GIRFs as addressed in Chapter 4.  
Now we can proceed to examining the international macroeconomic impact of US-UMP. 
It is expected that an expansionary UMP in the form of asset purchases program would lower 
return of the assets and increase broad money through signalling and the portfolio balance 
channels. The policyˈs target is to stimulate private expenditure by lowering borrowing costs and 
generating a positive wealth effect, see Baumeister and Benati (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), 
Joyce et al. (2011,2012), and Kapetanios et al. (2012), and Pesaran and Smith (2012). To assess 
the impact of US-UMP, we consider two policy experiments: (i) a fall in US bond yield spread, 
and (ii) an increase in US broad money.        
We first present the macroeconomic impact of a fall in US bond yield spread and its 
potential international spillovers. Figure 5.3 presents the GIRFs to a one standard error fall in the 
bond yield spread within the GVAR model. We can see that a fall in the spread induces US output 
to increase by 0.2 percent that sharply returns to zero. The response is statistically significant 
only for a short while. In addition, the policy shock increases US inflation at around 0.1 percent 
at peak which becomes statistically significant over the first 4 months of the simulation period. 
The responses of both output and inflation are conventional and consistent with the literature. For 
example, see Gagnon et al. (2011), Baumeister and Benati (2013), and Gambacorta et al. (2014).  
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Figure 5. 3. The GIRFs to a fall in the US Bond Yield Spread  
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Notes: This Figure provides GIRFs of the GVAR specified-variables after a one standard error fall in US bond yield 
spread over the monthly observations spans 2007:M06-2013:M06. The solid lines present bootstrap mean estimates 
with the dotted lines presenting 90% bootstrap error bands. The scale on the horizontal axis measures the number 
of months after the initial shock.   
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Their simulation result for the US economy suggest that in the absence of UMP,  real output 
would have been 0.75-2.4 percent lower and economy would have faced deflation. Comparing 
our results with those of Baumeister and Benati (2010), our model suggests less expansionary 
effect for US output. It could be due to the fact that our GVAR model captures the international 
spillovers of US-UMP.     
Furthermore, this policy-induced fall in the spread by -0.1 percent appears to be persistent. 
As regards the response of broad money, the GIRFs suggests that the policy shock increases 
broad money by around 0.5 percent, which is statistically significant over the period. This is an 
important finding. Having considered that a policy-induced reduction in the spread caused broad 
money to increase, it may indicate that the policy is transmitted through portfolio balance channel 
as the asset holders rebalance their portfolio. This also implies that US expansionary UMP, in 
the form of LSAP that would cause the spread to fall, can raise broad money leading to an 
expansion in the size of balance sheet. 
As regards the impact of US-UMP on the asset prices, Figure 5.3 illustrates that real equity 
prices increases by one percent in average, although the response is significant for a short while. 
This finding also can account for portfolio balance as the transmission channel. It suggests that a 
policy-induced fall in the spread is associated with an increase in equity prices implying that US 
UMP may improve asset trading, hence, inducing an increase in the price of equities. This 
portfolio rebalancing, in turn, would generate a positive wealth effect increasing aggregate 
demand.  
Note that, prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the impact of the short-term rates on equity 
prices was widely acknowledged, see Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), and Gurkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson (2005). As noted in Chen et al. (2012), and Kiley (2013), the negative correlation 
between the spread and the equity prices caused by an expansionary UMP may validate portfolio 
balance as the monetary transmission channel. Finally, as can be seen, government debt-to-GDP 
increases in response to this policy shock, by 0.5 percent, which is statistically significant over 
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the period. It may be due to either an increase in the interest share of public debt or the issuance 
of new government bonds to finance UMP program.   
Turning our focus to the international macroeconomic impact of a fall in US bond yield 
spread, Figure 5.3 illustrates its international spillovers. We can see that US-UMP has increased 
output in China, the Euro Area, and UK, which are statistically significant for a while. In 
addition, this policy shock increases inflation within both the Euro Area, and UK, although the 
responses are statistically insignificant.   
As regards Euro Area and UK bond yields spread, a fall in US spread causes a fall in their 
spread as well. This implies that bond yields spread are linked globally. Our results from the 
cross-section correlation indicate that bond yield spread are highly correlated among the 
countries. This finding is also consistent with the literature on the global interdependence of 
short-term and long-term interest rates, see Dees et al. (2007).  
We can also observe that US-UMP shock increases real equity prices within both the Euro 
Area and UK, although their responses are statistically significant only for a few months, see 
Figure 5.3. It implies that US unconventional monetary measures may generate international 
spillovers into equity markets in the Euro Area and UK. Thus, it can be argued that portfolio 
balance channel may be the international transmission channel of the policy. Finally, the GIRFs 
suggest that US-UMP shock has no significant impact on the real exchange rate and government 
debt in the economies of interest, see Figure 5.3.  
5.3.10 The GIRF Results of US Broad Money Shock  
An alternative approach to examine the macroeconomic impact of US-UMP is through a one 
standard error positive shock to broad money. This can be justified as UMP may contribute to 
an expansion in the size of Central Bank balance sheet, particularly, an increase in liabilities 
column of the balance sheet, see Woodford (2012).36  
                                                     
36 The increase in broad money assumption can be interpreted by agents as the Fed intention to continue with further 
asset purchases program until achieving the policy target.     
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Figure 5.4 presents the GIRFs results to this expansionary UMP shock. As illustrated, the 
policy succeeds to increase US output by 0.2 percent, which is statistically significant for a while. 
Comparing the response of output to a rise in broad money with those of a fall in the spread, it 
can be observed that a shock to US broad money seems to be more effective in stimulating the 
domestic economy. Inflation also increases in response to the policy by around of 0.05 percent, 
which is significant over the period. Thus, the GIRFs suggest that an increase in broad money 
can generate a more persistent increase in domestic inflation and output within the US economy. 
This finding is also reported in Gambacorta et al. (2014). Their finding suggest that US output 
and inflation are increased by 0.06 percent and 0.025 percent, respectively.                   
As regards the response of the spread, it can be seen that the policy induces a small reduction 
in the spread that sharply turns to be insignificant for the whole period. Furthermore, real equity 
prices increases in response to the shock by 2 percent, which is significant for a while. This again 
implies that US unconventional monetary measures may be transmitted through portfolio balance 
channel leading to an increase in output and inflation. Finally, the policy shock induces 
government debt to increase, though the response appears to be statistically insignificant.       
Turning to policy international spillovers, we can see that there is not a strong evidence of 
international spillovers. For example, output and inflation increase in China and the UK, 
however, the responses appears to be insignificant. For the Euro Area, Figure 5.4 shows that the 
policy shock has no impact on output and inflation. As GIRFs suggests, a policy-induced increase 
in US broad money is associated with an increase in broad money in China, the Euro Area, and 
UK that the responses turn to be significant. Furthermore, the policy shock induces real equity 
prices in the Euro Area and UK to increase which is significant for the UK. This finding may 
suggest that the portfolio balance can be the international transmission channel of the policy 
shock within the Euro Area and UK, however, the impulse responses of their bond yield spread 
does not make it a strong influence. Finally, government debt in China, the Euro Area, and UK 
increase in response to the shock, although, the responses appears to be insignificant.  
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Figure 5. 4. The GIRFs to a Rise in the US Broad Money  
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Notes: This Figure provides GIRFs of the GVAR specified-variables after a one standard error shock to US broad 
money over the monthly observations spans 2007:M06-2013:M06. The solid lines present bootstrap mean estimates 
with the dotted lines presenting 90% bootstrap error bands. The scale on the horizontal axis measures the number 
of months after the initial shock.   
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Table 5. 6. Comparing the Point Estimate Result for US-UMP  
 Policy Shock/Econometrics Approach US China Euro Area UK 
  at Peak 
 The Spread-FAVAR 0. 5* NA NA NA 
Output The Spread-GVAR 0.2* 0.02* 0.2* 0.2* 
 Broad Money-FAVAR 0.01* NA NA NA 
 Broad Money-GVAR 0.2* 0.15 0 0.1 
 The Spread-FAVAR 0. 5* NA NA NA 
Inflation The Spread-GVAR 0.1* 0 0.02 0.05 
 Broad Money-FAVAR 0.01* NA NA NA 
 Broad Money-GVAR 0.05* 0.1 0.01 0.02 
Note: The Table presents the point estimate results of a one standard error fall in US bond yields spread together 
with those of a one standard error increase in US broad money. Values are presented in percentage. An asterisk,*, 
superscripts indicates that the results are statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.6 compares the point estimate outcome of a policy-induced fall in the spread with 
those of an increase in broad money within both the FAVAR and the GVAR models. As reported 
in the Table, it seems that US-UMP, proxied by both a fall in the spread and an increase in broad 
money, can stimulate the US economy. However, the GIRFs suggest that changes in the spread 
is a more effective way to generate international spillovers within China, the Euro Area, and UK, 
while an increase in broad money is more effective to improve the US economy, see Table 5.6. 
Given that the bond yield spreads are correlated across countries, a fall in US spread can cause 
the spread to fall in the economies covered in our analysis. This in turns may stimulate their 
economies through portfolio balance channel.     
In contrast, the impact of US-UMP in the form of an increase in broad money tends to 
significantly improve US output with weak international spillovers to the selected economies. 
Overall, our estimated GIRFs suggests that US-UMP can stimulate the US economy and generate 
international spillovers to China, the Euro Area, and UK. Our results are consistent with the 
empirical literature on the effectiveness of US unconventional monetary measures.  For example, 
Baumeister and Benati (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), Gambacorta et al. (2014), and Wu and Xia 
(2014) find that UMP has been effective to increase US output and inflation. However, we find 
less expansionary effect for US-UMP compared with the literature. This finding is also reported 
in Pesaran and Smith (2012). They examine UK-UMP and find that including foreign output can 
reduce the expansionary effects of the policy due to the potential international spillovers.               
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5.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter explores the domestic and international impact of US expansionary UMP using the 
FAVAR and GVAR methods. The study pursues two objectives. First, to examine the way that 
an expansionary Unconventional Monetary Policy may influence the US economy. Second, to 
investigate whether and by which means US Unconventional Monetary Policy can generate 
international spillovers to other economies. Despite the growing literature on the macroeconomic 
impact of UMP, there is little empirical literature with the focus on the policy outcome in a global 
framework.  
Given our motivation, we first construct a FAVAR model to account for the domestic 
impact of US-UMP shocks. Then we construct a GVAR model that connects all the country-
specific models by bilateral trade and allows a large degree of interdependencies among the 
economies. This enables our investigation to capture the international spillover of US 
expansionary UMP. We model US-UMP shocks using two methods: a fall in the bond yield 
spread, and an increase in broad money. Our overall results from both the FAVAR and GVAR 
model suggest that US-UMP has significant domestic and international spillover effects on the 
macro and financial variables.     
Having examined impulse responses, a number of features emerge, although qualitatively 
the IRFs to US-UMP shocks are very similar to those of GIRFs. First, the results from our 
FAVAR model suggest that US expansionary UMP has a significant domestic impact on the 
economy increasing output and inflation. The impulse responses from a fall in the US spread 
seems to generate more inflationary impact on the US economy compared with those of an 
increase in US broad money. Second, the results within the GVAR model suggest that both 
output and bond yield spread are highly correlated across countries, while the correlation for real 
equity prices are relatively modest. This finding is consistent with those of Dees et al. (2007). 
We also find that there is a negative correlation between the spread and the equity prices, which 
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validates portfolio balance as the transmission channel. In addition, bond yield spread are 
globally linked between the US, Euro Area, and UK.  
As regards the impulse responses to policy shocks, within the GVAR model, we find that a 
fall in US spread may generate strong international spillovers. The presented results also show 
that this expansionary UMP contribute to increasing output and prices both in the US economy 
and within the Euro Area and UK. In addition, a fall in US spread is associated with a fall in the 
spread within both the Euro Area and UK, while the real equity prices increased. This finding 
suggests that the policy shock is transmitted through portfolio balance channel.  
Third, our results within the GVAR model are robust to a policy-induced increase in US 
broad money as this UMP shock can also significantly increase the output within the US 
economy and generate international spillovers to the Euro Area and UK. In addition, the increase 
in real equity prices within both the Euro Area and UK indicates that the portfolio balance is the 
international transmission channel for this policy shock. Fourth, Comparing the GIRFs of UMP 
shocks suggest that changes in the bond yield spread are more effective in generating 
international spillovers within the Euro Area and UK, while an increase in broad money is more 
effective in improving the US economy.  
Finally, our results suggest that US-UMP may be transmitted through the portfolio balance 
channel both in the domestic and international levels, given that the policy shocks cause a 
reduction in the spread while the real equity prices increased. This is consistent with the finding 
reported in Joyce et al. (2011, 2012) who identify portfolio balance as the main transmission 
channel.  
Our results are generally consistent with those presented in Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et 
al. (2011, 2012), Kapetanios et al. (2012), Baumeister and Benati (2013), Gambacorta et al. 
(2014), and Wu and Xia (2014). However, our finding suggests slightly less expansionary effect 
generated by the policy shocks compared with the literature. It might be due to our approach, 
which focus on the crisis period. Also, it can be justified as our GVAR model allows for potential 
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international spillovers of the policy interventions. This finding also is reported in Pesaran and 
Smith (2012). Their model includes foreign output growth to investigate the effectiveness of UK 
UMP. They argue that the comparison of the results from a simple model with those of foreign 
output-augmented one, indicates that including foreign variables can reduce the expansionary 
effect of UMP shock.  
It is worth noting that our empirical results only allow limited conclusion given the 
limitation of the applied econometrics approaches. Further research is required to examine the 
macroeconomic impact of policy, which allows alternative potential channels for transmission 
of UMP. It can also enhance our results if we can discriminate between temporary and permanent 
shocks. Another avenue for further research in line with our study is that to evaluate the 
effectiveness of UMP with Conditional Modelling techniques that allows counterfactual analysis 
as in Pesaran and Smith (2012). Furthermore, although, the models used in this study are the 
variants of VAR models that capture different aspects of the overall evolution in macroeconomic 
variables, a structural DSGE-type model may provide some further insights.  
. 
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Appendix 5.A 
Table 5.A.1. Trade Weights Matrix 
Country Australia Canada China Euro Area Japan UK US 
Australia 0.000 0.005 0.053 0.028 0.079 0.018 0.019 
Canada 0.018 0.000 0.039 0.037 0.034 0.030 0.328 
China 0.301 0.063 0.000 0.222 0.380 0.076 0.224 
Euro Area 0.179 0.067 0.283 0.000 0.176 0.676 0.244 
Japan 0.274 0.033 0.235 0.087 0.000 0.033 0.120 
UK 0.062 0.029 0.045 0.326 0.032 0.000 0.065 
US 0.166 0.803 0.344 0.300 0.299 0.166 0.000 
Note: Trade weights are calculated based on dividing the share of bilateral trade between countries i and j, over the total 
amount of foreign trade of country i, using the IMF databases for Bilateral Trade.  The sample spans 2007-2013.  
 
 
Table 5.A.2. Unit Root Test for the Domestic Variables  
Variable 
WS 
Statistic 
Australia Canada China Euro Area Japan UK US 
ity  (trend) -3.24 -2.702 -2.254 -2.009 -1.924 -0.648 -2.391 -1.595 
ity  (de-trended) -2.55 1.551 0.692 0.239 0.761 0.633 -0.631 0.195 
ity  -2.55 -6.407* -5.097* -3.444* -4.882* -4.433* -3.020* -4.189* 
it  (trend) -3.24 -2.209 -1.924 -2.991 -0.899 -1.356 -1.459 -1.783 
it  (de-trended) -2.55 -2.299 -2.004 -3.020 -0.991 -1.326 -1.447 -1.786 
it  -2.55 -11.069* -9.732* -6.437* -8.238* -9.547* -6.634* -9.868* 
itep  (trend) -3.24 -0.841 -1.150 0.093 -1.631 -2.467 -2.252 NA 
itep  (de-trended) -2.55 -1.306 -1.053 0.713 -1.680 -0.390 -1.854 NA 
itep  -2.55 -7.795* -7.721* -7.020* -5.138* -5.082* -8.208* NA 
iteq  (trend) -3.24 -3.206 -2.663 NA -2.259 -1.737 -1.571 -1.879 
iteq  (de-trended) -2.55 -1.234 -0.842 NA -0.919 -1.656 -0.242 -0.360 
iteq  -2.55 -7.328* -7.239* NA -6.986* -5.101* -7.62* -6.443* 
itbys  (trend) -3.24 -3.156 -3.014 NA -3.047 -2.596 -3.060 -2.703 
itbys  (de-trended) -2.55 -2.048 -0.670 NA -1.081 -1.010 -0.411 -0.057 
itbys  -2.55 -7.425* -6.344* NA -5.858* -5.343* -7.032* -4.281* 
itM 2  (trend) -3.24 -1.682 -1.187 0.009 -2.758 -0.145 -1.449 -1.887 
itM 2  (de-trended) -2.55 -1.281 -1.256 -0.065 -2.048 0.088 -0.470 -1.814 
itM 2  -2.55 -7.746* -6.173* -8.118* -8.054* -7.138* -6.94* -6.832* 
itgdr  (trend) -3.24 -3.02 -1.77 -2.34 -3.12 -1.51 -2.50 -2.42 
itgdr  (de-trended) -2.55 -2.05 -1.31 0.75 -0.40 0.20 -2.22 -1.36 
itgdr  -2.55 -3.29* -2.99* -2.81* -3.38* -3.28* -3.09* -2.80* 
Note: Unit Root t-statistics is reported based on Weighted Symmetric estimation of ADF (WS) type regressions due to its 
superior performance compared to the standard ADF test as it exploits the time reversibility of stationary autoregressive 
processes. The lag length employed in the WS unit root tests is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). An asterisk 
,*, indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 5% significance level. The blank spaces are either due to 
setting as reference country, i.e. the US, or data limitation, i.e. China. All the statistics are computed over the sample 2007:M06-
2013:M06. 
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Table 5.A.3. Unit Root Test for the Foreign Variables  
Variable 
WS 
Statistic 
Australia Canada China Euro Area Japan UK US 
*
ity  (trend) -3.24 -2.736 -1.729 -1.263 -3.053 -3.105 -1.816 -2.831 
*
ity  (de-trended) -2.55 1.287 0.230 0.477 0.723 -0.025 0.767 0.958 
*
ity  -2.55 -3.952* -4.523* -4.529* -4.541* -3.433* -4.897* -5.392* 
*
it  (trend) -3.24 -1.772 -1.987 -0.924 -1.783 -3.189 -1.043 -1.570 
*
it  (de-trended) -2.55 -2.064 -1.996 -1.650 -2.056 -2.204 -1.119 -1.653 
*
it  -2.55 -6.433* -9.237* -6.115* -6.600* -6.541* -6.155* -6.243* 
*
itep  (trend) -3.24 -0.452 -0.300 -2.340 -0.417 0.486 -1.298 NA 
*
itep  (de-trended) -2.55 -0.346 0.045 -1.508 0.198 0.829 -1.312 NA 
*
itep  -2.55 -7.654* -7.373* -5.178* -7.865* -6.896* -5.162* NA 
*
iteq  (trend) -3.24 -1.874 -1.886 -2.046 -1.874 -2.150 -2.208 -2.906 
*
iteq  (de-trended) -2.55 -0.858 -0.387 -0.721 -0.409 -0.569 -0.796 -0.963 
*
iteq  -2.55 -7.041* -6.550* -6.953* -7.041* -6.837* -6.937* -7.224* 
*
itbys  (trend) -3.24 -3.050 -3.009 -3.034 -2.391 -3.019 -3.013 -3.051 
*
itbys  (de-trended) -2.55 -0.835 0.046 -0.151 -0.778 -0.832 -0.680 -0.737 
*
itbys  -2.55 -4.409* -4.324* -5.162* -5.185* -5.047* -5.268* -4.961* 
*
2itM  (trend) -3.24 -1.709 -2.418 -2.728 -1.149 -1.879 -2.729 -1.653 
*
2itM  (de-trended) -2.55 -0.883 -1.649 -1.698 -0.399 -1.005 -1.911 -1.104 
*
2itM  -2.55 -8.214* -7.807* -8.078* -7.781* -8.186* -8.085* -8.124* 
*
itgdr  (trend) -3.24 -1.35 -2.39 -3.00 -2.19 -1.91 -3.04 -2.96 
*
itgdr  (de-trended) -2.55 1.20 -0.64 0.93 0.79 0.37 0.13 0.55 
*
itgdr  -2.55 -2.69* -2.70* -2.93* -3.27* -3.02* -3.13* -2.73* 
Note: Unit Root t-statistics is reported based on Weighted Symmetric estimation of ADF (WS) type regressions due to its superior 
performance compared to the standard ADF test as it exploits the time reversibility of stationary autoregressive processes. The lag 
length employed in the WS unit root tests is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). An asterisk,*, indicates the rejection 
of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 5% significance level. All the statistics are computed over the sample 2007:M06-2013:M06. 
 
 
Table 5.A.4. Lag Order and Number of Co-Integrating Relationships for VARX Models 
Country 
VARX Order of Individual Models 
   ip                                iq  
Co-integrating Relations 
Australia 2 1 2 
Canada 2 1 3 
China 2 1 2 
Euro Area 2 1 2 
Japan 2 1 2 
UK 2 1 2 
US 2 1 2 
Note: This Table presents the lag order of domestic, pi, and foreign, qi, variables in order. The rank of the co-integrating 
relations is estimated using Johansen`s trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics for models with weakly exogenous 
regressors, in the case where unrestricted constant and restricted trend coefficients are included in the country-specific 
Error Correction Models (ECM). The Co-Integration results are based on the trace statistic and significant at 95% critical 
value level.  
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Chapter 6 
Concluding Remarks 
This thesis sheds light on topical issues relating to the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy.  
Two features of the macroeconomic policies received less attention despite being central to the 
impact of the policy actions. First, monetary and fiscal policy interacts and influences the real 
activity measures jointly. A number of studies emphasize that separating monetary and fiscal 
policies undermines policy interactions that are important for the determination of prices, see 
Davig and Leeper (2007,2011), Sims (2011), and Woodford (2011). Second, monetary and fiscal 
policy interactions may have important international spillovers that may influence or even 
weaken the domestic impact of the policy shocks, see Pesaran et al. (2004), Dees et al. (2007), 
Gali (2008), and Pesaran and Smith (2012). Indeed, adopting a global approach might be useful 
to uncover common dynamic relationship that might otherwise be ignored by idiosyncratic 
effects at the individual country level, see Pesaran and Smith (2006, 2011).  
Given our motivation, we examined thesis subject matter in three stand-alone empirical 
chapters. This Chapter summarise the main findings and elaborates on the shortcoming of our 
analysis to identify directions for further work as follows. 
6.1 Main Results and Contribution to the Literature 
Chapter 3 focused on the conduct of US monetary policy and its transmission mechanism in the 
presence of government debt over different time intervals. The study contributes to the empirical 
literature on monetary and fiscal policy interactions in three ways. First, we find that a monetary 
contraction in a linear FAVAR reduces output growth as expected. This is irrespective of whether 
the fiscal stance is included or not. However, while inflation falls in response to a monetary 
contraction within the simple model, it increases in the fiscal-augmented model. This response 
can be interpreted through the potential positive wealth effects generated by a monetary 
247 
 
contraction. Second, the impulse responses from a fiscal-augmented TVP-FAVAR model suggest 
that fiscal policy may contribute to producing a price puzzle. The price puzzle is more accentuated 
in the case of an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy. This is the case during the 
1970s. This influences the monetary transmission mechanism through generating a positive 
wealth effect and increasing consumption. 
The positive response of inflation and output growth to monetary contraction, which is more 
accentuated under active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy coordination, is consistent 
with the results presented in Favero and Monacelli (2003), Chung et al. (2007), Davig and Leeper 
(2007, 2011), Sims (2011), and Leeper and Walker (2012). Chung et al. (2007) argue that the 
price puzzle can be a normal outcome of periods when monetary policy fails to follow a Taylor 
Rule and taxes fail to respond to the state of debt. In addition, this result is consistent with 
Hansonˈs (2004) explanation of the price puzzle that it cannot be solved by the conventional 
method of adding extra information and it tends to be severe under an active fiscal policy and a 
passive monetary policy regime.  
Thirdly, the impulse responses within both the linear and TVP-FAVAR model 
specifications show that fiscal policy has an inflationary impact on the economy. This finding 
provides empirical support for the non-Ricardian view on US fiscal policy. That is an 
expansionary fiscal policy stimulates prices and output. This finding is consistent with the results 
reported in Favero and Monacelli (2003), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), and Reade (2011).  
In Chapter 4, we examined the international spillovers of US monetary contraction in the 
presence of government debt. We contribute to the literature on international spillovers of 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a number of ways. First, according to the estimated 
GVAR model, we find evidence that real output and long-term interest rates are highly correlated 
across major economies, while real exchange rates, short-term interest rates and inflation show 
a modest correlation. As regards the contemporaneous effects of foreign variables, empirical 
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evidence suggests that Euro Area bond market is more responsive than its monetary policy 
reactions. This finding is also reported in Dees et al. (2007). 
In addition, the impulse responses obtained from the estimated GVAR models suggest a 
number of features. First, we show that US government debt influences the duration of responses 
to a monetary contraction. Given the high level of US government debt, this finding seems to be 
plausible, as any changes in interest rates can significantly change the interest expenses share of 
government expenditure. Second, we find empirical evidence to support the non-Ricardian view 
on fiscal policy within the US economy. The results from a linear government debt-augmented 
GVAR model show that an expansionary fiscal policy shock may have significant domestic and 
international spillovers on real and financial variables. In particular, the results suggest that US 
expansionary fiscal policy shock influences real output and the bond markets in the Euro Area 
and UK. Third, according to the results of Persistence Profiles test, we provide evidence 
suggesting that US government debt reduces the speed of adjustment to equilibrium following a 
contractionary monetary policy shock. This may be due to the impact of fiscal policy on inflation 
and its persistence. 
In Chapter 5, we explored both the domestic and international impact of US Unconventional 
Monetary Policy (UMP). We adopted the FAVAR and GVAR methods as our policy analysis 
frameworks. Our results add further evidence to the empirical literature on UMP to support the 
effectiveness of US-UMP. Our contributions in this chapter are as follows. First, our results from 
a FAVAR model suggest that US expansionary UMP may have inflationary impact on the 
economy. Nevertheless, the impulse responses from a fall in the bond yield spread seems to 
generate more expansionary effect compared with those of an increase in broad money. Our 
finding overall is consistent with the literature on the effectiveness of US-UMP, see Baumeister 
and Benati (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), Gambacorta et al. (2014), and Wu and Xia (2014).    
Second, we show that a fall in US spread may generate strong international spillovers. Our 
results from a GVAR model suggest that US-UMP, in the form of a fall in the spread, contribute 
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to increasing output in US economy and within both the Euro Area and UK. In addition, a fall in 
US spread is associated with a fall in the spread within the Euro Area and UK, while the real 
equity prices increased. This finding suggests that the policy shock is transmitted through 
portfolio balance channel. Third, our results within the GVAR model are robust to a policy-
induced increase in broad money. We find that an increase in US broad money can significantly 
increase US output and generate international spillovers to the Euro Area and UK. In addition, 
the increase in real equity prices within both the Euro Area and UK indicates that the portfolio 
balance is the international transmission channel for this policy shock. This is consistent with the 
finding reported in Joyce et al. (2011, 2012) who identify portfolio balance as the main 
transmission channel.  
Finally, our results suggest that changes in the bond yield spread are more effective in 
generating international spillovers within the Euro Area and UK, while an increase in broad 
money is more effective in improving the US economy. Our results are generally consistent with 
the literature as presented in Baumeister and Benati (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. 
(2011, 2012), Kapetanios et al. (2012), Gambacorta et al. (2014), and Wu and Xia (2014). 
However, our finding suggests slightly less expansionary effect generated by the policy shocks 
compared with the literature. It might be due to our approach, which focus on the crisis period. 
In addition, it can be justified as our GVAR model allows for potential international spillovers of 
the policy interventions. This finding also is reported in Pesaran and Smith (2012). They argue 
that including foreign variables can reduce the expansionary effect of UMP shock.  
6.2 Policy Implications of the Research   
This section outlines some policy lessons that can be drawn from our empirical finding. Overall, 
our results have important implications for macroeconomic policy management and suggest that 
a reconsideration of certain popular approaches in measuring the impact of monetary policy is 
required. Clearly fiscal policy has important impact on the conduct of monetary policy, in 
particular for inflation and output. This is the case as inflation is the key variable that monetary 
250 
 
policy aims to control. However according to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, fiscal policy 
also can significantly influence prices. This implies that the monetary authorities can no longer 
ignore the fiscal stance. 
Thus, the central policy implication arises from our analysis counteracts the monetarist view 
that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. We find the opposite: monetary 
aggregates are not the main determinant of inflation. Fiscal policy may also play a substantial 
role in the determination of the price level, see Bradley (1984), Woodford (1998, 2011), Cochrane 
(2009), Favero and Monacelli (2003), Chung et al. (2007), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011), Sims 
(2011), Leeper and Walker (2012), and Leeper (2013).  
In addition, we find empirical evidence that price puzzle can be the outcome of active fiscal 
policy and passive monetary policy. It implies that an active fiscal policy may contradict the 
policy-targeted deflationary impact of monetary contraction. This has an important policy 
implication for the macroeconomic policy management. It suggests that the omission of the fiscal 
stance from models intended to evaluate monetary policy may produce implausible results. 
Furthermore, our results show that US government debt may reduce the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium following monetary policy shocks due to the impact of fiscal policy on inflation and 
its persistence. This finding also suggests that the monetary authorities should consider adopting 
econometrics model that explicitly account for the fiscal stance.            
Finally, we find that an increase in broad money is more effective to stimulate the domestic 
economy, while lowering the bond yield spread can generate more international spillovers. This 
implies that the monetary authorities should examine the use of unconventional monetary policy 
measures in a global framework that accounts for both the domestic and international impact of 
policy implementation.         
6.3 Limitations of the Study and Direction for Further Research   
Having outlined the main findings of our thesis, there are a number of caveats concerns our 
analysis. We note these limitations together with some directions for further research as follows. 
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First, our results from Chapter 3 are limited to the constructed FAVAR models, both the linear 
and non-linear model specifications, which only allow very limited scope of macroeconomic 
policy interactions to be traced. As concerns the results from the linear FAVAR model, it worth 
exploring the experiment within the Block of Factors framework as in Korobilis (2013). As 
regards the results obtained from the Time-Varying Parameter FAVAR model, our model does 
not explicitly allows for monetary and fiscal policy regime switching as in Davig and Leeper 
(2011). Thus, this experiment is left to future work. Finally, it may be useful to further investigate 
our research questions adopting a Time-Varying Factor loadings as in Del Negro and Otrok 
(2008).  
Second, we employ a linear GVAR model with constant parameters in Chapter 4. Given 
the existing evidence on significant macroeconomic regime changes over the past decades, it 
appears plausible to explore the research questions using a non-linear version of the GVAR. For 
example, the non-linear GVAR model as in Favero (2013) may account for different monetary 
and fiscal policy regimes to analyse global policy shocks. Adopting alternatives identification 
approaches for monetary and fiscal policy shocks also is left to future work.  
Third, as concerns the findings presented in Chapter 5, a few dimensions is emerged in line 
with this study is to discriminate between temporary and permanent shocks. It may be also useful 
to evaluate the effectiveness of UMP with Conditional Modelling techniques that allows 
counterfactual analysis as in Pesaran and Smith (2012). Furthermore, although, the models used 
in this study are the variants of VAR models that capture different aspects of the evolution in 
macroeconomic variables, a structural DSGE-type model could potentially provide some further 
insights.  
Finally, the usual caveats concerning the econometric specification, estimation and 
validation of our models apply. However, our use of state of the art econometric techniques 
hopefully minimizes the effects of such issues.                 
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